LUTHER (Vol. 1-6). Grisar Hartmann
id="ulink_d774331f-677e-5403-9b79-3d2186e29a40">[373] “Werke,” Weim. ed., 24, p. 244, in 1527.
[374] Ibid., p. 4.
[375] Ibid., 2, p. 420.
[376] Denifle, 1¹, p. 561. In spite of this, some Protestant critics are under the impression that Denifle has made of Luther a faithful follower of Occam and that he “gives him short shrift as a confirmed Occamist.”
[377] On April 13, 1520, “Briefwechsel,” 2, p. 379 f.
[378] Cp. Denifle, 1¹, p. 564.
[379] Mathesius, “Tischreden” (ed. Kroker), p. 172. “Scholastica theologia in hoc articulo consentit, hominem ex puris naturalibus posse mereri gratiam de congruo.” Words of Luther in 1540. As a good Occamist he himself had taught the same in his first exposition of the Psalms. See above, p. 75.
[380] Cp. the passages from Occam, d’Ailly and Biel in Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 591 ff. To the texts there quoted from Occam must be added those from 3 Sent., q. 8, A., where, “de necessitate habituum supernaturalium,” he establishes three conclusions: 1. Their necessity cannot be proved by natural reason. 2. The necessity of these habits cannot be inferred from the article of faith, that eternal salvation is bestowed on man on account of his merits. 3. We can in addition to each supernatural habit possess also a natural one corresponding to it and which impels us to similar acts. Yet, as he says in concluding, the passage 1 Cor. xiii. 13: “Nunc autem manent fides,” etc., teaches that the habits exist in the righteous and remain in the next life. But at the letter D he returns to the subject: one who is not baptised and receives instruction can arrive at the love of God: “dilectio non infusa, igitur acquisita”; the acts of the will which we produce are natural ones, therefore the habit also is natural which they induce: “non obstante quod sit in voluntate habitus supernaturalis propter auctoritatem [scripturæ], adhuc oportet ponere habitum naturaliter acquisitum.” Finally, under T, after again recognising the “fides infusa, propter auctoritatem scripturæ,” yet, as a matter of fact, he says, though the habits might be acquired naturally, they are frequently infused by God, and therefore called rightly “dona Dei” and “habitus infusi.” The same habit, however, cannot be merely naturally acquired, but also as such “habere effectus eiusdem speciei vel rationis”; the supernatural habits might nevertheless appear absolutely superfluous (“viderentur totaliter superfluere”) were it not for biblical authority; “non sunt ponendi propter aliquam rationem evidentem.” Thus, on the one hand, the strongest attempts to abolish the habits, and, on the other, a holding fast to the teaching of the Bible. Nothing is more incorrect than to accuse Occam of a simple surrender of the supernatural qualities and a direct destruction of the supernatural order. Even the index to Occam’s Commentary on the Sentences shows under the word habitus how strictly he distinguishes between habitus infusus and habitus acquisitus, and how he accepts both and teaches, for instance, that the natural habits may remain even after the destruction of the supernatural.
[381] See Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 594.
[382] In Augustine the doctrine of imputation does not appear. Cp. Mausbach, “Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus” (1909), 2, p. 187, who, after pointing out this fact, remarks: “This doctrine of imputation was actually set up by Luther, whose mind was dominated by Nominalism.” Luther was able to introduce the continuance of original sin into Augustine’s writings only by forcing their meaning (see above, his alteration of concupiscentia into peccatum, p. 98). From the standpoint of the continuance of original sin Luther, already in his Commentary on Romans, attacks the supernatural habit of grace. Cp. Braun, “Die Bedeutung der Concupiscenz bei Luther,” p. 310.
[383] Cp. Denifle-Weiss, 2, p. 305, n. 4.
[384] Cp. Loofs, “Dogmengesch.,”4. p. 699.
[385] Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 510.
[386] Denifle-Weiss, ibid., p. 606.
[387] In 2 Sent. in princ.: “Multa, quæ apparent manifeste contra rationem, et quorum opposita sunt consona fidei.”
[388] Quodlib. 1, q. 1: “Non potest demonstrative probari, quod tantum unus est Deus.”
[389] 1 Sent., dist. 2, q. 10, concl. 3, F.
[390] Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 608.
[391] Raynald., “Annal.,” an. 1513, n. 92 sq.; Mansi, “Coll. conc.,” 32, p. 842 seq.
[392] Drews, “Disputationen Luthers,” p. 487, No. 4-6, from the Disputation on January 11, 1539.
[393] In 1 Sent., q. 3, a. 3: “nullæ vel paucæ sunt rationes evidentes demonstrativæ ... magis opinio quam scientia, et ideo valde sunt reprehensibiles qui nimis tenaciter adhærent auctoritati Aristotelis.”
[394] “Superbia scholasticos a pœnitentia et fide viva præpediens,” etc. “Opp.” (Antv., 1706), p. 90.
[395] See above, p. 70.
[396] So Luther relates, in Gal. 2, p. 103.
[397] “Totius summæ christianarum rerum.” So the Weim. ed., 18, p. 614. “Opp. Lat. var.,” 7, p. 132, in “De servo arbitrio.”
[398] This is the work which Albert Ritschl, the well-known Protestant theologian, summed up as follows on account of the contradictions which it contained: “Luther’s work, ‘De servo arbitrio,’ is, and remains, an unfortunate piece of bungling.” “Die christl. Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung,” 1², Bonn, 1882, p. 221. See below, vol. ii., xiv. 3.
[399] “Non potest probari sufficienter, quod Deus sit causa finalis,” Quodlib. 4, q. 2. Other Nominalists go still further.