The SADF in the Border War. Leopold Scholtz
the Gymnasium itself and 1 Parachute Battalion. The Special Forces – the “Recces” – were founded only in 1969.[6] The Gymnasium members would undoubtedly have respected them too!
The fact is that, in 1966, the army was not in a position to fight a war of any kind. Even so, the legacy that would transform the organisation into a highly mobile and battle-hardened force was already present. The army of the 1960s was the descendant of two forefathers, namely, the British Army and the Boer commandos of the 18th and 19th centuries. In terms of its organisation and visible culture, the army was virtually a clone of the British Army: the uniforms, the way in which soldiers marched and saluted, the officers’ public manners were all intensely British. The British experience in the Second World War had heavily influenced the army’s doctrine, because the senior officers and NCOs were mostly veterans of the Libyan and/or Italian campaigns against the Italians and Germans. Nevertheless, the mounted infantry tradition, the most outstanding legacy of the Boer commandos, was always near the surface. During the occupation of Somalia and Ethiopia in 1940/1941 – the only Second World War campaign in which South African forces had operated relatively independently – officers such as Major General Dan Pienaar had organised their units into motorised infantry columns, very much like the Boer commandos, and kicked dust into the eyes of the Italians in a whirlwind campaign.[7] After 1975, and the start of cross-border operations in Angola, this mounted infantry tradition would resurface very quickly indeed.
The South African Air Force (SAAF) was equally unprepared for a war. Equipment-wise, the force was relatively well off. In the 1960s, South Africa had acquired a number of GAM Dassault Mirage III aircraft (of which 16 were Mirage IIICZ interceptors, 17 Mirage IIIEZ ground-attack aircraft, as well as several two-seat trainers and reconnaissance aircraft) from France.[8] But by the time the war started to hot up, in 1975, the Mirage III was already obsolescent. Its range was too limited for southern Africa’s vast spaces, and sorties sometimes lasted only 40 minutes. Just in time, in 1975, the first of a new batch of Mirage F1s (consisting of 16 F1CZ interceptors and 32 F1AZ ground-attack fighters) was received, although these would become operational only in the course of 1978. Nevertheless, when Major Dick Lord (later Brigadier General) joined the SAAF in the early 1970s from the British Fleet Air Arm, he found a force that “had fallen into the trap of becoming a ‘peace-time’ air force”, so “flying had become rather like the activities of an exclusive aviation club”.[9]
The air force had also purchased 16 Blackburn Buccaneer S.Mk.50 and 8 Canberra B (1) Mk 12 and T Mk 4 bombers and trainers in the 1960s, which, together with the Mirages, provided a formidable air strike capability. However, as the 1980s approached, the Buccaneer force had become sadly depleted through accidents. Apparently some senior SAAF officers – again according to Dick Lord – thought they knew better than the British how to maintain and fly the “Buc”, with the result that in SAAF service the aircraft had an “abysmal safety record”.[10] By April 1978, nine Buccaneers had been lost in flight accidents. When the climax of the Border War came in 1987/1988, only five were left.[11]
The other important asset in the SAAF arsenal was helicopters, without which the army simply wouldn’t have been able to fight. A total of 128 Sud-Aviation Alouette III light helicopters had been obtained in different batches since the 1960s.[12] Later on, they would be used in a role they were never designed for, that of helicopter gunship against SWAPO infiltrants in the operational area in northern South West Africa (SWA) and southern Angola. For trooping – critical for the rapid deployment of troops in a counterinsurgency role – a bigger workhorse was needed, and this was found in the form of the Aérospatiale Puma, of which 20 were bought in 1970. Several subsequent batches followed, for a total of 69 by 1978, when a UN weapons embargo was slapped on South Africa. This force was augmented by 16 Aérospatiale Super Frelons. All these helicopters were French in origin.[13]
The other important task of the air force was transport, but the SAAF – with about 40 Second World War-vintage Douglas DC-3 Dakotas, 9 Transall C-160s and 7 Lockheed C-130 Hercules – was not adequately equipped to keep a large army on the move on the battlefield. General Constand Viljoen (later Chief of the SADF) recognised that “we will not be able to haul a significant portion of the logistics load by air” and that it would have to be moved “over land by truck”.[14] This inability would prove a substantial limitation on the army’s capability to strike deep into Angola for extended periods with large forces.
