The Franco-German War of 1870-71. Graf von Helmuth Moltke
Commanding the Guard Corps.
[14] Of Saxony, commanding XIIth Corps.
[15] These figures represent only the infantry of the eight (not seven) Corps engaged; they do not include the cavalry, 24,584; the artillery, at least as strong; nor the officerhood of the two armies, numbering several thousands. Inclusive of those items the German host "employed" in the battle of Gravelotte—St. Privat numbered, in round figures, 232,000 combatants. Accepting Moltke's own estimate of ten defenders per "Schrith" of front, there works out a total of 133,000 men, as the strength of the French army "employed" in the battle.
[16] During the first fourteen days of August, the German troops were in conflict with the enemy on five occasions: viz. Saarbrücken, 2nd, loss 79; Weissenburg, 4th, loss 1551; Wörth, 6th, loss 10,642; Spicheren, 6th, loss 4871; Borny, 14th, loss 5000. Total losses during the fourteen days, 22,143.
New Distribution of the Army.
The siege of Metz had formed no part of the original plan of campaign; it had been intended to do no more than merely to maintain an observation on the place when the main army should have passed it on the advance towards Paris; and a Reserve Division, consisting of eighteen battalions, sixteen squadrons, and thirty-six guns, detailed for that duty, was now near at hand.
Under the altered conditions, however, the regular investment of Metz was now necessary, and this involved a radical alteration of the existing arrangements throughout the whole army.
A separate army under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, consisting of the Ist, VIIth, and VIIIth Corps of the former Ist Army, the IInd, IIIrd, IXth, and Xth Corps of the IInd Army, the Reserve Division and the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, in all 150,000 men, was assigned to the duty of investing Metz.
The Guard, IVth, and XIIth Corps and the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions were formed into a separate army under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony; it was styled "The Army of the Meuse" and was 138,000 strong.[17] This and the IIIrd Army, which numbered 223,000 men, were directed to advance against the new French army forming at Châlons.
Certainly the army investing Metz was left weaker than the blockaded enemy. It was to be expected that the latter would renew his efforts to break out to the westward. Prince Frederick Charles' main forces were therefore to remain on the left bank of the Moselle.
All these orders received the approval of the King, and were dispatched to the commanding officers by eleven o'clock on the morning of the 19th.
In accordance with the orders of Prince Frederick Charles, the Xth Corps occupied the woodland districts of the lower Moselle as far as St. Privat, while the IInd held the high ridge from that point to Moscou. To the right of the IInd, the VIIIth and VIIth Corps followed on, the latter positioned on both sides of the Upper Moselle. The Ist Corps occupied the Pouilly upland to left and right of the Seille, specially charged to protect the great magazines which were being established at Remilly and Pont à Mousson. The 3rd Reserve Division moved to the vicinity of Retonfay, north-east of Metz. The IXth and IIIrd Corps cantoned at St. Marie and Verneville as reserve. All the troops immediately set about the construction of earthworks, and of bridges over the Moselle above and below the fortress.
Of the Corps now belonging to the Army of the Meuse, the XIIth assembled at Conflans and the Guards at Mars la Tour; the IVth Corps, which had not been ordered to Metz, had already reached Commercy.
The IIIrd Army, after crossing the Vosges range, and having left a Bavarian brigade blockading Toul, was pressing forward in three columns. Its foremost Corps had already reached the Meuse, but were obliged to halt there for two days, so as to cross the river approximately abreast of the Meuse army. Its cavalry meanwhile patrolled three marches ahead as far as Châlons and Vitry, where, for the first time since Wörth, it regained touch of the enemy. The French encountered were only guarding posts on the Marne railway-line, which retired when the traffic thereon ceased.
FOOTNOTE:
[17] These figures are erroneous. It is manifest that three Corps and two Cavalry Divisions, most of which had been materially weakened by casualties, could not furnish a strength of 138,000 men; nor could the IIIrd Army, originally 130,000 strong, swelled by one Corps and diminished by battle losses of 12,000, approximate a strength of 223,000. As a matter of fact, on August 22nd, the Meuse Army was 86,275 strong, and the IIIrd Army 137,622; the two armies together had a total strength, in round numbers, of 224,000 men.
The Army of Châlons.
Meanwhile at Châlons there had been formed a French army of 166 battalions, 100 squadrons, and 380 guns, consisting of the Ist, Vth, VIIth, and XIIth Corps.
Of the last the Division which had been left behind on the Spanish frontier formed the nucleus, to which was added a body of very superior troops, consisting of four regiments of marines; later the two cavalry divisions also joined. General Trochu, who had been made Governor of Paris, had taken back with him thither eighteen battalions of Gardes-Mobiles, they having already given such proofs of insubordination that it was thought unsafe to confront them with the enemy.
The Emperor had arrived in Châlons and had placed Marshal MacMahon in command of the newly-formed army. In the French Head-quarter it was not unnaturally assumed that Marshal Bazaine was in retreat from Metz. By an advance of the Army of Châlons merely to Verdun the armies could form a junction with each other in the course of a few days, and so a fighting force be formed which might make head against the hitherto victorious enemy. On the other hand, MacMahon had to concern himself with the duty of covering Paris, and that capital, no less than his own right flank, was threatened by the appearance of the Crown Prince of Prussia's army on the Meuse.
For the attainment of a decision between advancing and retiring, it was beyond everything necessary to know the direction which Marshal Bazaine might have taken.
On the 18th tidings had come from him, that he had maintained his position in a battle about Rezonville, but that his troops had to be supplied with ammunition and supplies before they could renew the march. From this it seemed only too probable that the communications of the Army of the Rhine were already threatened; and MacMahon determined to march on Rheims, whence he could either reach Paris, though by a somewhat circuitous route, or move in the direction of the other army.
But when it became known that the Crown Prince of Prussia's army had not even been near Metz, and that Prussian cavalry had already appeared before Vitry, the Marshal could not deceive himself as to the danger involved in the latter alternative. With sound judgment, therefore, he stood out against the order of the Empress and the Ministry to undertake that enterprise; he determined against it, and announced his resolution to march to Paris. Under its walls he could accept a battle with advantage, since the fortifications, even in the event of defeat, assured a safe retreat and precluded pursuit.
Further reports from Metz did not afford a clear insight into the situation there. Also on the 18th, "the army had held its position," the narrative ran—only the right wing had changed front. "The troops required two or three days' rest," but the Marshal "counted still on being able to move out in a northerly