COSSAC. Stephen C. Kepher
before the spring of 1943, using the minimum force available after all other commitments were met, assuming that German resistance had weakened, and without identifying a commander or his deputy or identifying units that would be involved.
After the Dieppe Raid, planning continued. In late September 1942 a deception exercise, Operation CAVENDISH, was postponed for a second time and the Commander-in-Chief, South Eastern Command, Lt. Gen. J. G. Swayne, wrote to Paget arguing that the operation should be cancelled. Originally planned for October 1942 and now proposed for early November, the operation was an attempt to convince the enemy “that an invasion was being staged, though this deception was always difficult on account of the small number of modern landing craft available.” General Swayne pointed out the obvious fact that the “enemy must know that the possibility of sufficiently long periods of suitable weather being obtainable in November are extremely remote…. I am informed by A.O.C. 11 Fighter Group that from the air point of view November would be very unsuitable for this enterprise.”22 We can infer that the operation was another attempt to lure the German air force into battle while a sea-based feint approached the Pas-de-Calais. As the general noted, weather over the Channel in November is rarely favorable for such operations; indeed, it was a basic principle (at least for experts like Hughes-Hallett) that the Channel’s “invasion season” ended in September. The operation was cancelled.
Another operation, titled OVERTHROW, was to be a major cross-Channel effort and required coordination with Bomber Command to ensure that pre-invasion targets like gun emplacements and all forms of transport were attacked, which meant that Bomber Command would have to stop bombing cities and start bombing tactical targets. In part, this was to test if bombers could hit targets like gun emplacements and to find out what the level of damage might be. That operation also didn’t get past the planning stage.
By now the long-considered operation to capture the Cherbourg Peninsula had a code name as well, and by September 1942 outline plans for a similar operation focused on Brittany were being considered.
By the end of September 1942 the Combined Commanders and their planners were considering the sixth draft of a memorandum to the COS, “Future Planning for Operation ROUNDUP” and the third draft of a similar memo, “Offensive Combined Operations in North-West Europe in 1943–1944.” The memo for ROUNDUP outlined what the planners believed a theoretical phase 2 would look like—assuming the Allies had successfully reestablished themselves on the Continent. They identified three main goals: the capture of Paris; the capture or peaceful occupation of the Atlantic ports of Brest, Lorient, Saint-Nazaire, and Nantes, in part for a secure rear area to build up forces and in part because they expected the French would have to be fed with food shipped into the country; and a drive to capture Antwerp.
The commanders and planners requested that the COS grant them the authority to “frame an outline plan … basing it on the assumption that the full number of divisions included in the [previously] approved outline plan for Phase I will be available; and to prepare this outline plan in cooperation with the staff of the Commanding General ETOUSA, on the distinct understanding that the completed plan is subject to his approval and may therefore require revision.”23 That is, they asked for permission to plan given a certain set of assumptions, knowing that the American commander might modify or reject their plan after the work was completed.
The second memo recommended that “raids, whether designed primarily to provoke air battles under conditions favourable to ourselves or for some other purposes, must be closely co-ordinated with the approved strategy for 1943 and 1944” and not just be done for their own sake (a reference, perhaps, to Dieppe) and that “a plan for moving an Army into Europe in the event of serious deterioration in German morale should be prepared in outline.”24
In the memorandum the planners also proposed consideration of an alternative to the existing ROUNDUP plan. Noting that the capture of the Pas-de-Calais might be a “very hazardous operation,” the planners proposed the capture of Le Havre, Rouen, and Cherbourg at the earliest opportunity. If German forces in the Pas-de-Calais could be contained by a series of major raids, then a “land and sea attack on the Cotentin [Cherbourg] Peninsula (could be) increased in strength.” They went on to state that while prior planning had been based on the idea of simultaneous assaults over a wide front, consideration should be given to launching a series of assaults, “timed and directed to take advantage of the then existing circumstances, and supported in each case by a maximum possible concentration of air and naval effort…. We might hope to deceive the enemy as to whether he was still faced with major raids, or feints or with our main effort.”25
The concepts in these memos were put forward as a basis for operations in 1944. The Combined Planners then asked the COS if they agreed in principle with the concepts and if they wished the planners to begin a detailed study of the proposed alternatives.
In broad terms, these ideas were not far off from Churchill’s vision of what a cross-Channel attack might look like. In his note to the British COS regarding Operation IMPERATOR, Churchill noted that “if this were one of a dozen simultaneous operations of a similar kind, very different arguments would hold” versus those against the operation in question.26 His vision in June 1942 was of “at least six heavy disembarkations at various points along the north and west coast of Europe, from Denmark and Holland down the Pas de Calais [‘where a major air battle will be fought’] to Brest and Bordeaux. He also advocated ‘at least a half a dozen feints’ to mystify the enemy. These armoured landings would be followed by a second wave of heavier attacks at four or five strategic points, with the hope that three might be successful.”27 He envisioned a third wave once a port had been captured and opened.
There was, of course, no calculation of resources needed or resources available, nor any particular target date for the operation, nor any force commanders to lead beyond the roles to be played by the Combined Commanders.
The Combined Planners suffered from being a British, as opposed to an Allied, group. While it was true that there was ongoing, informal collaboration between Barker’s group at ETOUSA and the planners, they reported to the Combined Commanders, who then reported to the British COS. The blunt-speaking Hughes-Hallett (who was called Hughes-Hitler behind his back28) said of the planners, “I could not take the work very seriously. The combined staffs of the Combined Commanders were so large that when they had plenary meetings it resembled a meeting of Parliament itself—with no equivalent of Mr. Speaker to enforce rules of order.”29
The questions the planners had were not being answered. The projects were beginning to feel like exercises that were never to be executed. In addition to the fighting in North Africa, initial plans for attacks on either Sardinia or Sicily were being considered, which left few resources for the planners to use for any cross-Channel operation. It seemed that the Allies were going to stay in the Mediterranean for a long time.
At the end of October 1942 the COS accepted a memorandum from the Joint Planners, which was a statement of the British military’s strategic outlook. Among the analyses was the following:
Despite the fact that a large-scale invasion of Europe would do more than anything to help Russia we are forced to the conclusion that we have no option but to undermine Germany’s military power by the destruction of the German industrial and economic war machine before we attempt invasion. For this process, apart from the impact of Russian land forces, the heavy bomber will be the main weapon, backed up by the most vigorous blockade and operations calculated to stretch the enemy forces to the greatest possible extent….
Even when the foundations of Germany’s military power have been thoroughly shaken, it is probable that she will be able to maintain a crust of resistance in Western Europe. We must have the power to break through this crust when the time comes. We must therefore continue to build up Anglo-American forces in the European Theatre in order that we may be able to re-enter the Continent at the psychological moment.30
As for amphibious operations against France, the paper suggested more “Dieppe”-type raids (obviously with better outcomes) as well as large raids of longer duration against high-value targets and smaller commando raids.
Operation SKYSCRAPER
According