As for the navy, it would play a rather minor tactical and operational role in the Border War. During the early 1970s, the navy was equipped with two modernised Second World War-vintage destroyers (which were withdrawn from service during the decade), three Type 12 President-class frigates (all bought from Britain), and three French-built Daphne-class submarines. Although the submarines, with their excellent stealth qualities, would be of much use for special force operations, the five major surface ships were not suited to the demands of the Border War. In any case, they were not meant to fulfil South Africa’s maritime needs, so much as those of Britain against the background of the Cold War. In the latter half of the decade, Israeli-built strike craft, also eminently suitable for clandestine operations, would begin replacing them as the navy’s principal surface vessels.[15]
Early low-level insurgency
The first years of the Border War were very low-key. After having been decimated at Ongulumbashe in 1966, SWAPO did not enter Ovamboland again for some years. The group wiped out here was the first of ten groups that tried to infiltrate Ovamboland through southeastern Angola or through Botswana from Zambia and the only one that actually succeeded in crossing the border. The others were all intercepted and neutralised by the Portuguese before reaching the border.[16]
Instead, the Caprivi Strip, being relatively accessible from Zambia, for the time being became the main battleground. SWAPO had moved its headquarters to Lusaka in 1962, and so Zambia became the main staging ground for the insurgency.[17] This was favourable to South Africa, as the war’s centre of gravity proved not to be in Caprivi, but in Ovamboland further west, where 46% of the South West African population lived. Ovamboland was also the area where SWAPO, most of their leaders being Ovambos, would have the best chance of gaining the support and trust of the locals. The Caprivians were loyal to the Caprivi African National Union (CANU), and their support hinged on the precarious alliance between SWAPO and CANU holding up.[18]
Even this route did not bring about much success for SWAPO. Two groups that tried to infiltrate the Caprivi in 1968 were both intercepted, and the insurgents were in rapid order killed or taken prisoner – some fled back to Zambia. Only in 1971 and 1972 did SWAPO try again, this time with somewhat more success.[19] In June 1974, a large group of insurgents infiltrated the Caprivi Strip, but in a battle on 23 June all but six were killed by the SAP. The survivors barely escaped.[20]
The extreme difficulties experienced by SWAPO insurgents at the time were described by one of their field commanders, Rahimisa Kahimise:
We had to walk a long distance from Zambia through Angola. Some of our people also died in Angola and some missions could not reach Namibia, because they had to fight through Angola . . . the battles we were involved in, most of them were in Angola with the Portuguese . . . by then we had to train new recruits and we also had to fight to get food as we had to walk long distances, and then we had to try and get transport; also after a battle, then you must have more ammunition . . .[21]
The SADF looked on in growing frustration as its role in the fight at Ongulumbashe was publicly denied and the SAP was given the task of nipping in the bud an uprising by what was seen as “a few uppity blacks”. The SADF was also denied the chance to get much-needed combat experience in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), where the police took the honours of helping the Rhodesians fight their war.[22] Moreover, most of the men employed in patrolling the operational area were riot policemen whose effectiveness was dubious at best. According to historian Annette Seegers, their approach “seems to have been search-and-capture, consistent with policing that aims at a criminal trial”. Patrols and hearts-and-mind activities, which later became the key elements of the SADF’s counterinsurgency campaign, played a secondary role. The riot policemen were pulled out of SWA in 1968, after which the SAP started a counterinsurgency training course in Pretoria. Until 1972, only whites were employed, but the Rhodesian experience convinced the SAP to recruit black policemen as well.[23]
Although