Nelson's Battles. Nicholas Tracy

       John Bull, that stout and portly personification of Britain, is depicted in a contemporary cartoon keeping a close eye on the French fleet in Brest.

       (Cartoon published by Robert Middlemore)

      In consequence, when Admiral the Earl St Vincent was made First Lord of the Admiralty in 1800 he applied the experience he had gained keeping the Mediterranean Squadron on station off the Spanish dockyard at Cadiz to the problem in the Channel, and established a close blockade of Brest. The Channel Fleet was stationed off Ushant with frigates and support units close to the entrances of the Rade and with Plymouth and Torbay available for refuge in heavy weather. Admiral William Cornwallis was in command during the Trafalgar campaign of 1805, operating from Torbay and Plymouth with Portsmouth to leeward for a main supply and repair base.

      The French navy was dispersed to four dockyards in metropolitan France, at Brest, Lorient, Rochefort and Toulon, with ships deployed to protect French interests in the West Indies and the Indian Ocean. These squadrons had considerable value in the containment of British resources, and for supporting privateer action against trade, but separately they could not risk action unless the British forces offshore should be reduced by storm or accident. The Spanish navy in European waters depended on Cartagena in the Mediterranean, Cadiz at the southwest corner of Spain, and Ferrol at the northwest, and always had a sizeable detachment in the West Indies and South America. By stationing blockading forces close to these ports, and dominating the maritime communications between, the Royal Navy was able to keep on top of the aggressive use of French and Spanish naval forces.

      The Royal Navy’s most important overseas command was the Mediterranean Squadron. The acquisition of Gibraltar had made it possible for British ships to remain in the Mediterranean for extended periods, but Gibraltar was not well placed for supporting a blockade of Toulon because of the prevailing northeasterly and northwesterly winds. Minorca was preferable, and several times during the century Britain held Port Mahon as a forward base. Nelson, however, did not have the use of Port Mahon which had been returned to Spain as part of the peace settlement after the American Revolutionary War. Instead he had to use the undeveloped Magdalena anchorage in northern Sardinia. From this station he maintained a distant watch on Toulon, hoping to entice the French fleet out to sea where he expected to be able to defeat it.

      When the Toulon fleet did come out, it was a problem to discover where it had gone. In 1798 it went to Egypt; in 1805 it went to the West Indies. It was standing orders for squadrons deployed outside home waters that, if the forces they were watching managed to escape, they were to concentrate on the Western Squadron, or later on the Channel Fleet off Ushant. In 1798, however, Nelson decided that the French must have gone to Egypt, and took the risk of going there himself. In 1805 he concluded that they had gone to the West Indies and again took the risk of following them. He then had to follow them back, consumed with anxiety that they might get to Ushant ahead of him, join with the Brest squadron, and defeat Admiral Cornwallis commanding the Channel Fleet. In making his judgements, Nelson was able to depend on over a century of collective service experience about the effect of terrestrial geography, meteorological and hydrographic conditions on the potential movement of fleets.

      To guard against the threat of invasion during the campaigns of 1804 and 1805, the Royal Navy deployed flotillas along the Channel coast. These ensured that no sudden assault could be attempted without heavy support. They were given close cover by a squadron of frigates and a few ships of the line based on the Downs, the roads to seaward of the white cliffs of Dover, the Nore command in the mouth of the Thames, and Great Yarmouth in Norfolk. Another cruiser squadron was based on the Channel Islands where it was to windward of the embarkation ports during the prevailing southwesterlies. The Channel Fleet off Ushant provided the ultimate muscle.

       Nelson – the Diplomat Sailor

      British foreign policy in the late eighteenth century was controlled by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and to the extent that foreign policy could be said to be ‘made’ in London, it was made collectively by the Ministry acting in the King’s name, and with King George III exercising some influence. Throughout Europe were stationed British envoys who were the agents of the Secretary of State. For practical reasons, however, naval commanders often had to take great responsibility for developing and supporting British policy. Communications were so poor that in peacetime it would take up to a month for letters to pass between London and the Mediterranean, and in wartime when the French mail service could not be used and letters had to be diverted over the Alps and through Germany, or take their chances of a fair wind for a passage by sea around Spain, they could take much longer. A detached naval commander at a foreign court, such as was Nelson at the Court of Naples after the battle of the Nile, had to undertake the task of coordinating naval and diplomatic action, and work to develop the policies of Britain’s allies along safe and useful lines. After the battle of Copenhagen Nelson played a vital role in putting an end to the hostile policies of Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. It was his victories at the Nile and Copenhagen that made his diplomacy influencial.

      Nelson died of his wounds during the battle of Trafalgar. It was others who profited from that victory, and had to exploit it. Nelson’s last great battle reduced the naval forces available to Napoleon to such an extent that he was unable to dictate the course of European history by continuing to threaten invasion of Britain. Neither could he extend his control of the Mediterranean although he was able to overrun Naples from the land. Operationally, it freed the Royal Navy for other tasks, the most fundamental of which was the defence of trade. Strategically, this operational freedom at sea ensured that British trade would be able to pay for the subsidised armies that ultimately defeated Napoleon.