The China of Chiang K'ai-Shek: A Political Study. Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger
with the Office of Civil Affairs (Wên-kuan Ch'u), adjunct to the Council of State, described above.
[17] A brilliant and informative discussion of the practical work of the Executive Yüan is to be found in Tsiang Ting-fu, "Executive Yüan," The Chinese Year Book 1936–37, cited, p. 241–6.
[18] For these Ministries and Commissions, see the following chapter. These are not to be lumped with the Party-Ministries and Commissions which, if anything, are even more complex in structure, but whose titles follow the same scheme of terminology as that of the government.
[19] Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui. The Chinese Year Book, v.d., cited, and most of the official publicity from Chungking translates this term as "National Military Council," which is far from the original, literally "military-affairs-committee." "National Military Council" is also easily confused with the Supreme National Defense Council. Hence the present translation is employed, following Tsang, O. B., A Supplement to a Complete Chinese-English Dictionary, Shanghai, 1937, and the original.
[20] See Ho Yao-tsu, "The National Military Council," in The Chinese Year Book, 1938–39, cited, p. 361–3; Carlson, Evans Fordyce, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency, New York, 1940, p. 26 ff.; and frequent references in China At War and the News Release of the China Information Committee, both semiofficial, particularly the issue of the latter for July 15, 1939. A list of the highest military personnel and brief outline of the General Staff may be found in Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, The China Year Book 1939, Shanghai, n. d., p. 216–17, and p. 225.
[21] Descriptions of the subordinate organs of all these agencies but the Pensions Commission and the War-Area Commission will be found in Ho Yao-tsu, cited immediately above. The translations of the titles here given, however, are those of the author.
[22] As an instance, see Outline of the Organization of the Kuomintang … , cited above, p. 54, n. 13.
[23] This is a semi-official agency sponsored by the Generalissimo. See below, p. 149. The new war-time change is well illustrated by the following statement: "Special commissioners were assigned to every group army, and political departments in the divisions were augmented. Enough political directors were assigned to every company of troops withdrawn from the front for reorganization, and to Chinese forces behind the enemy lines. In addition, political corps were formed to organize and train civilians. Because of the lack of personnel, so far there have been no political officers in units engaged in military operations.
"Conscious and hard-working, the political officers have done much to remove irritations which used to occur between the commanding officers and the political men. …
"Political work in the army formerly consisted in a weekly or fortnightly talk by the officers, whereas now well-planned lessons on political subjects, reading classes, discussion groups, individual conversations and twilight meetings are conducted with clockwise regularity. Singing, theatricals, cartooning, sports, are promoted among the soldiers so long as they do not jeopardize their discipline. Among the civilians, the political officers have also been active. The organization of people's service corps, self-defense units in areas close to the war areas and money contributions to the war chest from people in the rear are a few of their accomplishments." China Information Committee, News Release, October 2, 1939.
The comment of Generalissimo Chiang in the interview on p. 371 is, despite its laconicism, relevant to this topic. A further discussion is available in Chên Chêng, "Three Years of Political Training Work," The China Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Autumn 1940), p. 581–5.
[24] The official view of this work, silent on the competition of the Communists and independents, is found in Li Chai-sum, "Chinese Government Organization behind the Enemy Lines," last citation above, p. 595–600.
[25] Statement to the author by Sun K'ê (Sun Fo), President of the Legislative Yüan, Chungking, July 17, 1940. A summary of the work of the Yüan will be found in various issues of The Chinese Year Book; in Escarra, Jean, Le Droit Chinois, cited above, containing bibliographies; and in Tyau, M. T. Z., "The Work and Organization of the Legislative Yüan," The China Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Christmas Number, 1936), p. 73–88.
[26] Wang Shih-chieh, Pi-chiao Hsien-fa, cited, p. 676 ff.
[27] The same, p. 691.
Chapter III
CONSULTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS
The outbreak and continuance of war has left the fulcrum of power relatively untouched. The highest organs of state are primarily in Kuomintang hands; the Party Chief of the Kuomintang is, even at law, governmentally more important today than in 1937; and the constitutional monopoly of power remains under the Kuomintang. Even changes in the highest organs—such as establishment of the Supreme National Defense Council and the Military Affairs Commission—have left very little impress on the sources of power. Reforms have altered only the mode of power, not its tenure.
Modifications have, however, been introduced at the level of government just below the apex. These are important in two remarkable ways. The People's Political Council (Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui) admixed an ingredient of representation which (save for the Party) had been lacking since the dubious, betrayed, inaugural years of the Republic. Furthermore, sweeping administrative reorganization and reinvigoration made possible the vitalization of the central government in the course of the war, so that despite Japanese pressure and rising Leftist rivalry, the National Government is, on any absolute scale, becoming more powerful year by year.
The People's Political Council
The People's Political Council was established by order of the Emergency Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress held in Hankow, March 1938. Its creation was a compromise measure between the proposal for a European-type United Front government, based on popular elections to a National Convention, and a continuation of the Kuomintang monopoly of government hitherto prevalent. Like many similar compromises in other countries, the institution has proved its viable and useful character. Without exaggeration, it may be stated to be the closest approximation of representative government which China has ever known. Simple, improvised, legally an instrument promising little independence or élan in its work, the Council demonstrates the effectiveness