Post Wall, Post Square. Kristina Spohr
looking out from the West Front of the Capitol across the Mall to the Lincoln Memorial. After the customary invocations of the deity and American history, Bush positioned himself on the cusp of a new era, as yet ill-defined. ‘There are times when the future seems thick as a fog; you sit and wait, hoping the mists will lift and reveal the right path. But this is a time when the future seems a door you can walk right through into a room called tomorrow.’ And Bush was ready to do so. ‘We live in a peaceful, prosperous time, but we can make it better. For a new breeze is blowing, and a world refreshed by freedom seems reborn. For in man’s heart, if not in fact, the day of the dictator is over.’ The new president made no direct reference to the amazing transformations under way in the Soviet bloc and in communist China, but no one could have been in any doubt of what he meant. ‘The totalitarian era is passing, its old ideas blown away like leaves from an ancient, lifeless tree … Great nations of the world are moving toward democracy through the door to freedom.’ And America was the gatekeeper. ‘We know what works: freedom works. We know what’s right: freedom is right.’ The president set out the country’s mission: ‘America is never wholly herself unless she is engaged in high moral principle. We as a people have such a purpose today. It is to make kinder the face of the Nation and gentler the face of the world. My friends, we have work to do.’[47] This was America’s moment and he wanted to seize it.
But where should the work begin? One might have expected that Bush would have opened the door towards Moscow: after Gorbachev’s watershed speech at the UN and with the political transformation under way in Poland and Hungary, much of the world was fixated on the changes in the Soviet Union and the ferment in Eastern Europe. Yet, guided by the scepticism of Scowcroft and also keen to break from Reagan’s cosy relations with Gorbachev, Bush’s presidency began with a deliberate ‘pause’ in superpower diplomacy.[48] With few active agenda items left by the Reagan White House – START I being the notable exception – Bush decided to order a set of studies ‘re-examining existing policy and goals by region, with reviews of arms control as well’. Working out how to deal with Moscow was ‘obviously our first priority’, Scowcroft would later recall, but the reports would take a while to produce. Indeed, the NSC review on the Soviet Union (NSR 3) did not land on the president’s desk until 14 March, the reviews on Eastern (NSR 4) and Western Europe (NSR 5, focused on closer union by 1992) two weeks after that.[49]
Meanwhile, Bush had not only opened the China door but strode right through it. On 25–6 February he met with the Communist Party in Beijing. It was the first time in American history that a new US president had travelled to Asia before going to Europe.[50]
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Bush, who considered himself an expert on China, was keen to bring Beijing into a ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership’. ‘The importance of China is very clear to me,’ Bush told Brzezinski two weeks after his election. ‘I’d love to return to China before Deng leaves office entirely. I feel I have a special relationship there.’[51] Deng Xiaoping was the mastermind of China’s policies of ‘reform and opening up’ – the drive after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 to abandon the autarkic planned economy and cautiously enter the global market. By 1989 the diminutive Deng was eighty-four and Bush was anxious to exploit their unusually long-standing personal relationship, which dated back to Bush’s quasi-ambassadorship to China in 1974–5. For Bush, China meant Deng. The president’s fascination with China had less to do with the country per se (its language, landscape or culture) than with its social and economic potential that Deng was in the process of unleashing into the global capitalist economy. Conversely, the Chinese referred to Bush as a lao pengyou – their term for a really trusted ‘old friend’ who is committed to building positive relations and acting as interlocutor between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the wider world but who also enjoys a special confidence that permits plain speaking. Those Americans before Bush who had earned such a distinction included Nixon and Kissinger; but neither Carter nor Reagan were considered a lao pengyou.[52]
China’s new course, promoted by Deng from 1978, was one of the transitional moments of the twentieth century. Under his leadership Beijing promoted rapid modernisation through greater engagement in an increasingly interdependent world, particularly with technologically advanced Western Europe and America. Domestically, measures were introduced to make policy more responsive to economic incentives. These included the decollectivisation of agriculture, allowing farmers to make profits; rewards for especially efficient industrial performance; and the promotion of small-scale private business. With an eye on both the global economy and the international power balance, Deng gradually relaxed controls on foreign investment and trade and sought membership of global financial institutions. His stated aim was to accomplish before the end of the century a total socio-economic transformation of his country, which in the 1980s ranked among the poorest third of states in the world. By the time Bush was elected president Deng’s gamble was already paying off. In just over one decade of reform, China’s GDP more than doubled from $150 billion in 1978 to over $310 billion in 1988.[53]
The world’s most populous country was in the throes of an economic revolution which, unlike Soviet Russia under Gorbachev, was very tightly managed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and which also advanced step by step. Not only did Gorbachev’s economic liberalisation begin much later, in 1985 rather 1978, but the concomitant political reforms, which gradually dismantled the Soviet Communist Party’s monopoly on power, amounted to nothing less than a new system of governance. This process in turn stirred up destructive ethnic conflicts in what was a much less homogeneous society than China’s. Whereas in the PRC the process of economic reform was controlled from above, in the USSR perestroika combined with glasnost would eventually undermine the Soviet state.[54]
In the course of this Chinese revolution, the United States played a major role. Although Deng was initially keen to engage with Western Europe, America represented his ultimate model, especially after his eye-opening visit in early 1979 to mark the opening of full diplomatic relations: ‘what he saw in the United States was what he wanted for China in the future’. During a week’s whirlwind tour from Washington DC to Seattle, America’s factories and farms simply ‘bowled him over’. So impressive was US technology and productivity that, by his own admission, Deng could not sleep for several weeks.[55]
The Carter administration was keen for Deng’s reforms to succeed; it also wanted to pull China closer to the USA at a time when détente was eroding and the relationship with Moscow had slipped into a deep freeze amid the ‘New Cold War’. Not only did Carter normalise diplomatic relations with China but he granted ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) status twelve months later – a crucial precondition for expanded bilateral trade. The PRC joined the World Bank in April 1980, the same month that it took over from Taiwan China’s place on the IMF. Accelerating the momentum, in September 1980 the Carter administration concluded four commercial agreements: on aviation, shipping, textiles and expanded consular representation. Announcing these, Carter called the Sino-American relationship ‘a new and vital force for peace and stability in the international scene’ which held ‘a promise of ever-increasing benefits in trade and other exchanges’ for both countries.[56]
Reagan took up Carter’s policy and pursued it with even greater vigour. One of the priorities of his new ‘global strategy’ was the integration of the Pacific Rim into the world economy. Within that enlarged market, China was potentially the biggest player, so its successful opening up would offer exceptional opportunities for US trade and investment. There was also a strategic dimension. The drive for economic modernisation would align China with the capitalist order and make it a more robust bulwark against the Soviet Union. In this vein, the Reagan administration offered Deng in 1981 a ‘strategic association’ with the USA – effectively a de facto alliance. So at a time when Cold War tensions ratcheted up, Sino-American security cooperation expanded. Beijing got US weapons technology, while coordinating with the American anti-communist campaigns in Afghanistan, Angola and Cambodia.[57] Although Reagan himself visited China in 1984, he was happy to make as much use as possible of his vice president’s old-friend status with the Chinese. Bush paid two week-long visits to Beijing in May 1982 and October 1985. On the second occasion he was particularly bullish about Sino-American trade: ‘The sky’s the limit, the door’s wide open,’ he told a news conference, adding that he found ‘much more openness’ now than