The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945. David S. Nasca
two major amphibious operations that led to the occupation of Taiwan, Korea, and the Liaodong Peninsula. Like the United States during the Spanish-American War, the Japanese used wooden boats supported by powerful, modern warships to land troops at undefended key points and quickly push inland before Chinese ground forces could react. Therefore, the quick defeat of Chinese military forces contributed to China’s continued political, economic, and military decline and made it an increasingly attractive target to the European powers. Unfortunately, the crushing defeat of China through Japan’s amphibious capabilities triggered a regional crisis among the world’s major powers, especially Great Britain, which desperately sought to maintain the existing balance of power.
China was simply too big, weak, and old to hold itself together. Japan’s victory over China meant that the Asian mainland was open for invasion and occupation. As Japan pondered how much to take from the Chinese, the western powers were drawn into China’s affairs as well. The French, the Germans, and the British were especially interested in expanding their commercial and territorial interests for geopolitical purposes and saw China’s imminent collapse as an opportunity to further their respective national glory and power. However, among the western powers, Great Britain was concerned over the potential geopolitical consequences a power vacuum in China would mean for the rest of the world. Not only would the British balance-of-power system be threatened with the opening of yet another land grab, more importantly, it would allow the Russians to move across its borders with China and take huge parts of territory, thereby potentially locking the British out of China’s vast commercial markets while also posing a threat to British core interests in India and Southeast Asia.9 While the British did have some amphibious capabilities to utilize in the Royal Navy, their capabilities were really a haphazard affair that allowed only for ad hoc amphibious operations by a small, professional British Army supplemented by large pools of local native troops.
The major power rivalry soon manifested in Manchuria and Korea when these areas became points of contention between the Russians and the Japanese. Both nations were expansionist powers, and both refused to negotiate control of Northeast Asia. While Russia enjoyed a larger military with virtually unlimited resources and was geographically linked to Northeast Asia, Japan was better organized and had a larger industrial base. That industrial base supported a smaller but more well-trained and well-equipped army and navy. However, Japan suffered geographically by being separated from Asia’s markets and resources by the Sea of Japan.
The main obstacle to Japanese prosperity and dominance in Northeast Asia was Russia. It was the Russians who blocked Japan’s attempt to secure the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria after the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 by getting the western powers to back up Russia’s position in pressuring Japan from the region. In addition, to make matters worse for the Japanese, Russia’s stance against Japan to protect Chinese sovereignty proved hypocritical when Russia soon declared Manchuria to be within the Russian sphere of influence and gained access not only to the Liaodong Peninsula’s ports and harbors, but also received permission to begin constructing Russian railroads, gaining further access to Chinese markets and resources. In short, Russian control of Manchuria and its expanding naval influence in the area was a potential national security threat in that it brought Russian ground and naval forces within potential striking distance of the Japanese islands.10
This impasse led to the Russo-Japanese War, which was opened by Japan launching a surprise attack against the Russian Pacific Fleet in Port Arthur. While the Japanese attacked Russian naval forces, it also used its amphibious capabilities to land in Inchon in order to occupy and secure the Korea Peninsula and set the stage for its invasion of Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula, where it quickly trapped the large Russian garrison in Port Arthur. Afterward, Japan’s extraordinary use of amphibious operations kept the Russians on edge along the maritime districts of the Russian Far East, especially Vladivostok, where Russian military forces remained in place to deter a possible Japanese invasion of the Russian homeland. Due to this commitment, Russian forces were neutralized as a threat to the Japanese since these units were now unable to support the Russian military stationed in Manchuria. As the intensity of the war grew in Northeast Asia, the periodical The Advocate of Peace, from March 1904, observed:
Both the powers [Russia and Japan] have treated these intervening countries [Manchuria and Korea] as if they had no rights of their own. Japan is using Korea, an independent nation, for war purposes, as if she owns it. For this kind of aggression and antagonism there is no superficial remedy. Given the spirit and determination manifested on both sides, war was inevitable. It was to the credit of the civilized world that there was so much talk of reference of the trouble to The Hague Court. But for the two powers to have been willing to let the conflict go to The Hague Court would have been tantamount to a willingness to drop the dispute altogether and to cease all aggression. If Japan and Russia had been actuated by the real spirit of justice and humanity, they would have united cordially in assuring the independence of Korea and the integrity of China including Manchuria. Such a course would have averted all strife and laid the foundations of permanent peace.11
The conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War came about when Japan won a series of decisive victories that helped secure Japan’s control over Northeast Asia. On sea, the Japanese fleet under Admiral Togo Heihachiro destroyed the Russian Baltic Fleet at the Battle of Tsushima when it attempted to relieve the Japanese siege on Port Arthur; while on land, Japanese ground forces defeated the Russians at Mukden in Manchuria. These battles not only placed the Japanese at a strategic advantage against Russia, but also led to the fall of Russian ground and naval forces trapped in Port Arthur. Therefore, in order to preserve a balance of power and prevent the conflict from spreading, the United States intervened to serve as an impartial third party to mediate between the combatants. In the Treaty of Portsmouth in September 1905, Japan became the dominant power in Northeast Asia, while Russian power and credibility were severely compromised. According to Raymond Esthus, “It was at this juncture that President Theodore Roosevelt urged Russia to make peace. Throughout the war he had hoped that a balance of power would emerge in East Asia, and now though his personal sympathies were with Japan, he worried about the possibility that Russian power in the East would be completely shattered.”12 Japan’s success during the war and the dramatic change in geopolitical positions in the Asia-Pacific Region were made possible only because of Japan’s employment of amphibious operations against the Russians, who initially held a geographic and military advantage. Unlike the ad hoc amphibious operations conducted by the British in Egypt during the Anglo-Egyptian War in 1882 and by the Americans during the Spanish-American War, the Japanese naval and ground forces worked in concert with each other to destroy Russian ground and naval forces in Port Arthur. The speed and success in the execution of the campaign and the capture of Port Arthur removed an immediate threat in the Pacific against the Japanese home islands and secured rear communications for Japanese ground forces as they advanced into Manchuria.
Through Japan’s and the United States’ recent success in their wars against Russia and Spain, respectively, amphibious operations were beginning to be viewed as an option that had significant strategic implications in the power dynamics of the international system. In the Asia-Pacific Region, Russian expansion was halted as a result of its defeat, resulting in Northeast Asia becoming open for Japanese expansion. Meanwhile, the United States removed the last vestige of Spanish colonial rule and also turned the Caribbean into an “American lake.” In both cases, these successes gave positive reinforcement for the continued usage and experimentation in amphibious warfare for future geopolitical gains. The new interest in amphibious warfare became apparent after World War I, when Japan focused an extraordinarily large amount of its time and resources to further develop its amphibious tactics, techniques, and technological capabilities. The Japanese understood the importance of amphibious capabilities and how it tied to its geopolitical strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region where it was used to great effect against the Chinese and later the Russians. The Japanese believed that their nation had a special destiny, and according to their culture and beliefs, they saw Japan eventually contending with the other major powers for domination over Asia. Not only would the inevitable Japanese victory result in the conquest of China, but it would also finally drive out the western powers for good and leave Asia for the Asians.13
While the other great powers recognized Japanese and American success, they were not