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Attention, Noticing, and Awareness in Second Language Acquisition
RONALD P. LEOW
Introduction
The role attention plays in the learning process has almost always been assumed since the earliest studies in the field of second language acquisition (SLA). Any exposure, be it aural or written, manipulated or authentic, to the foreign or second language (L2) is arguably premised on the role of attention on the part of the learner. The SLA field up to the mid‐1990s had generally assumed that experimental conditions (instruction or exposure, be it explicit, that is, with awareness, or implicit, that is, without awareness) elicited the required attention paid to the targeted item(s) in the L2 input. This premise is evidenced in the type of research design employed in the studies, which was the classical pretest—experimental condition—posttest design, without any concurrent or online data on learners' actual attention paid to the targeted items in the input.
The early postulations of Schmidt (1990) and Robinson (1995a) in SLA, and Tomlin and Villa (1994) from the field of cognitive science, regarding the roles of attention and awareness in input processing arguably propelled several researchers to probe deeper, both methodologically and empirically, into the constructs of attention and awareness. As Schmidt (2001) pointed out, it is quite challenging to separate these two constructs given that in psychology they are commonly viewed as being intrinsically integrated. While the role attention plays is relatively noncontroversial in most research fields that include cognitive psychology, cognitive science, and SLA, whether awareness plays a role in learning remains highly debated in all these fields.
This entry presents a concise review of the important tenets of the several major theoretical approaches that have postulated roles for both the constructs of attention and awareness in L2 learning at the initial stage of language processing (e.g., Schmidt, 1990, 1993, 2001; Tomlin & Villa, 1994; Robinson, 1995a; Leow, 2015a). A report of empirical studies premised on some role for attention/noticing is presented followed by those that have isolated the construct of awareness to investigate its effects on L2 learning. Finally, studies in SLA that have empirically probed deeper into the construct of unawareness will be reported and suggestions made for future research directions.
Theoretical Approaches to the Roles of Attention and Awareness in SLA
While there are several theoretical underpinnings in the SLA field that have postulated an important role for attention at the initial stage of L2 development, only Schmidt's (1990 and elsewhere) noticing hypothesis, Tomlin and Villa's (1994) functional model of input processing in SLA, Robinson's (1995a) model of the relationship between attention and memory, and Leow's (2015a) model of the L2 learning process in instructed second language acquisition (ISLA) have directly addressed the roles of both attention and awareness. The main tenets of these four underpinnings are discussed below.
Schmidt's Noticing Hypothesis
Drawing from works in cognitive psychology and his own personal experience while learning Portuguese, Schmidt's (1990, and elsewhere) noticing hypothesis postulates that attention, which “is necessary in order to understand virtually every aspect of second language acquisition” (Schmidt, 2001, p. 3), controls access to awareness and is responsible for noticing. Noticing is “the necessary and sufficient condition for the conversion of input into intake” (Schmidt, 1990, p. 129). Intake in SLA is usually defined as a subset of the input that has been taken in by the learner but not necessarily internalized in the language system and occurs at a preliminary stage along the acquisitional process (e.g., Leow, 1993). Attention, according to Schmidt, is isomorphic with awareness and he rejects the idea of learning without awareness. In addition, Schmidt proposes a level of awareness that is higher than awareness at the level of noticing, namely, awareness at the level of understanding. Whereas awareness at the level of noticing leads to mere intake, this higher level of awareness promotes deeper learning marked by restructuring and system learning and is underscored by learners' ability to analyze, compare, and test hypotheses at this level.
Tomlin and Villa's Functional Model of Input Processing in SLA
While concurring with Schmidt's noticing hypothesis on the important role of attention in learning, Tomlin and Villa's (1994) model of input processing in SLA differs sharply from Schmidt's regarding the role of awareness in the acquisitional process. Drawing on works in cognitive science, Tomlin and Villa propose a functionally based, fine‐grained analysis of attention. In their model, attention comprises “three separable attentional functions that have also been paired to separate yet interconnected neuroanatomical areas” (Tomlin & Villa, 1994, p. 190): (a) alertness (an overall readiness to deal with incoming stimuli), (b) orientation (the direction of attentional resources to a certain type of stimuli), and (c) detection (the cognitive registration of stimuli). The network hypothesized to be necessary for further processing of input and subsequent learning to take place is that of detection. The other two networks (alertness and orientation) are important in SLA and can enhance the chances that detection will occur, but their role in promoting detection is not crucial. According to Tomlin and Villa, in their model, detection does not imply awareness, that is, awareness does not play a crucial role in the preliminary processing of input into intake during exposure.
Robinson's Model of the Relationship between Attention and Memory
Robinson's (1995a) model of the relationship between attention and memory neatly reconciles Schmidt's notion of noticing (which involves awareness) and Tomlin and Villa's notion of detection (which does not imply awareness). In this model, detection is strategically placed at an earlier stage in the acquisitional process when compared to noticing. In other words, linguistic information may be detected and taken in by the learner but if this information is not accompanied by awareness, then the chance of this information being further processed is relatively minimal. Noticing, according to Robinson, is “detection plus rehearsal in short‐term memory, prior to encoding in long‐term memory” (1995a, p. 296). Like Schmidt, Robinson assumes that noticing does involve awareness and that it plays an important role in L2 learning.
Leow's Model of the L2 Learning Process in ISLA
Leow's (2015a) model of the L2 learning process in ISLA also underscores the role of attention at the input processing stage but, like Tomlin and Villa (1994), does not posit a crucial role for awareness at this stage. He provides a more fine‐grained notion of input processing by dividing this stage into three phases, each with attentional resources that may incorporate cognitive registration, awareness, and depth of processing,