The Animal at Unease with Itself. Isaac M. Alderman
to Today’s Civilization (Lincoln, NB: iUniverse, 2006), 89.
11.
Ken Stone, Reading the Hebrew Bible with Animal Studies (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), 166–167. Stone embraces the term Anthropocene and concludes his book with a reading of the Hebrew Bible in an age of anthropogenic extinction. The Elsevier journal Anthropocene publishes articles “addressing the nature, scale, and extent of interactions that people have with Earth processes and systems. The scope of the journal includes the significance of human activities in altering Earth’s landscapes, oceans, the atmosphere, cryosphere, and ecosystems over a range of time and space scales.” From https://www.journals.elsevier.com/anthropocene/.
12.
Angelique Richardson, “Introduction,” in After Darwin: Animals, Emotions, and the Mind, ed. Angelique Richardson (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013), 1.
13.
Stephen Mulhall, Philosophical Myths of the Fall (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 73. This is a quote by Alasdair MacIntyre, taken from Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals—Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (London: Duckworth, 1999), 50. MacIntyre goes on to criticize Heidegger, arguing for a spectrum between humans and other animals with no stark divisions. Other philosophers engage in the effort to eliminate, rather than emphasize or describe the difference between humans and non-human animals. For example, Olson and Snowden use thought experiments such as cloning machines and brain transplants to build logical cases against the suggestions that there is some human nature that is distinct from animal nature. Eric T. Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Paul F. Snowdon, Persons, Animals, Ourselves (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
14.
Jonathan Gottschall, The Storytelling Animal; How Stories Make Us Human (Boston: Mariner Books, 2013), xiv.
15.
Gottschall, The Storytelling Animal, 138. Emphasis in the original.
16.
Gottschall, The Storytelling Animal, xiv.
17.
It is interesting to contrast this with the Egyptian conceptions of humanity as images of God. Cf. Erik Hornung, “Der Mensch als ‘Bild Gottes’ in Ägypten,” in Die Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen, Schriften des Deutschen Instituts für Wissenschaftliche Pedagogik, ed. Oswald Loretz (Munich: Kösel, 1967), 123–156.
18.
Risto Uro, “Towards a Cognitive History of Early Christian Rituals,” in Changing Minds: Religion and Cognition Through the Ages, eds., István Czachesz and T. S. Biró (Leuven: Peeters, 2011), 112–114. Uro notes Pascal Boyer’s emphasis on rituals as a way to ward off dangers, which Boyer sees as a potential origin of ritual behavior. Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought (New York: Basic Books, 2001).
19.
Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Thomas A. Pyszczynski, The Worm at the Core: On the Role of Death in Life (New York: Random House, 2015), 63.
20.
Solomon et al., The Worm at the Core, 7.
21.
Solomon et al., The Worm at the Core, vii. The authors draw their title from William James: “Back of everything is the spectre of universal death . . .” and a weak moment can “bring the worm at the core of all our usual springs of delight into full view, and turn us into melancholy metaphysicians.” William James, Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1902), 140.
22.
Three anthologies on death have been helpful for this project: Robert F. Weir, Death in Literature (New York: Columbia University, 1980); D. J. Enright, The Oxford Book of Death (Oxford: Oxford University, 1992); David Meltzer, Death: An Anthology of Ancient Texts, Songs, Prayers, and Stories (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1984).
23.
Becker, Denial of Death, 17. Solomon et al., The Worm at the Core, 167.
24.
Weir, Death in Literature, 2.
25.
Meltzer, Death, 5–6.
26.
Meltzer, Death, 6.
27.
Meltzer, Death, 34. Heidegger also makes this point, going so far as to suggest that death is not open to analysis in existential terms, see Mulhall, Philosophical Myths, 64.
28.
Meltzer, Death, 6.
29.
Meltzer, Death, 7.
30.
Jacob Juhl and Clay Routledge, “Putting the Terror in Terror Management Theory,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 25 (2016): 99–103. Clay Routledge, Jacob Juhl, and Matthew Vess, “Mortality salience increases death-anxiety for individuals low in personal need for structure,” Motivation and Emotion 37 (2013): 303–307.
31.
Jamie Goldenberg, Tom Pyszczynski, Jeff Greenberg, and Sheldon Solomon, “Fleeing the Body: A terror management perspective on the problem of human corporeality,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 4 (2000): 200–218.
32.
Arthur C. Graesser and Sydney D’Mello, “Moment-To-Moment Emotions During Reading,” The Reading Teacher 66 (2012): 238–242.
33.
David Duncan, The Brothers K (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 135. For information on Edward Conze, see Edward W. Bastian, “Edward Conze,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 2 (1979): 116.
34.
David Cave, “Reading the Body, Reading Scripture: The implications of Neurobiology on the Study of Scripture,” in Religion and the Body; Modern Science and the Construction of Religious Meaning, ed. David Cave and Rebecca Sachs Norris (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 22–23, 28. Stanislas Dehaene, Reading in the Brain: The New Science of How We Read (New York: Penguin, 2009), 6. Lévy-Bruhl made a similar point in 1923: “We shall no longer define the mental activity as primitives . . . as a rudimentary form of our own.” Quoted in, Luther Martin, “Towards a Scientific History of Religions,” in Theorizing Religions Past: Archaeology, History and Cognition, ed. Harvey Whitehouse and Luther Martin (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2004), 8.
35.
Robert B. Arrowood, Jonathan Jong, Kenneth E. Vail III, and Ralph W. Hood, ”Guest editors’ foreword: On the Importance of Integrating Terror Management and Psychology of Religion,” Religion, Brain & Behavior, 8 (2017): 1. The goal of Arrowood et al., is necessarily limited in scope, and so does not engage with how terror management theorists are defining religion, or indeed even qualifying their statements about studying religion. The work of scholars such as Clifford Geertz and Christian Smith do not seem to be accounted for in their statements about religion. The quote by Arrowood et al., includes a quote from Kenneth E. Vail, Zachary K. Rothschild, Dave R. Weise, Sheldon Solomon, Tom Pyszczynski, and Jeff Greenberg, “A Terror Management Analysis of the Psychological Functions of Religion,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 14 (2010): 65.
36.
Arrowood et al., “Terror Management,” 2.
37.
Derrida, The Animal, 3.
38.
Peter