Restless Nation. William Gumede
Julius Malema, it is fair to say that if he still supported a second term for Zuma it is most unlikely he would have been suspended. Some kind of face-saving compromise would have been cobbled together.
Zuma says he would ‘never defy’ a nomination for a second term as ANC and South African president. Meanwhile, one has to be politically blind not to see he is running a tough and determined campaign. The other day, Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe unexpectedly issued a statement that as a ‘loyal and disciplined member of the ANC’ he is ‘not involved in any campaigning or lobbying for the presidency of the ANC’, but meanwhile others are running spirited campaigns on his behalf.
Worse, since the 2007 Polokwane conference, presidential candidates are mobilised around a slate of candidates to the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC). Then, in 2007, the slate was limited to one for the then president Thabo Mbeki and the other for Zuma, with one candidate for each position on either the Mbeki or the Zuma slate. This meant that individuals were not elected on merit but on the basis of their allegiances. In such a situation, mediocre candidates are usually elected to key senior positions in the ANC.
It is likely that the ANC’s 2012 leadership election will be decided on slates, probably two only: one slate for a second presidential term for Zuma, the other against. But democracy within the ANC and in the country generally would be better served if the ANC democratised the way it elects leaders.
The very obvious problem with the current system of internal elections in the ANC is that elected presidential and other leadership candidates will always have their mandates questioned. Losing groups will always feel afterwards that the winning candidates won unfairly. The winners will continually be challenged by those who lose out, especially in situations such as that now faced by the ANC, where the winning slate monopolises state patronage, positions and business deals, and could even hound those on the losing slate out of the party.
Democratising the ANC’s presidential elections would therefore bring better leaders to the fore. There is a higher premium on quality leaders in infant democracies such as South Africa, where democratic institutions, political cultures and nation-building efforts are still nascent, and where undemocratic leaders can damage the system.
Among the worst failings of the system of African liberation movements, whereby leaders are chosen by small cliques, is that the most talented, those with the best ideas, especially young leaders from outside the old patronage networks, are almost never elected to the top leadership. This is because the cliques that supervise elections fear they may shake up existing, lucrative patronage networks. In fact, in most cases the leaders chosen by such small cliques in these liberation movements are not selected for their holistic leadership qualities, such as the ability to bring new ideas to the party and the country, but for how best they can balance factional interests.
Thus, African liberation movements may have quality leaders but they almost never rise to the presidency. The criteria for leadership nomination are narrowly delineated and produce leaders who may have struggle credentials but little skill in leading complex and changing societies. In the environment of increasing global uncertainty, and in a world driven by fast-changing technology, the certainties of the past cannot offer a reliable guide to the future. The existing system favours patriarchy and older leaders, or it favours younger leaders who mimic the old in their thinking and behaviour. Partly as a result of this phenomenon, very few African countries since independence have been able to elect more dynamic new leaders.
South Africa’s democracy would be much enhanced if the ANC were to introduce the idea of American-style party primaries into its presidential election campaign, with presidential hopefuls going directly to both the ANC membership and their own supporters, making a case for why they should be elected as president.
Groups within the tripartite alliance – trade unions, civic groups, communists – could nominate candidates. A period could then be set for campaigning and defending manifestos. All party members could then vote. All parties receiving public money should be required to prove that their internal elections are conducted in ways that are in keeping with the democratic norms of South Africa’s Constitution.
More broadly, and moving beyond the internal elections of parties such as the ANC, South Africa’s current electoral system of proportional representation should be changed to a constituency-based system. This would make members of parliament, legislatures and local government directly accountable to those in their constituencies who elected them, not to party leaders, as is now the case.
COSATU, in a prescient argument in a 2006 discussion paper, said that the current system ‘undermines independent thought’, because individual careers depend on endorsement by the party leadership and by the ANC deployment committee. The document argued that unless the system changes, ‘the movement towards sycophancy is inevitable’. Proportional representation reinforces the party’s power to make or break the careers of independent-minded leaders, even if they are competent. It makes it possible to protect leaders who are incompetent but who are perceived to be loyal to the party leader.
Both the Mbeki and Zuma presidencies have ignored the very useful proposals made by a government task team appointed in 2002 to investigate the most suitable electoral system for South Africa. The team, led by the late Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, proposed that three quarters of the current 400 MPs be elected on the basis of a constituency system. Such a system would increase accountability in our electoral system, allowing communities to elect their representatives directly and to recall them if they are felt to be failing that community.
This far into South Africa’s post-1994 democracy, voters, especially ANC members and supporters, have simply stayed away from the polls if they are unhappy with the party. Many ANC members and supporters view other parties as inadequate. A vote means little if opposition parties are weak – the norm in many poorly governed African and developing countries.
Perhaps we could add to every South African ballot paper a box that gives voters the opportunity to vote for none of the parties on the ballot paper. In this way, they can still exercise their vote while expressing their disapproval of the quality of all the political parties and leaders up for election.
Mail & Guardian, 15 December 2011
The sources of Malema’s power
Why is it that President Jacob Zuma and most of the ANC leadership appear to be currently held prisoner by ANC Youth League President Julius Malema? The source of Malema’s power is that he played a leading role in helping to oust President Thabo Mbeki from the leadership of the ANC and the country. Malema helped rally significant sections of the ANC behind Zuma in his successful battle with Mbeki for control of the ANC. This means that Zuma owes Malema a gigantic political favour.
In addition to this, the Youth League, with its thousands of members, many of whom are idle, are a useful press gang to be mobilised for campaigns, protests and rallies. Throughout Zuma’s rape trial, corruption hearings and fights with Mbeki, they almost daily embarked on mass protests, helping to convey the impression that support for Zuma was an unstoppable ‘tsunami’.
Furthermore, in the run-up to the battle of Polokwane, Youth Leaguers, during branch polls, flooded ANC meetings, increasing voting numbers and influencing results. At ANC branch level, voting mostly operates with a show of hands in public and a faction that floods a meeting with a block of voters can easily swing the outcome.
New terms of political engagement emerged in the battle for control of the ANC between Zuma and Mbeki. Both groups on occasion used underhand means, whether selectively leaking confidential information, or using state institutions, such as the intelligence agencies, to trip up adversaries. Vote buying became a norm – money has now become so important in ANC political contests that a presidential candidate without a massive war chest, whether drawn from state coffers or private donors, has a very slim chance of success.
This kind of undemocratic political culture is now entrenched within the ANC family and the Youth League is a formidable force in the context of this new political environment. For Zuma and the current ANC leadership, who came to power with the help of the Youth League, it now becomes difficult to ask the proponents of these tactics to desist.
Given