New South African Review 2. Paul Hoffman
of the alliance, there is little chance of a split. However, this might, in his view, change with time. Pillay also sees potentials for new political challenges coming from the DLF, a network of activists, academics, NGOs and social movements united in their various struggles against capitalism, and beyond, but only if they are supported by Cosatu and its members.
It is important that the emergence and potentials of the DLF be assessed in the context of a longer trajectory of struggles of post-apartheid social movements, particularly in the light of earlier attempts at similar convergences in the form of the Social Movements Indaba (SMI) and Social Movements United (SMU) that were formed in the course of protests during the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002 (Gibson, 2006; McKinley and Naidoo, 2004). In doing this, it would be important to reflect on the various political forms that characterised the organisations and movements composing the SMI and SMU and the relationship of different activists and groups to the question of electoral politics. While for some activists the DLF might hold the potential of becoming a political party worthy of the status of ‘official opposition’, it is also viewed by some of its members as holding the potential for ways of doing politics beyond the ballot box and the party.
But while much attention has focused on contestation amongst political parties, little has been said about those who for one or other reason do not vote. Close analysis of voting patterns shows that large numbers of South Africans choose not to exercise their democratic right to vote. Commenting on the turnout in the 2009 national election, Schulz-Herzenberg noted (2009: 25–6): ‘Despite the growth in the eligible voting population and increases in registration figures, the number of valid votes cast actually decreased by over 3.9 million between the 1994 and 2004 elections. In the 2009 elections, however, the decline in voter turnout halted and increased very slightly from 76.7 per cent in 2004 to 77.3 per cent in 2009. Actual votes cast also increased by approximately 2.1 million … While turnout of registered voters remained relatively high at seventy-seven per cent, turnout as a proportion of the voting age population (VAP) was less impressive at about sixty per cent or less in the past two elections. When these figures are considered against the overall population growth in the VAP, it appears that there are an increasing number of eligible voters who do not for some or other reason cast a vote at election time.’
While the 2011 local government elections have recorded an increase, from 2006, in voter turnout, it is still important to ask why such large numbers of the eligible population do not participate in elections.
The act of voting has come to be seen by many as the granting of greater power and authority to a few to enrich themselves and those close to them.
Those who are on the top there, their children are fed, they get everything smooth in life, but we on the ground, we have to suffer, I don’t know until when. But soon they are going to the elections. So you’ll see cars running around, pamphlets will be put all over the place, so that we must just go and vote for them, so they can win again. After that, they’ll just dump us again. Empty promises since 1994. I was turning sixty recently, but nothing has been done since 1994. I haven’t seen anything being done.’ (Female pensioner, Focus Group Discussion, Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee, 26 September 2007)
Politics, seen in its narrowest sense as the marking of an ‘X’ on a ballot every five years, has come to be viewed by some as the playground of elites and not as a site through which ordinary citizens gain voice. While their choice not to vote may be portrayed, as has often been done, as reflective of a general apathy in society towards issues of government, it could also be taken as a sign of a refusal of a particular way of doing politics in the world. While many South Africans continue to view the ballot box as a means for exercising their voice in politics, for others it has come to represent the failures of traditional politics and politicians.
RE-MAKING THE (COM)PROMISE OF LIBERATION
The struggle against apartheid was significant for its embrace of and experimentation with different political forms – from armed struggle to political theatre to mass marches, demonstrations and stay-aways, and to economic sanctions, and negotiations. This suggests the existence of political imaginaries that were not confined to those circumscribed by the vote, the political party, and the wage. But after apartheid, there seems little left to the imagination of change but electoral politics and the struggle for decent work. While the popular critique of the ANC begins with the adoption of Gear in 1996, missing from these accounts of the transition are the intense struggles that took place within the alliance during the late 1980s and early 1990s over the giving up of armed struggle, the terms of the negotiations with the apartheid state, the protection of the right to private property being included in the constitution, the labour laws (in particular the right to strike versus the right to lock out), and macroeconomic policy generally.
It could, then, be argued that the promise of 1994 was already based on a set of compromises entered into by the ANC that foreclosed the imagination of political possibilities for the transition, limiting it to electoral power and representative democracy, and the promise of full-time, permanent employment. With its adoption of neoliberal policies, each new election has demanded that the party demonstrate its continued commitment to the realisation of ‘the promise of liberation’, each time this promise refigured according to the limitations and possibilities set by the changing needs of the global capitalist system.
The NGP appears, then, as the latest in the ANC government’s attempts at renewing mass confidence in it to continue leading the process towards the realisation of ‘the promise of liberation’ within the context of its unchanged commitments to a neoliberal macroeconomic policy framework. Having been developed and proposed by a new leadership under the Zuma presidency, the NGP enjoys the support and carries the hopes of millions of working-class people who believe that it must have been developed in their best interests by virtue of its custodianship. Since 1994, the imagination of political possibilities has come to be framed by the nature, characteristics, and commitments of the particular leader in power, from Mandela to Mbeki to Zuma. This is evident not just in the form that politics assumes, but also in the manner in which it is interpreted, with recent academic and other public commentary being driven by the need to write up history in the names of its big men. But perhaps, as the experience of Argentina showed in 2001, and the more recent popular uprisings in the Middle East have shown, politics seems always to return to the people in whose name it claims to speak, who demand accountability and the right to participate in decisions that are made about their lives.
NOTES
1 An earlier period of conflict in the ANC and the Alliance occurred over its adoption of Gear in 1996 and the effects of the implementation of its policies from 1997 onwards. This involved the expulsion of several members from alliance formations, and the formation of new social and community movements, such as the Concerned Citizens Forum (CCF), the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), the Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC), the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and the Landless People’s Movement (LPM). While these movements were responsible for a period of heightened censure of the ANC and its adoption of neoliberalism until about 2006, as well as some significant policy changes with regard to the delivery of basic services, many of them no longer exist today, or face internal conflicts. Those that have survived also exhibit a rhythm, routine and predictability with regard to struggle that makes them less threatening to the ANC-led government and less successful in making and winning demands.
2 It should, however, be noted that these conflicts within the alliance have also highlighted levels of intolerance and authoritarianism among its members, and that the very existence of a culture of caucusing, cliques and cabals demonstrates undemocratic practices dominating the functioning of the ANC and the broader congress tradition.