The Gathering Storm. Geirr Haarr
survivors from the boats.
The Polish refugee Isaac Stotland and his wife were rescued, but lost both their children when No. 8 lifeboat was crushed under the stern of Southern Cross. (Author’s collection)
The last boat to be taken care of was No. 14A lifeboat, with 105 people on board. This was the boat that Chief Officer Copland had transferred to and, coming on board the Electra, he climbed the bridge of the destroyer to be welcomed by Lieutenant Commander Buss. He also met the nurse of Athenia and, going through the list of survivors, they discovered that it was likely that a woman had been left in the sickbay of the liner. She had fallen down a ladder before the attack, suffering a concussion, and nobody could ascertain that she had been evacuated. Copland convinced Lieutenant Commander Buss he needed to go back and, with Electra moving close to the sinking liner, a boat was manned by sailors from the destroyer. Copland and two volunteers re-entered the sinking ship, found the woman in the sickbay and brought her on board the destroyer.16 Within minutes of their return to the destroyer, at 10:40, Athenia’s stern slipped beneath the surface, her bow rose towards the sky and she slipped quietly under.
Of the 1,417 aboard, 1,305 were rescued while 112 perished – ninety-three passengers and nineteen crew. Twenty-eight of the dead were American citizens. Southern Cross had picked up over 350 survivors, Knute Nelson around 450, Electra 200, Escort 300. The Norwegian freighter headed for Galway, the destroyers for Greenock on the Clyde.17
By 09:00, the American freighter City of Flint arrived at the scene. Few remained to be rescued, but in spite of the choppy sea a boat was lowered to pick up stragglers from some of the lifeboats bobbing around and to check that the others were empty. Thereafter 236 rescuees were transferred from the Southern Cross as she was not equipped to handle such a large number of additional people. Those rescued by Southern Cross and not wishing to continue to the USA, including all Athenia’s crewmembers, were taken on board the other ships. Ascertaining that there were no further people to be rescued from the now-empty lifeboats, Captain Gainard bid the Swedish yacht goodbye and set course for Halifax, where he arrived on 13 September. Southern Cross continued towards South America.18
Within twenty-four hours, news of the sinking echoed around the world. It had been the first day of the war and already it appeared that Germany had broken all the rules and introduced unrestricted submarine warfare. This was a propaganda gift to the British, who used it to its full extent and all merchant ships were encouraged to start reporting any U-boat on sight. On a practical note, the sinking of Athenia instantly removed any doubts in the Admiralty regarding the institution of the convoy system and instructions were issued forthwith towards its swift establishment.
In Germany, the news of the sinking of Athenia was received with disbelief and astonishment. The fear that the significant loss of American lives would draw the USA into the war was real, and an immediate statement from the OKW that ‘no German submarine was in the area at the time’ was issued in the early morning of the 4th, before any proper investigation had been carried out. Dönitz first learned of the sinking through the BBC in the morning of the 4th. It came as a surprise to him as the SKL was in the dark as to what had happened; the orders to follow the Prize Regulations to the letter were repeated by signal to all U-boats at 11:00. Hitler’s orders had been clear and it was difficult to believe they had been breached.19
Athenia survivors being landed at Glasgow by Knute Nelson. (Author’s collection)
Having reviewed the patrol zones of the U-boats in the Atlantic, Dönitz at midday concluded correctly that in all likelihood it had been Lemp in U30 that had sunk Athenia. By then, the US Embassy in Berlin had been informed by the German Foreign Office that no German U-boat had been involved in the sinking. Later, Raeder repeated the same statement to the American naval attaché: probably acting in good faith. The Propaganda Ministry of Josef Göbbels went one further and held that as no U-boats had been in the area, it must have been a British torpedo that had sunk the liner. Hitler was furious and another signal was sent from the SKL just before midnight: ‘By order of the Führer, no attacks are to be carried out on passenger liners, not even when in convoy.’20
Dönitz was waiting in the docks to hear Lemp’s account first-hand when he eventually returned to Wilhelmshaven on the 27th. He and his crew were sworn to absolute secrecy. They were not ever to mention anything at all to do with the incident. The war diary of Dönitz makes no mention of the incident and Lemp was ordered to falsify the war diary (Kriegstagebuch – KTB) of U30 by rewriting two complete pages.21 A court martial for Lemp was considered but decided against, as Dönitz was satisfied that he had ‘acted in good faith’. In all likelihood there was also a significant wish to avoid the public attention that a court martial would have created. Lemp had sunk three ships (including the Athenia), captured two British airmen, demonstrated control under attack and brought his boat home in spite of severe battle damage. To punish him for a mistaken identity would send the wrong signal to the rest of the U-boat force and Dönitz decided it would be best to sweep the whole thing under the carpet. It was never acknowledged during the war that the Athenia had been sunk by a U-boat.22
In Washington, President Roosevelt had already announced that his government was preparing ‘a declaration of American neutrality’ and, though serious, the Athenia affair would not change that.
— 8 —
Echoes
AT THE END OF WWI, the British Navy had developed a prototype for active underwater sonar-based submarine detection gear, the so-called Asdic.1 By 1923, the 6th Destroyer Flotilla operated several Asdic-equipped vessels on a regular basis. The following year, the Anti-Submarine Warfare School, HMS Osprey, was established at Weymouth and a training flotilla of four vessels set up at Portland.
Asdic works by sending a narrow, ultrasonic sound wave, created by an oscillator, through the water. When it strikes anything, including the hull of a submerged submarine, an echo is bounced back that can be picked up by a hydrophone in the A/S vessel. The transmitter and receiver were usually housed inside a dome fastened to the outside or lowered by an electric motor through an opening in the bottom of the ship’s hull. That was usually no problem at sea, but vulnerable to damage in shallow, coastal waters. On board, the echo was recorded as electrical impulses heard by the operator and displayed on a screen or as marks made by a stylus on a paper roll. The hydrophones of 1939 could determine the direction of the echo quite accurately. The distance to, and hence the depth of, the object giving the echo was not given, though.
The Asdic operator, sitting in a small cabin near the bridge of the A/S vessel, operated the equipment via a wheel, sweeping the Asdic beam around the ship, searching for echoes. Submerged submarines could be detected at a distance of up to 2,700 yards. So too would wrecks, schools of fish and anomalies in the water column, and it would take an experienced operator to know what he had in his beam. In reality, a U-boat had to be within 1,600 yards to be firmly ascertained, and even closer if it was end-on. When an echo was established, its bearing was forwarded to the captain via the Asdic officer in charge, including an estimated distance to the object based on the strength of the echo. If possible, positive or negative Doppler effect was added, indicating an increase or decrease in the frequency of the echo, signifying if the A/S vessel and the U-boat were closing or moving away from each other. By September 1939, four different Asdic sets for various types of surface vessels had been developed, as well as one for submarines. Some 180 vessels were fitted with Asdic. Of these, 150 were destroyers, twenty-four were sloops and six were other types of patrol vessels.2
A/S warfare was considered