The Gathering Storm. Geirr Haarr
for the situation.21 Later, a new ministerial appointment for the coordination of defence was also made to focus the efforts inside the cabinet.22
The possibility of a three-sided conflict with Germany in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean and Japan in the Far East emerged during the early 1930s, and the motivation of the Admiralty for the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935 was the wish to keep German naval rearmament at a qualitative level where it could be matched by the existing Home Fleet. By allowing the Kriegsmarine to aim for a ‘balanced fleet’, the treaty meant that Germany would have to spread its resources and build many types of ships rather than focusing on those most dangerous for Britain.
The Royal Navy was not the service that was in the worst state, but the situation was sinister. Capital ships were largely obsolete and even if light cruisers, destroyers and submarines were relatively modern, their numbers were insufficient. In July 1934, the cabinet approved a modest five-year programme to try to mend some of the deficiencies of the naval forces. A prioritised modernisation of battleships and cruisers commenced, but the refits would take time and the ships undergoing the upgrading would be out of commission for years. It was February 1936 before political agreement for a factual expansion programme of the armed forces was reached and an accelerated warship-building programme initiated. From £53.5 million in 1933, the naval budget increased to £127.2 million in 1938. A significant part of this had to be used for upgrades and modernisations, though, and only a slow increase in building could be envisaged. As a stopgap measure, some of the older capital ships were taken to the yards for modernisation: Warspite, Renown and Malaya first. Armament, armour, fire-control systems and machinery were prioritised, together with A/A and torpedo protection. The ships were virtually rebuilt and the process took years. Still, they were back in commission before the war. Valiant and Queen Elizabeth were not, and further upgrades, including that of Hood, were cancelled. The County-class cruisers were also upgraded before the war with additional armour and A/A armament.
Unexpectedly, the lack of shipyards, skilled labour and a high-tech naval industry turned out to be a major challenge, creating a growing dependence on foreign deliveries. High-quality steel was in such short supply that some of the new cruisers and carriers had to use Czechoslovak armour. Likewise, Swedish Bofors and Swiss Oerlikon A/A guns had to be imported as such weapons could not be manufactured in Britain. Most serious was the fact that an inferior fire-control system for the A/A guns was chosen, largely due to incompetence and inability of British engineering firms to manufacture the precision instruments needed in the superior systems.
Nevertheless, construction of new ships commenced, and it was projected that at the end of 1940 the Royal Navy would have 15 capital ships, 8 carriers, 70 cruisers, some 145 destroyers and 55 submarines. As things turned out, however, the newbuilds would largely replace the losses inflicted by the war, rather than increase the fleet.23
During the late 1930s, discussions within the Royal Navy arose as to where the main wartime anchorage for the Home Fleet should be: Rosyth or Scapa Flow. Many preferred the former, not least due to its less remote location. Eventually, during mid-1938, a decision was made in favour of the Orkneys, and during the Czech crisis in September 1938 the Home Fleet was assembled at Scapa Flow for the first time since 1919. It became instantly obvious that the anchorage was inadequately equipped and protected, vulnerable to both submarine and aircraft attacks. Hence, Loch Ewe, Clyde and Rosyth had to be used as well until adequate defences had been installed at Scapa Flow. This would take time, though, due to lack of priority and funds, and actual improvements at Scapa Flow between the Munich summit and the outbreak of the war were limited.24
In April 1938 Admiral Roger Backhouse was appointed First Sea Lord, and Admiral Charles Forbes took his place as C-in-C of the Home Fleet. Forbes (aged fifty-eight) was an experienced sailor, both in the staff role and on the bridge, who strongly disliked publicity. His flag lieutenant from his later days in command, Godfrey Style, described him as ‘always calm, always the same, and always correctly dressed’.25 In another subordinate’s view, he had ‘a fine brain and a tremendously powerful character’.26
Backhouse died less than a year after becoming First Sea Lord, and his successor was Admiral Alfred Dudley Pound (aged sixty-two), recalled from his post as C-in-C of the Mediterranean Fleet in June 1939. Pound was a very experienced admiral indeed, but by many was considered ‘rugged and undistinguished, solidly middle-class . . . with a mind untroubled by large strategic visions’.27 Not always good at detailing tasks to subordinates – or if he did, at trusting their assessments – Pound was to carry a heavy burden through the first part of the war. His capacity for work endeared him to Churchill and, after a rather cold start, a very special relationship developed between the two men. They were truly different in character, temper and competence but with an aligned belief in the Royal Navy as the senior service. Between Forbes and Pound, though, an unconstructive personal relationship developed that was to affect the Home Fleet’s operations in the first period of the war. Unlike the War Office and the Air Ministry, the Admiralty was an operational centre, and information was often available to the First Sea Lord before it reached the commanding officers at sea. This gave him an opportunity to interfere, which Pound often could not resist, to Forbes’ intense dislike.28
The Naval Staff met daily to review the previous twenty-four hours, consider reports and decide matters on which immediate action was necessary. In mid-1939, the deputy chief of the Naval Staff (DCNS) was Rear Admiral Tom Phillips. The Second Sea Lord, Admiral Charles Little, was responsible for all matters concerning personnel, while the Third Sea Lord or Controller, Rear Admiral Bruce Fraser, oversaw design and construction of warships, including machinery, weapons and equipment. Fourth Sea Lord Rear Admiral Geoffrey Arbuthnot dealt with the procurement and distribution of stores and supplies, including fuel, and Fifth Sea Lord, Vice Admiral Alexander Ramsay – replaced by Vice Admiral Guy Royle in November 1939 – was responsible for all aspects of naval aviation.29
Defence of the Fleet
During WWI, the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) developed from very small beginnings to a major service in its own right. Still, the navy to a large degree supported the establishment of an independent Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1918, accepting the argument that a single force would optimise aircraft and engine development and ensure effective operational control. An agreement was reached whereby the Royal Navy would operate the ships, while the RAF would provide the aircraft and the men to fly and service them, onboard or ashore. Maritime aviation was quickly sidelined within the RAF, however, creating a detrimental conflict between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry.
When Admiral Alfred Chatfield became First Sea Lord in 1933, he carried with him experience from the Mediterranean, where the carriers Glorious, Furious and Eagle had been part of his command. He lobbied extensively for an independent naval air force, arguing that such sophisticated services as operating and flying aircraft at sea needed dedicated involvement. Eventually, he was heard, and in 1937 the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) was moved from RAF to Admiralty control as a branch of the Royal Navy. Sulking, the RAF developed tactics to deal with the threat to seaborne trade at the source, bombing shipyards and naval bases, eliminating the need for a specialised anti-shipping strike force. Occasional bombing trials against maritime targets were considered satisfactory and only a limited number of reconnaissance and flying-boat squadrons were necessary for escort, anti-submarine patrols and reconnaissance. Long-distance navigation over the sea was brushed over, and few if any British aircrews had any training in this by September 1939.30
In spite of the addition of a Fifth Sea Lord as Chief of the Naval Air Services to the Board of the Admiralty, the FAA was in a rather sorry state as war approached. Experience in the tactical use of carrier-based aircraft was limited, both in the Royal Navy and in the FAA itself, all the more so as the approximately 200 carrier-aircraft were largely obsolete – Swordfish, Skua, Roc and Sea Gladiators.31 Budgetary reasons must take a fair share of the blame for this, but traditionalist British naval officers also held that aircraft would never be a danger to capital ships at sea and were unwilling to spend resources on their development.
Contrary to the tactics developed during the later Norwegian campaign, where carrier task forces operated