The War at Home. Helen Bradford
blamed the deaths of Boer children in the camps on what he perceived to be the unhygienic practices of their mothers. He even threatened to charge some of them with manslaughter.
This mindset was characteristic of many British imperialists, and it reveals Kitchener’s indifference towards women in general. After his young fiancée had died in 1885, he had little interest in women. He allowed only unmarried men in his inner circle and seldom agreed to see women. In fact, he even thought that the absence of women in his life had helped to advance his military career. These personal traits, which were not rare among hardened British militarists of the time, provide an explanation as to why the plight of Boer women was of little importance to Kitchener. His only concern (and that of those like him) was that policy needed to be carried out. He was not sympathetic towards women and their fate; he considered them to be an alien and inferior species, who merely hindered the execution of his duties.
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Casualties of war: a mourning woman with children at the grave of a family member in the Bethulie camp. |
Many British officers had extreme views on how civilians should be treated during the war. As one officer put it bluntly, ‘war is war and humanity is rot’.[8] This viewpoint creates the impression that any measures or actions were deemed acceptable. In Britain, however, the opposition Liberal Party did not agree and became increasingly uncomfortable with the situation. In 1901 it was said in the British Parliament, ‘When is a war not a war? When it is carried on by methods of barbarism in South Africa.’[9]
Were excessively cruel measures used in this conflict? In order to answer this question, one needs to look at international standards for the conduct of war established at the time. At the end of July 1899, about two months before the outbreak of the war, representatives of 24 countries signed the First Hague Convention. The purpose of this convention was to regulate the conduct of war in accordance with certain legal principles. Britain did not sign all the provisions of the Hague Convention, and neither of the Boer republics attended the discussions. Therefore, technically, the Hague Convention did not have a bearing on the Anglo-Boer War because it stipulated that both parties to a war had to be signatories before it could be applied to them. However, this did not prevent both parties from invoking the convention in an effort to justify their respective customs of war.
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The fearsome engine of total war in the twentieth century: under the cover of tents and sheets, Boers are transported in railway trucks to the Pinetown camp in Natal. |
The Hague Convention was a framework of standards against which war practices could be measured. Of particular relevance to the Anglo-Boer War is the question of whether the transportation of civilian women complied with the existing rules of war. Article 23 of the Hague Convention prohibited the destruction or seizure of an enemy’s personal property ‘unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war’. To justify their scorched-earth policy, the British argued that farms were used as military hideouts. But they often burnt farms without proof that they were used for military purposes or that the women who lived there acted as spies. In such cases the actions of the British forces were a violation of the Hague Convention. What followed – the internment of women and children in concentration camps – was a transgression of another order that would have catastrophic consequences.
Women and children sacrificed for freedom?
In historical writing, it is often asked whether events were inevitable and destined to happen, or whether different decisions or actions could have produced another set of outcomes. Although such questions could be dismissed as mere speculation, a consideration of alternative outcomes can broaden and deepen our insight into certain events.
The question is often posed whether the tragic camp deaths during the harsh winter of 1901 could have been prevented. In retrospect, there was an opportunity to steer history in another direction on 28 February 1901 when Kitchener and General Louis Botha met in Middelburg. The meeting arose from Kitchener’s desire to prevent a protracted war and Botha’s attempt to gain an understanding of the potential peace terms envisaged by the British. According to a message conveyed to Kitchener by Botha’s wife, Annie, Botha was convinced that peace was necessary. Although he held that the republics should retain their independence, he was keen to explore other options.
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Far left: He and his enemy broke bread together, but did not reach an early peace: the costs of General Louis Botha’s failed talks with Lord Kitchener in Middelburg, February 1901, would be borne by civilians. Left: Field Marshal Lord Kitchener |
At their meeting, Kitchener tried to persuade Botha not to commandeer the surrendered burghers again, and he undertook not to burn the farms of fighting burghers if their families were not actively assisting them. But such an arrangement would have been difficult to apply practically, and Botha firmly believed that, as a Boer general, he was legally entitled to commandeer the surrendered burghers.
The British also proposed a number of peace terms and offered to install a semi-representative government. However, Botha maintained that a nation fighting for its independence could not accept terms that did not incorporate republican independence – a non-negotiable term. Consequently, after a short correspondence the negotiations came to nothing. Botha maintained afterwards that, where human efforts to achieve peace had failed, the matter should be left in the hands of the Supreme Being.
The time for peace did arrive – more than a year later. The question is whether it was due to providence or the war-weariness of both parties. The war ended when the Peace of Vereeniging was signed on 31 May 1902. Ironically, the terms, which the Boers accepted, did not differ much from the offer that had been made in February 1901. They relinquished their independence and accepted a form of self-government under the British Crown. Other issues, such as amnesty for Cape rebels, compensation for losses and the position of black people, were also broadly in line with the conditions that had been discussed in Middelburg.
The question then arises, what did the Boer leadership gain by continuing the war for another 15 months, especially in light of the deaths in the camps and the lack of any material differences between the two sets of peace terms that were offered? After the failed Middelburg talks, the ferocity of the war intensified and the mortality rate of women and children rose steeply in the cold winter of 1901.
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Annie Botha, the general’s wife with a fashionable taste for large hats |
At the root of these problems was the inability of the two military commanders to arrive at a feasible agreement at an earlier stage. Botha prioritised the continuation of the war and insisted on republican independence. The hardened militarist Kitchener did not have full authority during the negotiations and had to consider the wishes of politicians such as Milner (who had misgivings about the talks). Subsequently, he continued with his already established methods of arson and transportation of civilians to concentration camps. If the Boers were not willing to be persuaded, according to Kitchener, they would have to live with the consequences of their decision. Neither Kitchener nor Botha could have known in February 1901 how exceptionally cold the coming winter would be. But the plight of civilians had also not been their top priority and was given only cursory attention at the Middelburg talks. The political and military aims of both parties were of greater importance.
Thereafter,