The Animal at Unease with Itself. Isaac M. Alderman
the limits of doctrinal modalities is present even earlier in Christianity. Paul seems to be relying on doctrinal teaching, with low levels of arousal. For example, Paul opposed the charismatic practices of the Christians in Corinth and insisted that practices, such as glossolalia, “be regulated by instruction (oikodome, katechesis) and by reasoned interpretation (nous, diermenia)” (1 Cor 14:5, 13–15).[103] Though Uro does not mention the incident, the author of Acts has immortalized the danger of the tedium effect with the incident of poor Eutychus who falls from the window as Paul’s teaching drones on (Acts 20:9)!
Conclusion
From my survey of some of the major concerns of cognitive science, as well as its use in the humanities, religion, and biblical studies, I hope that the reader recognizes the importance of cognition in the process of telling, writing, and reading stories. In varying degrees, biblical scholarship today requires that one be an archaeologist, historian, linguist, anthropologist, and literary critic. Increasingly, I suggest that cognitive science needs to be a part of this discussion as well. Not only the events of history and the workings of a society, but also the way in which religious thoughts, texts, events, and concepts are cognitively processed have increasingly become useful tools in understanding the biblical text.
Notes
1.
J. Cheryl Exum, and David J. A. Clines, The New Literary Criticism and the Hebrew Bible, Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 12.
2.
Ellen van Wolde, Reframing Biblical Studies: When Language and Text Meet Culture, Cognition, and Context (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2009).
3.
István Czachesz, Cognitive Science and the New Testament: A New Approach to Early Christian Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). István Czachesz and Risto Uro, eds., Mind, Morality and Magic: Cognitive Science Approaches in Biblical Studies (Durham: Acumen, 2013).
4.
Jay Friedenberg and Gordon Silverman, Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Study of Mind (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2012), 3.
5.
Friedenberg and Silverman, Cognitive Science, 2.
6.
Justin L. Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology: From Human Minds to Divine Minds (West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Press, 2011), 5.
7.
Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology, 5.
8.
Luther Martin, “Religion and Cognition,” in The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion, ed. John R. Hinnells (London: Routledge, 2010), 526.
9.
Martin, “Religion and Cognition,” 526.
10.
Martin, “Religion and Cognition,” 527.
11.
Martin, “Religion and Cognition,” 527.
12.
Friedenberg and Silverman, Cognitive Science, 2, 11.
13.
Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology, 12.
14.
Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology, 16.
15.
Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology, 27. Barrett finds this term a little problematic, as an appliance such as a light fixture is hardwired (rigid in place and power source) or not, like a lamp (movable and “unplugable”). “For those of us who think that we think through our brain (or more strongly, that our brain thinks), it is a little odd to say that some cognition is part of our brain circuitry whereas other cognition is not: it is all part of our electrical system. So, the emphasis added by hard-wired just means degree of rigidity, automaticity, or invariance. But this is an issue of degree whereas to be hard-wired (in electrical systems) is a discreet concept—either hard-wired or not.”
16.
Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology, 7.
17.
Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology, 23.
18.
Marianne Regard, Daria Knoch, Eva Gütling, and Theodor Landis, “Brain Damage and Addictive Behavior: A Neuropsychological and Electroencephalogram Investigation with Pathologic Gamblers,” Cognitive & Behavioral Neurology 16 (2003): 47.
19.
Aya Norenzayan, W. M. Gervais, K. H. Trzesniewski, “Mentalizing Deficits Constrain Belief in a Personal God,” PLoS ONE 7 (2012): 1–8.
20.
D. Havas, A. Glenberg, K. Gutowski, M. Lucarelli, and R. Davidson, “Cosmetic Use of Botulinum Toxin-a Affects Processing of Emotional Language,” Psychological Science 21 (2010): 895.
21.
There are far too many studies to list. For examples, see, Lindsay Bruce and Sarah Lane Ritchie, “The Physicalized Mind and the Gut-Brain Axis: Taking Mental Health Out of Our Heads,” Zygon 53 (2018): 356–374; M. Hasan Mohajeri, Giorgio La Fata, Robert E. Steinert, Peter Weber, “Relationship between the Gut Microbiome and Brain Function,” Nutrition Reviews, 76 (2018): 481–496; Emeran A. Mayer, Rob Knight, Sarkis K. Mazmanian, John F. Cryan, and Kirsten Tillisch, “Gut Microbes and the Brain: Paradigm Shift in Neuroscience,” The Journal of Neuroscience 34 (2014): 15490–15496.
22.
For an overview of the positions regarding mind-body monism and dualism, see John Cooper, Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000).
23.
Alvin Goldman, “Theory of Mind,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, eds. Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels, and Stephen Stich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 402. While theory of mind researchers are in essential agreement as to the definition of theory of mind, they do have competing theories regarding the way in which mentalizing is accomplished. Goldman (403–409) outlines the three theories. The “theory-theory,” in which intuitive theory of behavior is refined over time with experience and cognitive maturation; the “modularity nativist theory,” in which innate understandings need cognitive maturation; and the “rationalist teleological theory,” in which we calculate events, developing rational expectations based on our perceived evaluation of others’ situations.
24.
Brian Boyd, On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 141.
25.
Todd Tremlin, Minds and Gods: The Cognitive Foundations of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 77.
26.
For example, see Deborah Kelemen, “Are Children ‘Intuitive Theists’? Reasoning about purpose and design in nature,” Psychological Science 15 (2004): 295–301.
27.
Tremlin, Minds and Gods, 80. Studies have also shown that people are more likely to detect agency in nature when given religious primes. See, Wieteke Nieuwboer, Hein van Schie, and Daniël Wigboldus, “Priming with Religion and Supernatural Agency Enhances the Perception of Intentionality in Natural Phenomena,” Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion 2 (2015): 97–120.
28.