Ramaphosa's Turn. Ralph Mathekga
had ordered him to do.
The evidence for this isolation of the ANC from the broader society had been steadfastly piling up during Zuma’s tenure of office since 2009. But the problem stretches far back, even to the Mbeki era, when under the direction of the president, the ANC government refused to roll out antiretrovirals to treat the HIV/AIDS pandemic, despite the public outcry.
The problem can also be seen in the extreme form of nationalism that has engulfed the party, when it seeks self-determination – “African solutions” – even on matters that are universally agreed upon. Then, too, there are those within the ANC who believe that whenever the party’s conduct or leadership conflicts with constitutional principles, this is an indication that there is something wrong with the Constitution.30 Seldom does the ANC reflect on its policies or conduct with the aim of finding ways in which they can be grounded upon constitutional principles and the values that are widely shared in the broader society.
In the recent contest for leadership of the party, Cyril Ramaphosa’s campaign was a direct challenge to the ANC’s traditional ways of thinking. While his opponent, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, whose campaign was firmly located within the party, lost the contest to lead the ANC, Ramaphosa’s victory does not mean that his project to ground the ANC in the broader society was universally approved by the wider ANC membership. I believe there are strong sentiments within the ANC to retain an inward-looking approach to leadership. By rejecting Ramaphosa’s power backers and his slate, which enjoyed widespread approval and legitimacy outside the party, the ANC has attempted to impose constraints on Ramaphosa’s leadership. For instance, had his wish been granted, Ramaphosa would have served alongside Lindiwe Sisulu as his deputy president. No matter at what speed the Ramaphosa train travels, it will still have to move along the tracks laid down by the party.
As mentioned earlier, Ramaphosa’s leadership style differs from the liberation movement approach and tends towards a more broad-based, consultative style. In this style, the justification for political conduct is more broadly based than on the dictates of the party and involves wider consultation with the people. In this regard, it is significant that whereas Zuma went into exile, Ramaphosa never did. Thus, while Zuma drew legitimacy for his leadership from the moral basis of exile politics, which historically remained contained and organised within the party, Ramaphosa would derive legitimacy for his decisions and leadership, particularly in the 1980s and early 1990s, from the political culture of mass activism.
Exiled liberation political parties tend to justify their actions on the basis of a shared value system crafted by party insiders and sold to members as the gospel. This moral basis for the party’s struggle proved effective in fighting against colonialism and repressive regimes such as apartheid, but it has failed dismally to serve as a basis for justification in newly liberated nations.
Problems emerge during the period of democratic consolidation when liberation parties continue to operate as exclusive entities focused only on the narrow interests of those who have been liberated, forgetting that liberation also entails liberating even those who benefited from the former oppressive regime. Moreover, once liberation is attained, the expectations of the broader population place new demands on the liberation movement and its style of leadership, even if there are not major improvements in the material conditions of the majority of people or they are slow in coming. Liberation parties fall short in this regard, and tend to lag behind society, leading from behind.
Citizens have two sets of demands from a state, and those demands may be compatible or contradictory, depending on historical conditions. The first set of demands has to do with the health of political interactions, including accountability by those who exercise power.31 The second set of demands has to do with the material returns of democracy as a system of distributing or redistributing resources and opportunities. This has been the subject of concern both politically and philosophically. Besides offering healthy and dynamic engagements for people, democracy should bring about material changes in people’s living conditions. In a well-functioning democracy, people should have access to running water, basic amenities, education and employment, for example. These are the material benefits that are associated with an optimal society. Democracy should also provide people with an open environment in which they can exchange ideas, formulate political choices and then exercise them. Poor people are just as much entitled to a lively dynamic democracy as they are to improved living conditions.
Once an oppressive regime has been defeated, poor people may find the language and discourse of liberation parties increasingly monotonous and devoid of imagination. The poor have a right to reject the single-track approach of liberation politics pursued by liberation parties in democratic dispensations such as South Africa. The ANC’s approach to leadership has been to craft a simple message about the poor and then package it as a moral justification for its decisions. There seems to be a common view that says that the poor are inherently unsophisticated and uninterested in demanding things such as good governance because they are only concerned with access to basic necessities. This is not the case. The poor in South Africa also had a problem with Zuma’s liberation politics, particularly the manner in which it failed to meet the required standards of justification and accountability required by the broader society.
As we can now see, Ramaphosa is confronted with both risks and opportunities when it comes to leading the country. The risks he faces are those within the ANC, while there are opportunities galore outside the party. The question is: how will he navigate this minefield as he crafts his leadership style? He has to manage the internal expectations among his comrades within the ANC while at the same time ensuring that he meets the broader requirements of justification demanded by the wider society. Distinguishing between the ANC and the broader society is not meant to say that the ANC does not exist within society. There are distinct moral bases for leadership within the ANC, and within the broader society outside the ANC. Ramaphosa has one foot in the ANC by virtue of the fact that he is the president of the organisation, and another foot in the broader society in the sense that he enjoys wider legitimacy outside the ANC as president of the country.
The risk is that whenever Ramaphosa brings to the ANC a justification that comes from outside, he will face resistance from within the party. Having run an outward-looking campaign to lead the ANC, Ramaphosa is widely seen as a threat by those who are set on retaining the liberation character of the ANC and its inward-looking basis for leadership. These are the people who genuinely believe that the ANC is under threat from a takeover or destabilisation by outside elements. Whenever the ANC is pushed into a corner, the party has a habit of alleging conspiracy by hostile foreign elements aimed at undermining the party’s progressive agenda as the oldest liberation movement on the continent. That is how the ANC rejects the level of accountability demanded by the broader society, by relying on loyalty to the party’s character as a liberation party.32 Whether or not the people behind this kind of thinking genuinely believe this does not matter. What matters is that the problem itself has become genuine, and it has implications for how Ramaphosa will lead the ANC and the country.
The greatest risk that Ramaphosa faces is that in his attempt to show the ANC the way, he will be accused of capturing it and selling it to his friends in the business sector who masquerade as representatives of the public interest. Ramaphosa can insist that all he is trying to do is show the ANC how it can ground itself in the broader society. He can further assure the party that he wants to secure its position in history as the first liberation party to adapt to a modern democratic system. This is the case Ramaphosa can take to the ANC jury, hoping he will be allowed to recreate a good relationship between the party and the broader society. For some within the ANC, however, this is just a plausible sales pitch: something Ramaphosa is certainly known for.
Whatever decision he makes as president of the country, Ramaphosa has to consider the extent to which it will offend some within the ANC, particularly when the decision is in the outright interests of the broader society and justifiable outside the ANC. It looks like he is heeding this advice, as his first cabinet reshuffle in February 2018 seems to indicate. He managed to get rid of some ministers he inherited from Zuma, particularly those who occupied key positions such as finance, public enterprises and foreign affairs. By doing so, he yielded to common sense outside the ANC and the common feeling that he should stamp his authority when it comes to key departments at the forefront of government policy. At the same time, to ensure