Directed Motivational Currents and Language Education. Christine Muir
same genesis of curiosity: researchers recognised powerful motivational phenomena in the world around them for which existing theory was unable to account, which subsequently pushed them to dissect the powerful mechanisms at work (see Dörnyei et al., 2016 and Csikszentmihalyi, 1975/2000). Interestingly, Adler describes his work on momentum as being born of exactly this same beginning, describing it in essence as ‘a basic “folk” idea’ (Adler, 1981: 14). Throughout the intervening years, research on momentum has matured, and the term ‘psychological momentum’ has also been introduced (Markman & Guenther, 2007; for a recent discussion see Briki & Markman, 2018). The definition of the latter can be understood as something akin to a layperson’s understanding of momentum – for example, reflecting the upward spiral of ‘success breeds success’ – and with this in mind, it is unsurprising to note that much of the research conducted in this domain has been in the context of competitive sports (see Hubbard, 2015, 2017, for an overview of recent research into various aspects of momentum, and Dörnyei, 2020, for more detailed discussion of the relationship between momentum/psychological momentum and DMCs).
Past literature has come tantalisingly close to recognising the unique motivational experience of DMCs, yet has fallen short of recognising the potential of this framework when viewed as a whole. This may be due, first, to a dominant focus on goal setting over goal striving: motivation has traditionally been considered largely in isolation from subsequent behaviour. Second, there has been the challenge in motivational psychology to fully account for the notion of time, and the fact that there is ‘no mainstream account of human motivation which would consider motivation to be a process’ (Dörnyei et al., 2016: 36; see also the previous chapter). Although several fascinating approaches have offered unique perspectives to the conceptualisation of action over time (e.g. time perspective as brought to the fore in Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999; Raynor’s, 1974, contingent path theory; and the notion of velocity in goal pursuit, see Carver & Scheier, 1990), when viewed in isolation none is able to fully account for the DMC experience. Third, it may even be that investigation of DMCs was supressed because they represented such a stark departure from dominant perspectives, which primarily sought to investigate strategies aimed towards limiting the loss of motivation (see previous chapter), that our eyes were simply not able to recognise a motivational phenomenon that was fundamentally contrary to this: a process which instead functions to energise long-term learning behaviours, in which ‘the outworking of the initial motive becomes part of the energy source itself’ (Dörnyei et al., 2016: xii; see Chapter 1 of Dörnyei et al., 2016, for a fuller exploration of these ideas than I am able to include here).
While no single theory has previously been able to fully account for the DMC experience, our understanding of DMCs as a whole is nevertheless rooted in many well established and deeply rooted theories, principles and ideas. Comprehensive overviews – both concise (Henry, 2019) and full length (Dörnyei et al., 2016) – can be found elsewhere, yet this book would not be complete without including its own precis and introduction. In this chapter, I summarise the theoretical underpinning of the five most prominent facets of DMCs:
(1) Their goal/vision orientedness: a DMC is always directional, and always has a clear end goal.
(2) The launch of a DMC: a DMC always has a clear starting point at which action towards a goal is triggered.
(3) DMC structure: action and engagement within DMCs are highly structured, with regular feedback loops underpinning the self-propelling nature of the current.
(4) Positive emotional loading: a key characteristic of DMCs is their acutely experienced positive emotionality.
(5) The end of DMCs: DMCs are always finite, with motivation ceasing at varying rates, but via the same underlying processes.
(1) Goal Orientedness
DMCs are in each and every case directional, with motivational energy channelled down an explicit goal pathway. It is clear, however, that not all goals inspire DMCs – DMCs are certainly the exception and not the norm in the context of goal striving! So, what is it that distinguishes a goal capable of inspiring a DMC-like surge of motivation?
Of all the ideas incorporated into the field from mainstream motivational psychology in the 1990s (cf. Dörnyei & Ushioda, 2011), goal theories were notably underexplored (although not entirely ignored, see, for example, Tremblay & Gardner, 1995). A reasonable argument to explain this is the surface incompatibility of the conceptualisations of ‘goals’ in mainstream versus L2 motivation research. In educational psychology, motivation literature has tended to consider generic goals such as mastery versus performance (Ames, 1992) or learning versus performance (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Both fall under the heading of goal-orientation theory and, as Dweck describes, these two dichotomies function largely in the same way: ‘Put simply, with performance goals, an individual aims to look smart, whereas with learning [or mastery] goals the individual aims at becoming smarter’ (Dweck, 1985: 291). In the field of L2 motivation, from its very inception goals had been conceptualised at a fundamentally different level: primarily viewed as ‘orientations’ (c.f. Gardner, 1985), much of this work exploring language learner motivation had directed a primary focus towards student attitudes.
Research into goal setting is a discrete strand of investigation that has delved into the importance of goals in motivated action. A central tenet of goal theory is that for a goal to stimulate high levels of commitment, an individual must be convinced that the goal is important (Locke & Latham, 1990, 2006). Focus has centred particularly on the practical aspect of goal setting, and has sought to explain relative performance differences between individuals by way of goal attributes (Locke & Latham, 1990, 2006). This has highlighted three key areas in particular – specificity, difficulty and goal commitment (see Dörnyei & Ushioda, 2011; Locke, 1996). Three key strands of research are relevant to furthering this understanding, these are vision theory, self-concordant goals and proximal subgoals: it is their collective insight that underpins our understanding of the powerful functioning of a goal in the context of a DMC. As introduced in Chapter 1, vision theory has already had a considerable impact on the field of L2 motivation. In the following sections, I further this discussion by introducing the notions of self-concordant goals and proximal goal setting, neither of which has been fully explored within the domain of L2 motivation.
Self-concordant goals
In tracing the trajectories of the DMC experiences of three Swedish learners, Henry et al. (2015) found that while participants did not immediately appear to have an explicit final goal – something which seemed counterintuitive against the backdrop of DMCs presented as intensely and explicitly goal-oriented – the strong desire of these learners to integrate into their target country nevertheless functioned exceptionally effectively. That is, while their goals appeared transitory, nebulous and continually subject to reappraisal, they nevertheless inspired the strong sensory experiences that we saw in the previous chapter are linked with clear visualisations. As Henry et al. described:
Whether we choose to conceive of this ultimate goal/vision in terms of an integrative motive (Gardner, 2001), investment (Norton, 2013), or the desire to become one’s ideal L2-speaking self (Dörnyei, 2009b), the point is that it is one which operates at a heightened level of phenomenological abstraction. It is a feeling. A sensation. A sense of being or becoming. (Henry et al., 2015: 342; see also Colombo, 2017)
That is, the DMC experiences of these students were rooted in highly self-concordant goals.
Self-concordant goals ‘belong to the self in a deeper sense’ (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999: 494; see also Sheldon & Elliot, 1998; Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001). They tap into our core values and beliefs and correspondingly are deep-seated and highly identity-relevant. Sheldon and colleagues have argued that it is not sufficient for a goal to be self-determined. Instead, when a goal connects directly to our core set of beliefs or values, we pursue it not due to a sense of either external or internal obligation but from a strongly held conviction (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999).
Two features