The Franco-German War of 1870-71. Graf von Helmuth Moltke
in the Allgemeine Zeitung of Munich, in the somewhat abridged and altered form in which the Field-Marshal had placed it at the disposal of Professor von Treitscke, the well-known historian.
Count Helmuth von Moltke,
Major and Adjutant to his
Imperial Majesty.
Berlin, June 25th, 1891.
THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.
PART I.
The days are gone by when, for dynastical ends, small armies of professional soldiers went to war to conquer a city, or a province, and then sought winter quarters or made peace. The wars of the present day call whole nations to arms; there is scarcely a family that has not had to bewail lost ones. The entire financial resources of the State are appropriated to military purposes, and the seasons of the year have no influence on the unceasing progress of hostilities. As long as nations exist distinct one from the other there will be quarrels that can only be settled by force of arms; but, in the interests of humanity, it is to be hoped that wars will become the less frequent, as they become the more terrible.
Generally speaking, it is no longer the ambition of monarchs which endangers peace; but the impulses of a nation, its dissatisfaction with its internal conditions, the strife of parties and the intrigues of their leaders. A declaration of war, so serious in its consequences, is more easily carried by a large assembly, of which no one of the members bears the sole responsibility, than by a single individual, however lofty his position; and a peace-loving sovereign is less rare than a parliament composed of wise men. The great wars of recent times have been declared against the wish and will of the reigning powers. Now-a-days the Bourse possesses so great influence that it is able to have armies called into the field merely to protect its interests. Mexico and Egypt have had European armies of occupation inflicted upon them simply to satisfy the demands of the haute finance. To-day the question is not so much whether a nation is strong enough to make war, as whether its Government is powerful enough to prevent war. For example, united Germany has hitherto used her strength only to maintain European peace; while the weakness of a neighbouring Government continues to involve the gravest risk of war.
It was, indeed, from such a condition of relations that the war of 1870—71 originated. A Napoleon on the throne of France was bound to justify his pretensions by political and military successes. Only temporarily was the French nation contented by the victories of its arms in remote fields of war; the triumphs of the Prussian armies excited jealousy, they were regarded as arrogant, as a challenge; and the French demanded revenge for Sadowa. The liberal spirit of the epoch set itself against the autocratic Government of the Emperor; he was forced to make concessions, his internal authority was weakened, and one day the nation was informed by its representatives that it desired war with Germany.
Preparations for War.
The wars carried on by France beyond seas, essentially on behalf of financial interests, had consumed immense sums and had undermined the discipline of the army. Her army was by no means in thorough preparedness for a great war, but, in the temper of the nation, the Spanish succession question furnished an opportune pretext on which to go to war. The French Reserves were called out on July 15th, and, as if the opportunity for a rupture was on no account to be let slip, only four days later the French declaration of war was presented at Berlin.
One Division of the French Army was ordered to the Spanish frontier as a corps of observation; only such troops as were absolutely necessary were left in Algiers and in Civita Vecchia; Paris and Lyons were sufficiently garrisoned. The entire remainder of the army: 332 battalions, 220 squadrons, 924 guns, in all about 300,000 men, formed the Army of the Rhine, which, divided into eight Corps, was, at any rate in the first instance, to be under the sole direction of a central head. The Emperor himself was the fitting person to undertake this weighty duty, pending whose arrival Marshal Bazaine was to command the gathering forces.
It is very probable that the French reckoned on the old dissensions of the German races. Not that they dared to look forward to the South Germans as allies, but they hoped to paralyze their offensive by an early victory, perhaps even to win them over to their side. It was true that Prussia by herself was still a mighty antagonist, and that her armed forces were of superior strength; but peradventure this advantage might be counterbalanced by rapidity of action.
The French plan of campaign was indeed based on the delivery of sudden unexpected attacks. The powerful fleet of war-ships and transports was to be utilized to land a considerable force in Northern Prussia, which should there engage a part of the Prussian troops, while the main body of the German army, it was assumed, would await the first French attack behind the strong defensive line of the Rhine. A French force was to cross the Rhine promptly, at and below Strasburg, thus avoiding the great German fortresses; its function being, at the very outset of the campaign, to cut off the South-German army charged with the defence of the Black Forest, and prevent it from effecting a junction with the North Germans. In the execution of this plan it was imperative that the main body of the French army should be massed in Alsace. Railway accommodation, however, was so inadequate that in the first instance it was only possible to transport 100,000 men to Strasburg; 150,000 had to leave the railway at Metz, and remain there till they could be moved forward. Fifty thousand men in the Châlons camp were intended to serve as supports, and 115 battalions were destined for field service as soon as the National Guard should relieve them in the interior. The various Corps were distributed as follows:—
| Imperial Guard, | General Bourbaki—Nancy. |
| Ist Corps, | Marshal MacMahon—Strasburg. |
| IInd Corps, | General Frossard—St. Avold. |
| IIIrd Corps, | Marshal Bazaine—Metz. |
| IVth Corps, | General Ladmirault—Thionville. |
| Vth Corps, | General Failly—Bitsch. |
| VIth Corps, | Marshal Canrobert—Châlons. |
| VIIth Corps, | General Félix Douay—Belfort. |
Thus while there were but two Corps in Alsace, there were five on the Moselle; and, so early as the day of the declaration of war, one of the latter, the IInd Corps, had been pushed forward close to the German frontier, about St. Avold and Forbach. General Frossard, its commander, was, however, under strict injunctions to commit himself to no serious undertaking.
The regiments had been hurried away from their peace stations before the arrival of their complement of men, and without waiting for their equipments. Meanwhile the called-out reservists accumulated in the depôts, overflowed the railway stations and choked the traffic. Their transmission to their destinations was at a standstill, for it was often unknown at the depôts where the regiments to which the reservists were to be sent were for the time encamped. When at length they joined they were destitute of the most necessary articles of equipment. The Corps and Divisions lacked trains, hospitals and nearly the whole of the personnel of their administration. No magazines