A British Rifle Man. Simmons George
of both.
The letters in this volume are truthful accounts, written from many a bivouac and battlefield in Portugal, Spain, France, and Belgium, of the daily experiences of a young British officer taking his part in the great wars which were the main cause of Napoleon's downfall. Only now and then, where George Simmons has alluded to family matters of an entirely private nature, has it been considered desirable to excise the latter. But his views, correct or the reverse, of the military situation of the moment, his opinions of his chiefs and contemporaries, his anxieties about the welfare of his parents, brothers, and sisters, and his unceasing efforts to aid them, all forming as they do an integral part of his daily work, thoughts, and aspirations, have been left absolutely untouched.
To readers unacquainted with military matters it may be explained that these letters and journals claim to possess additional interest, since they are written by an officer who happened to belong to a regiment which saw more fighting in the Peninsula than any other in the British Army.
The Rifles formed part of the famous Light Division which was perpetually in the forefront of the battle, and they were the only regiment of British soldiers armed with the then newly introduced weapon—the rifle—in contradistinction to Brown Bess, the smooth-bore musket carried by the remainder of the Infantry. It is true that certain corps, notably the 5th Battalion of the 60th Royal American Regiment[1] and the Duke of Brunswick Oels' Corps, also were armed with rifles; but, as these were composed of Germans and other foreigners, and their companies at times distributed among various Brigades, the same interest did not attach to them, nor were they able to take such a leading part in the fighting as the three Battalions of the 95th Rifles, who were present in whole or in part at every great battle in the long and bloody struggle in the Peninsula, save Albuera only.
But although the regiment was composed of three battalions, it never mustered more than seventeen companies in the Peninsula, and at Waterloo only fourteen were present. It took its share not only in the general actions, sieges, and stormings in common with the other regiments, but also was constantly engaged in innumerable "affairs," as they are styled, which caused an unceasing drain on its strength—a drain from which regiments belonging to other Divisions were usually exempt. The reason for this was that the Light Brigade, or, as it was subsequently styled, the Light Division, was used during the campaigns in the Peninsula as a permanent covering or outpost force. Thus in 1810 it acted as a Corps of Observation on the Coa, far in advance of the rest of the army, and took part in the affairs of Barba del Puerco, Gallegos, etc., as well as in the severe fighting at the Combat of the Coa, at which no other troops were engaged. Again, in 1811, Craufurd's Brigade formed the advanced guard in the pursuit of Massena, and hence was constantly in collision with the enemy.
These events are well described by Simmons, and it will be seen that a similar condition of affairs prevailed in the subsequent campaigns of 1812–14. The normal strength of an infantry battalion in the Peninsula was ten companies, and whilst noting that the 95th Rifles had the great advantage of having three battalions in the field, which naturally gave them a greater chance than others of seeing fighting, it is only fair to remember that there were usually only from fifteen to seventeen companies, and not thirty, as is commonly supposed.
Several regiments had two battalions serving in the Peninsula, and hence were as strong numerically as the Rifles.
The "Baker" rifle, with which the regiment was armed, was in every sense an arm of precision up to 300 yards, and at ranges of 400 and 500 yards it was possible to hit a mark with it. This alone gave the Riflemen an immense advantage over their comrades armed with smooth-bore muskets, and, as proved by the experiments at Woolwich, it was greatly superior to the rifles of Continental and American manufacture in use at the time.
This rifle was invented by Ezekiel Baker, a London gunmaker, towards the close of the last century, and was the first rifle regularly adopted into the British service. It was tried at Woolwich in February 1800 by order of the Board of Ordnance, and was selected as the arm of the Rifle Corps, then in process of being raised. On this occasion eleven shots out of twelve were placed in a six-foot circular target at 300 yards' distance. The following is a description of the Baker rifle: Weight 9½ lbs., barrel seven-grooved and 30 inches in length, rifling one quarter turn in barrel, bullet spherical, 20 to the pound, charge of powder 84 grains, flint-lock. The ball was placed in the centre of a greased leather patch and rammed home, considerable force being necessary to effect this. At first, wooden mallets were issued to the Riflemen to facilitate the process of ramming home, but these were very shortly discontinued (circa 1803). A supply of greased patches was carried in a small box with spring brass lid in the side of the butt of the rifle.
As regards rapidity of fire, the maximum rate at which perfectly steady shots could be taken was reckoned to be one per minute.
This weapon was the one used by the Rifle Corps in their maiden action at Ferrol in 1800, and at the battle of Copenhagen in 1801, where the Riflemen fought under Lord Nelson and were distributed as sharp-shooters among various British ships of the line. It was further used in South America in 1807–8 and throughout the Peninsula campaigns of 1808–14, and also at Waterloo. In 1838 it was supplanted by the percussion-lock Brunswick rifle, having thus been in use in the service for a longer period than has any rifled firearm.
The smooth-bore musket, commonly known as "Brown Bess," was a much heavier and longer weapon, throwing a spherical ball of 14 to the pound, and the uncertainty of its fire is well evidenced by the expression "as random as a common musket," which is to be met with in treatises on rifle-shooting at the beginning of the century. This weapon was in use up to the year 1853. It would not carry straight for 100 yards, and its effective range was barely double that distance. Such was "the musket, that queen of weapons," as it has been styled, with which the British infantry won all its great victories from the time of Marlborough until the conquest of the Punjaub in 1849.
That even greater results were not obtained from the rifle during the Peninsular War is due to the fact that the 95th Riflemen were naturally often compelled to conform to the general movements of large bodies of troops armed with smooth-bores. Their utility was in consequence frequently unduly circumscribed by the exigencies of the moment.
It was, however, in the affairs of outposts and advanced guards, and on occasions when individual action was both permissible and practicable, that the value of the rifle became most apparent. Thus at the action of Tarbes on March 14, 1814, the three Battalions of the 95th attacked and ousted from an exceptionally strong position a French Division. George Simmons was severely wounded in this fight. An eye-witness belonging to another corps thus describes the attack, and in words which convey a good idea of the methods of Riflemen under such circumstances: "Our Rifles were immediately sent to dislodge the French from the hills on our left, and our Battalion was ordered to support them. Nothing could exceed the manner in which the 95th set about this business. Certainly I never saw such skirmishers as the 95th, now the Rifle Brigade. They could do the work much better and with infinitely less loss than any other of our best Light troops. They possessed an individual boldness, a mutual understanding, and a quickness of eye in taking advantage of the ground, which, taken altogether, I never saw equalled. They were, in fact, as much superior to the French Voltigeurs as the latter were to our skirmishers in general. As our regiment was often employed in supporting them, I think I am fairly qualified to speak of their merits."[2]
Unquestionably the most pressing military problem of the present day is how to conduct an attack on troops armed (as all infantry are now) with magazine rifles, which, owing to their flat trajectory and extraordinary rapidity and precision of fire, are overwhelming in their effects against favourable targets up to 2000 yards.
The object-lesson most recently before us is that of the fight at Khartoum, where the absolute impossibility of masses of men advancing under modern artillery and rifle fire, although known to students of war, was practically demonstrated again to the whole world. The unusually heavy losses experienced by our troops in the fighting on the Indian Frontier in 1897 were mostly due to the able manner in which the Afridis and other tribesmen took advantage of the ground and worked in unison (as did the Riflemen at Tarbes and on many another battlefield) to assist and support one another, and thus