Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy. Duchess of Margaret Cavendish Newcastle
Figures; as repeating former Figures, and comparing them to others of the like nature, qualities, proprieties, as also chances, fortunes, &c. Which figuring and repeating is done actually, in and by the Rational Matter, so that all the observation of the mind on outward Objects is onely an actual repetition of the mind, as moving in such or such figures and actions; and when the mind makes voluntary Figures with those repeated Figures, and compares them together, this comparing is Examination; and when several Figures agree and joyn, it is Conclusion or Judgment: likewise doth Experience proceed from repeating and comparing of several Figures in the Mind, and the more several Figures are repeated and compared, the greater the experience is. One thing more there is in the same Chapter, which I cannot let pass without examination; Your Authour says, That things Present onely have a being in Nature, things Past onely a being in the Memory, but things to come have no being at all; Which how it possibly can be, I am not able to conceive; for certainly, if nothing in nature is lost or annihilated, what is past, and what is to come, hath as well a being, as what is present; and, if that which is now, had its being before, why may it not also have its being hereafter? It might as well be said, that what is once forgot, cannot be remembred; for whatsoever is in Nature, has as much a being as the Mind, and there is not any action, or motion, or figure, in Nature, but may be repeated, that is, may return to its former Figure, When it is altered and dissolved; But by reason Nature delights in variety, repetitions are not so frequently made, especially of those things or creatures, which are composed by the sensitive corporeal motions in the inanimate part of Matter, because they are not so easily wrought, as the Rational matter can work upon its own parts, being more pliant in its self, then the Inanimate matter is; And this is the reason, that there are so many repetitions of one and the same Figure in the Rational matter, which is the Mind, but seldom any in the Gross and inanimate part of Matter, for Nature loves ease and freedom: But to conclude, Madam, I perceive your Author confines Sense onely to Animal-kind, and Reason onely to Man-kind: Truly, it is out of self-love, when one Creature prefers his own Excellency before another, for nature being endued with self-love, all Creatures have self-love too, because they are all Parts of Nature; and when Parts agree or disagree, it is out of Interest and Self-love; but Man herein exceeds all the rest, as having a supernatural Soul, whose actions also are supernatural; To which I leave him, and rest,
Madam,
Your faithful Friend,
and Servant.
[1] Leviathan, part. 1. c. 3.
[2] part. 1. c. 2.
[3] ibid. c. 3.
[4] ibid.
IX.
MADAM,
When your Author discourseth of the use of Speech or Words and Names, he is pleas'd to say,[1] That their use is to serve for marks and notes of Remembrance; Whereof to give you my opinion, I say, That Speech is natural to the shape of Man; and though sometimes it serves for marks or notes of remembrance, yet it doth not always, for all other Animals have Memory without the help of Speech, and so have deaf and dumb men, nay more then those that hear and speak: Wherefore, though Words are useful to the mind, and so to the memory, yet both can be without them, whereas Words cannot be without Memory; for take a Bird, and teach him to speak, if he had not Memory, before he heard the words, he could never learn them. You will ask me, Madam, What then, is Memory the Cause of Speech? I answer, Life and Knowledg, which is Sense and Reason, as it creates and makes all sorts of Creatures, so also amongst the rest it makes Words: And as I said before, that Memory may be without the help of Speech or Words, so I say also, that there is a possibility of reckoning of numbers, as also of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things without words, although your Author denies it: But some men are so much for Art, as they endeavour to make Art, which is onely a Drudgery-maid of Nature, the chief Mistress, and Nature her Servant, which is as much as to prefer Effects before the Cause, Nature before God, Discord before Unity and Concord.
Again, your Author, in his Chapter of Reason,[2] defines Reason to be nothing else but Reckoning: I answer, That in my opinion Reckoning is not Reason it self, but onely an effect or action of Reason; for Reason, as it is the chiefest and purest degree of animate matter, works variously and in divers motions, by which it produces various and divers effects, which are several Perceptions, as Conception, Imagination, Fancy, Memory, Remembrance, Understanding, Judgment, Knowledg, and all the Passions, with many more: Wherefore this Reason is not in one undivided part, nor bound to one motion, for it is in every Creature more or less, and moves in its own parts variously; and in some Creatures, as for example, in some men, it moves more variously then in others, which is the cause that some men are more dull and stupid, then others; neither doth Reason always move in one Creature regularly, which is the cause, that some men are mad or foolish: And though all men are made by the direction of Reason, and endued with Reason, from the first time of their birth, yet all have not the like Capacities, Understandings, Imaginations, Wits, Fancies, Passions, &c. but some more, some less, and some regular, some irregular, according to the motions of Reason or Rational part of animate matter; and though some rational parts may make use of other rational Parts, as one man of another mans Conceptions, yet all these parts cannot associate together; as for example, all the Material parts of several objects, no not their species, cannot enter or touch the eye without danger of hurting or loosing it, nevertheless the eye makes use of the objects by patterning them out, and so doth the rational matter, by taking patterns from the sensitive; And thus knowledg or perception of objects, both sensitive and rational, is taken without the pressure of any other parts; for though parts joyn to parts, (for no part can be single) yet this joining doth not necessarily infer the pressure of objects upon the sensitive organs; Whereof I have already discoursed sufficiently heretofore, to which I refer you, and rest
Madam,
Your faithful Friend
and Servant.
[1] Leviathan, part. 1. c. 4.
[2] Ch. 5.
X.
MADAM,
Understanding says your Author,[1] is nothing else but Conception caused by speech, and therefore, if speech be peculiar to man, (as, for ought I know, it is) then is understanding peculiar to him also. Where he confineth Understanding onely to speech and to Mankind; But, by his leave, Madam, I surely believe, that there is more understanding in Nature, then that, which is in speech, for if there were not, I cannot conceive, how all the exact forms in Generations could be produced, or how there could be such distinct degrees of several sorts and kinds of Creatures, or distinctions of times and seasons, and so many exact motions and figures in Nature: Considering all this, my reason perswadeth me, that all Understanding, which is a part of Knowledg, is not caused by speech, for all the motions of the Celestial Orbs are not made by speech, neither is the knowledg or understanding which a man hath, when sick, as to know or understand he is sick, made by speech, nor by outward objects, especially in a disease