1812. Adam Zamoyski
sister Catherine was urging him to leave the army. ‘If one of [the generals] commits a fault, he will be blamed and punished; if you make a mistake, everything falls on your shoulders, and the destruction of confidence in him on whom everything depends and who, being the only arbiter of the destiny of the Empire, must be the support to which everything bends, is a greater evil than the loss of a few provinces,’ she wrote.30
What she did not point out was that he had already done a great deal of damage by going to Vilna, and was compounding it by his irresolute behaviour. His refusal to commit himself to any of the options laid before him or to openly place his confidence in any one of his generals meant that nobody knew what to prepare for. His brother Grand Duke Constantine drilled his soldiers mercilessly, but nobody was preparing to meet the approaching Grande Armée. No serious attempts were being made to plot the enemy’s movements, and the units had not even been issued with adequate maps of the areas they were to operate in.31
‘In the meantime we held balls and parties, and our prolonged sojourn in Vilna resembled a pleasure trip rather than preparations for war,’ in the words of Colonel Benckendorff. Shishkov was astonished by the carefree atmosphere and the lack of any sense of imminent menace he found on his arrival in Vilna. ‘Our everyday life was so carefree that there was not even any news about the enemy, as though they had been several thousands of versts* away,’ he wrote. The troops had settled into their billets and savoured whatever pleasures the country life of Lithuania could provide. ‘The senior officers feared Napoleon, seeing him as a fearful conqueror, a new Attila,’ wrote Lieutenant Radozhitsky of the light artillery, ‘but we younger ones romped with the god of love, sighing and moaning from his wounds.’32
People far away from the front could not understand why the Russian army, whose officers wrote home letters full of bravado, did not attack and drive the French out of Prussia and Poland. There was grumbling about the lack of action, reinforced by widespread fear of a French advance into Russia, not least because it might provoke social unrest.
In May the erroneous news reached St Petersburg that Badajoz and Madrid had fallen to the British and that a Spanish army had crossed the Pyrenees into southern France. Why, people asked themselves up and down the country, was Alexander not marching out to deal the final blow against Napoleon? He and his entourage appeared to be whiling away the time at balls and parties, and it was reported in the capital that the officers were indulging in ‘orgies’.33
Russian estimates of the size of the Grande Armée were very low. Barclay and Phüll put the strength of the French forces at 200–250,000; Bagration at 200,000; Toll at 225,000; Bennigsen at 169,000; and Bernadotte at 150,000. The highest estimate drawn up by anyone on the Russian side was 350,000, and that included all reserves and rear formations.34 This meant that an attack on it would have been seen as perfectly feasible, and Alexander undoubtedly longed to launch one. His excitement about the Chichagov plan and his attempt to bribe Poniatowski can only be viewed in the context of an offensive. And there are other indications that he wanted to take command of it.35
But he was heavily influenced by Phüll’s views, and Phüll was against any attack, believing as he did that the Russian army was not up to it.36 Above all, Alexander wanted to be seen as the innocent victim rather than the aggressor, and his religious instincts told him to play the part of passive tool of the divine will.
In recent years he had made more and more references to the will of God in his letters and utterances, and he had been increasingly guided by the wish to make himself a worthy and righteous instrument of that will. ‘I have at least the consolation of having done everything that is compatible with honour to avoid this struggle,’ he had written to Catherine in February. ‘Now it is only a question of preparing for it with courage and faith in God; this faith is stronger than ever in me, and I submit with resignation to His will.’37
Nesselrode was still advising Alexander to negotiate rather than provoke a war, but Alexander seems to have ruled out negotiations entirely as an option, and he was in no mood to talk when Narbonne arrived in Vilna on 18 May.38 He received him and read the letter he had brought, but told him that as Napoleon had ranged the whole of Europe against Russia it was evident his intentions were hostile, and that there was therefore no point in negotiating. He reiterated that he would only consider doing so if Napoleon withdrew his troops beyond the Rhine.
‘What does the Emperor want?’ he asked Narbonne rhetorically. ‘To subject me to his interests, to force me to measures which ruin my people, and, because I refuse, he intends to make war on me, in the belief that after two or three battles and the occupation of a few provinces, perhaps even a capital, I will be obliged to ask for a peace whose conditions he will dictate. He is deluding himself!’ Then, taking a large map of his dominions, he spread it on the table and continued: ‘My dear Count, I am convinced that Napoleon is the greatest general in Europe, that his armies are the most battle-hardened, his lieutenants the bravest and the most experienced; but space is a barrier. If, after a few defeats, I retreat, sweeping along the population, if I leave it to time, to the wilderness, to the climate to defend me, I may yet have the last word over the most formidable army of modern times.’39
Although most people at Russian headquarters assumed that the only purpose of Narbonne’s mission was to spy out their dispositions and rouse local patriots to stage an uprising, Alexander invited him to attend a parade on the following day, and to dine with him afterwards. But the next day Narbonne was informed by one of Alexander’s aides-de-camp that a carriage generously provisioned for the journey back to Dresden would be waiting at his door that evening.40
* One verst = 1060 metres, approximately five-eighths of a mile.
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