Emergency Incident Management Systems. Louis N. Molino, Sr.
do their jobs safely, efficiently, and effectively, they need these advanced tools and technology. The pair goes hand in hand, and the tools are part of the resources that both the military and public safety must manage during an incident.
When we talk about tools in public safety, we think of items like handcuffs, Kevlar vests, axes, hose, and protective gear, but not all tools are forged out of steel. Some tools are concepts and operations systems that allow the military and first responders to provide control in the midst of chaos. This is necessary whether they are engaged in war or a responding to a disaster.
Their primary tool to respond to any incident is not a weapon, nor is it a fire engine, but rather the concepts that has become known as an IMS. If we deliver equipment and the people to a war (or disaster), we need to realize that if we do not manage the response to the incident, that response may be reminiscent of the Keystone Cops. No matter how many individuals and/or how many millions or billions of dollars of equipment that arrives, it would be a futile attempt if we do not provide an organized response that manages the human responders.
To prove the utility of the IMS, a modern‐day comparison is in order. Thinking about the military, if the management of ground troops and airstrikes are not properly managed, the ground troops could move into enemy territory only to suffer losses due to airstrikes from their own country. These ground troops could be accidently killed by those trying to reach the same objective. The same holds true in modern‐day policing. If a building is being entered and there is not resource management to cover all exits, the perpetrator could escape through an exit that has no police presence. Only through organizing all aspects of a response will the commanding officer know that every exit is properly guarded.
Looking at the United States, we have proven repeatedly that our military might is one of the best on the planet. We have both the tactics and the technology that leave other nations envious of our power, yet the true reason for the United States' military success is not technology. The success that we enjoy is based on a mission‐oriented, goal‐driven mindset that is instilled in our leaders. This mindset is also reflected in the workers of the emergency services community in the United States (and abroad).
Technology is only a tool in a collective toolbox for our military. Much of that same technology is used on a daily basis in emergency response activities. The military of the twenty‐first century has had to deal with technological leaps that are unprecedented in history. These leaps have undoubtedly caused many headaches and unseen problems that were unknown.
These same technological advances have been the cause of many problems to military leaders of the past. Modern warfare requires technology to become bigger and better, faster and stronger, but the warrior on the ground remains the most important part of war. Technology will allow him to win war with greater speed and ease, provided that the technology is managed and integrated into the plan of attack. Even with technology, it is the soldier on the ground fighting, and sometimes dying, in war that makes the true difference.
The same holds true in respect to emergency responders. It is not the soldier, but the firefighter, the police officers, the emergency managers, and the paramedic or Emergency Medical Technician's (EMT's) that serve their country on the home front. Technology will not, and cannot, do their jobs for them; it does however allow them to do their jobs in a more proficient manner and to undertake their tasks more efficiently. The men and women of emergency services make up the front line of Homeland Defense.
As we look back over time, it is plain to see that many of the fathers of incident command and incident management system had military backgrounds. They could see the obvious and sometime the unobvious needs of their emergency response agencies. They began to mold and modify military command and control structures learned while serving their country and developed those tools into systems that would allow their agencies to better respond to individuals who needed assistance during a time of crisis.
These individuals first adopted, then adapted, military command philosophy to be used in their day‐to‐day response activities as first responders. This adaptation process was not seamless nor was it an overnight success. Even after many years of honing these systems, incident management systems are still evolving, which creates a never‐ending process. The emergency services community looks to the military for guidance in ever‐increasing demands for response to incidents, and they rely on lessons learned in their own responses. The concepts that drive both emergency services incident management theory and military theories of tactical responses are still evolving. Often, those changes and improvements are on similar tracks, and for the most part, they always have been.
The beginnings of the modern‐day Incident Management Systems for public safety were born almost simultaneously in vastly different areas. They were developed for a wide and somewhat diverse array of reasons with one common goal. That goal was to better serve the needs of the community and to save lives and protect property in superior ways. Where each of these individual principals originated is still in question.
1.4 The Birth of IMS Method
When a public safety student begins to study emergency management theory, they will realize that there is a “documented birth” of IMS. While other incidents may have helped form IMS methods, the focused creation as a public safety entity‐based management system came about in the late 1960s. It was developed after the devastating wildfires that ravaged parts of Southern California. The fire service in California (as well as other state and local agencies) knew that they had to find ways to overcome a series of repeated deficiencies, mistakes, and negative events that seemed to occur during large‐scale, statewide (or multiagency) emergency operations. The agencies who responded to these incidents began to identify common failures in their response efforts to these events. These ongoing problems were especially important when multiple agencies responded to the same incident, and the same issues were seen time, and time, again. The most apparent problems, at least in the initial stages of creating IMS methods, appeared to be the same (or at least similar) issues.
1.4.1 No Single Person in Charge
As larger incidents occurred, often multiple jurisdictions would gather at the emergency incident, and there would be no clear command or person in charge. Additionally, in most instances, each entity did not communicate, coordinate, or collaborate with other first responders. With no clearly identifiable incident leader, it became apparent that multiple different agencies responding to the same incident had their own goals and objectives. This often led to more chaos and confusion, and it put first responders at risk as each agency “did their own thing.” Due to the fact that multiple entities were operating independently, competing tactics were sometimes contradictory to each other and dangerous to other crews operating at the scene of a major incident.
Old timers from the 1950s and the 1960s used to tell stories about how incredibly dangerous this was. While there is no way to confirm these stories, we often heard about firefighters who were directly attacking the flames with fire trucks and hoses, who would become caught in a wall of fire on all sides. From those stories, we learned that sometimes, later responding mutual aid crews did not know the first crew was actively fighting the flames, so they did what they felt was needed. These mutual aid crews would (sometimes) light backburn fires that would surround the first arriving crew, and the first arriving crew would be forced to run (or drive) for their life.
The old timers also told stories of crews helping to fight a structure fire, unaware that there were firefighters in the structure. Unbeknownst to the crews in the house, the mutual aid entity would arrive on scene, and not seeing anyone in charge, they would do what they thought was best. Not finding anyone in charge at a Command Post was typically because the command officers were usually with their crews fighting inside the fire rather than being at a Command Post and looking at the response objectively. This usually led to the mutual aid entity doing what they thought was best, and it would often cause issues. Sometimes those issues would turn life‐threatening. In firefighting, this would sometimes case a situation where interior firefighters would be hit with a large bore stream of water from the outside, or ventilation that drew the fire toward firefighters rather than away from them. This often resulted in injuries to firefighters