The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945. David S. Nasca
international system and in transforming the balance of power.
I wrote this book because amphibious warfare has often been viewed as outdated and long past its prime in the twenty-first century where advanced aircraft, nuclear weapons, special operators, drones, and now cyber warfare are seen as the new means to how conflicts will be fought. While all these new ways of fighting do bring various military options for states, four years of research at Salve Regina University has shown that amphibious warfare was the most influential in geopolitical strategy and has done much to transform the world in which we live today. I hope this book will generate discussion and debate on the important continued role amphibious warfare can still play in geopolitical strategy.
David S. Nasca
WASHINGTON, DC
JUNE 13, 2019
Acknowledgments
This book would not have been possible without the help of so many people over the course of four years. The beginnings of my manuscript started at the beautiful Salve Regina University in Newport, Rhode Island. The guidance, mentorship, humor, and vast knowledge of the late Dr. Eric John Shaw on the historical, technical, and strategic aspects of the U.S. military made the writing process both enjoyable and rewarding. In addition, I would also like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Michael Budd, Dr. Luigi Bradizza, and Dr. William Leeman at Salve Regina University, who went above and beyond the call of duty in taking time from their very busy academic schedules to invest their knowledge and energy in patiently reviewing my manuscript. Their insightful feedback and recommendations not only helped expand my research, but also kept me focused and on target with my arguments.
At home, I am thankful to my loving parents, Stephen Paul Nasca and Purita Mendoza Nasca, who taught me the value of lifelong learning and an appreciation for hard work. I am especially indebted to my father for the countless hours he spent with me on our mutual love of history and all things military. I would not be where I am today without him. In addition, my years of researching, writing, and traveling for this book would not have been possible without the amazing support of my family. My sister, Nikko Nasca Rice, and my brother-in-law, Shawn Rice, were a wealth of advice and support in helping me overcome the challenges in writing this book. In addition, my nephew, Braden, and my nieces, Cassidy and Halle, were my biggest cheerleaders and fans whose humor, smarts, and enthusiasm were a great source of inspiration and sorely needed fun!
Finally, the publication of this book would not have become a reality without the amazing support and work of the entire team at the Naval Institute Press. I especially want to thank Glenn Griffith, who as acquisitions editor patiently worked with me throughout the entire publication process. His guidance not only made it a fun and exciting experience, but I would also have been hopelessly lost without his help! In addition, I would like to thank production editor Rachel Crawford, as well as Mary Hardegree for her careful review of my manuscript. Her attention to detail in copyediting brought a refinement and polish to the book that makes me sound more intelligent than I really am! Next, I would like to express my gratitude to Chris Robinson for designing the beautifully crafted maps and allowing me to provide my initial input and guidance. He had to work extra hard to turn straw into gold! Lastly, I will always be grateful to all the amazing people at the Naval Institute Press who worked tirelessly in seeing this book transformed into its beautifully crafted final product. The hours they spent carefully designing and perfecting this book were the result of not only outstanding teamwork, but also a labor of love.
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Introduction
Amphibious Warfare in Practice through History
Amphibious warfare is a type of offensive operation in which naval vessels are used to land and support the movement of ground forces from ship to shore. It has been used for centuries in the history of warfare and has been conducted for a variety of reasons ranging from raiding and plundering to military and humanitarian operations. In short, the use of amphibious warfare not only allows the projection of hard power from the water, but also sets the stage for follow-on ground forces and subsequent operations beyond the coast and into the interior.
Amphibious warfare has been in use since ancient times. Historical records and archaeological studies show that amphibious warfare was used extensively throughout the world. It was used by the Greeks, especially the Athenians, in the subjugation of various maritime settlements and islands around the Greek peninsula. While the mountainous terrain of Greece’s landscape restricted movement and heavily favored the defender, the waters around the peninsula offered easier access for the movement, support, and deployment of Greek armies. The seas of the Adriatic, Ionian, Aegean, and Mediterranean were the common military avenues of approach that offered the least resistance. Athens became the dominant power not only by its maritime trade and development, but also by carefully utilizing its formidable navy to expand its control throughout the region. During the Persian Wars, the Greek city-states used these geographical features to decisively defeat two Persian invasions and, afterward, to go on to destroy the Persian Empire.1
Athens and the other maritime Greek city-states achieved this success by their effective naval tactics: the intelligent division of labor to operate their warships, ship-to-ship communications, and continuous training. City-states such as Athens excelled at naval warfare by maximizing speed and communication to coordinate their own ships to sink or disable other enemy ships. In addition, Athens and other Greek maritime states continuously adapted and developed naval technology to improve the speed, durability, and performance of their naval vessels. While Athens enjoyed naval superiority in the oceans of the ancient world, it was severely handicapped when it came to land-based operations.2
During the Peloponnesian War, Athens attempted to overcome this deficiency by using its naval strength to defeat the more powerful ground forces of Sparta and its allies. Athens elected to use amphibious warfare as the means to allow its powerful navy to land its armies at times and locations of its own choosing, hence forcing Sparta and its allies to spread their ground forces to protect vulnerable regions that they could not afford to lose. While Athens used amphibious warfare for demonstrations, raids, and seizing weakly defended coastal settlements and islands, the possibility of coordinating a large-scale amphibious campaign to seize a large, fortified city was extremely difficult and very risky.
Athens and its allies suffered for committing to one such amphibious operation during the Sicilian Expedition during the seventeenth year of the Peloponnesian War. The intent was to conquer Syracuse and utilize its immense wealth and manpower to finally finish the war with Sparta. Unfortunately, the campaign was a complete disaster, and it led to the destruction of the expeditionary force.3 While it failed for several reasons at the strategic and operational level—primarily poor leadership and planning—training and preparations also played a part. Although the Athenian expeditionary force had marines available, their responsibility was limited to policing the crew as well as defending or attacking ships. Meanwhile, the regular line Greek soldier had neither a familiarity with amphibious operations nor the ability to swim. Additionally, the lack of coordination and communication in offloading the expeditionary force, building up its combat power once ashore, and attacking Syracuse were hampered by continuous delays and indecisiveness. These holdups allowed Syracuse’s military to recover from the initial shock of the invasion, build up its defenses and, afterward, sally forth to surround and destroy the Athenians. In addition, the arrival of Sparta and its allies finished off what was left of the expeditionary force and turned the tide of the battle and, ultimately, the war.4 As a result, the geopolitical position of Athens as the most powerful city-state in Greece was shattered, the Peloponnesian War was concluded, and Athenian power was lost when it sued for peace with Sparta and its allies.5
The failure of the Athenian Expedition to Syracuse served as an important lesson for many centuries to future nations and empires about the importance of avoiding amphibious warfare whenever possible because it was simply too expensive and risky.