The Principles of Economics, with Applications to Practical Problems. Frank A. Fetter
attached to the field capable of producing the better grade or variety of fruit or product. A peculiar mineral quality in the soil may impart to wine a choice flavor that can at once be recognized by experts; while other fields, distant but a few rods, cannot by any effort be made to produce wine of the same rare quality. There is said to be a marked difference in the success of vineyards lying only a short distance apart on the shores of the larger lakes of New York. Nearness to the water moderates the temperature, often prevents frosts, and hence insures the ripening and quality of the fruit. In the Santa Clara valley, as in other parts of California, there is a frostless belt, sharply marked off from the lands where it is unsafe to attempt to cultivate the delicate orange-tree and other semi-tropical plants. In manifold ways differences in geological formation affect the use of land and the success of many industries. On one side of a little creek is limestone land, on the other shale, the limestone producing a crop larger and of better quality. When the peculiar nature of the one field is found to be the cause of the exceptional quality of its fruits, the difference in value is attributed to it.
The lower grade limits the value of the higher grade
If there is but one grade of agent, it is, of course, valued without reference to any lower grade. The effect of the presence of lower grades of agents is to lower the value of the higher, inasmuch as the lower grades are substituted for the higher. There may be at first enough of the higher grade of agents to produce all the fruit wanted of the better quality. If, then, there is an increasing demand, and the additional yield can be secured only with greater effort, the value of the product will rise. The presence of poorer grades, however, checks that rise, because use can be shifted to them. The value of grade one is not high because grades two, three, and four, which are worse than it, are available, but because they are not of better quality than they are. Poor as they are, their presence reduces somewhat the intensity of demand for the best grade. Indirect agents, therefore, are seen to be subject to just the same comparisons, substitutions, and estimates, when their value is considered, as are direct consumption goods.
Differential advantage of agents in the amount of their products
2. The rents of two agents differ as do the quantities of goods yielded by them, other things being equal. In the case just considered, the quantity remained the same while the quality differed; now is to be considered the case where the quantity differs while the quality remains the same. It is possible that one grade of agents is "poorer" because it produces less fruit, not fruit of poorer quality. Consider first the static problem. If both agents yield fruits exactly alike, the value of equal units at the same place and time must be equal, and the usufructs would vary in just proportion with the quantity of product. Now consider the dynamic problem. If the desire for that fruit increases, rent would grow as scarcity became more felt. The agents yielding, under the prevailing conditions, the largest product, would first be used; later, the poorer agents. The possibility of resorting to the poorer agents would keep the better from rising so high.
Complementary agents unite to form a product
3. When two agents are necessary to secure a product, the value attributed to each is influenced by competing uses. The thought of one agent independently producing a certain product is far too simple to correspond with reality. Two or more agents unite to produce a single product, and each agent at the same time can be used for acquiring other products. Complex as the problem appears, it is solved according to the principle of marginal utility at every moment in every market. The different uses, figuratively speaking, bid for an agent, and thus its marginal utility is determined just as is the price of a good by the bidding of buyers. Indeed, it is the bidding of buyers, indirectly. The more urgent the use, the higher the bid. The felt importance is reflected from the consumption goods that are sought, to the agent that will aid to get them. Two or more agents that are mutually needed for the acquiring of a product are complementary goods. A complementary agent may be either other material agents or labor.
Complementary agents used intensively show diminishing returns
When labor is applied to an agent, either to improve the Quality or to increase the quantity, it is subject to the law of diminishing returns. In the effort to increase the quantity of products, labor is applied first more intensively to the better agents. If it meets with resistance, if returns diminish, it is transferred to any of the poorer agents that have in them uses of as high grade as those still in the better agent. The superior effectiveness of the earlier over the later units of the added agent is called the "differential advantage" of the two fixed agents. The result of a day's labor applied to a field may be represented by 100, a second day's labor by 90 (it being only ninety per cent, as effectual), a third day's labor by 75; but it is more usual to say that the first field produces 10 more than the second and 25 more than the third, the second 15 more than the third. To the agent fixed in supply is attributed the difference in the effectiveness of the agent that is applied.
The relentless extensive margin of agents
4. The marginal uses of indirect goods are free uses. Here again is noted the close parallelism in the process of evaluating direct and indirect goods. There is an extensive margin in the use of an indirect agent, a point in the gradation from the better to the poorer agents where the materials and forces are left unused and have no value. Land beyond that point is free. Outworn goods in manifold forms, old pictures, old machines, having no longer charms even for a rummage sale, form a no-rent margin of wealth. On every hand a great multitude of things unused and worthless differ by only a shade from things that still are used and valued. Every rubbish-heap, rag-bag, junk-shop, and garret contains things once prized, now lingering on the margin of utilization.
There is also in agents an intensive margin, beyond which are certain unexploited uses in the things that we already have. This is a more subtle thought, but it has been already discussed in connection with diminishing returns. These potential uses in agents, uses which in the existing conditions lie outside the margin of utilization, of course have no value. We have noted that there is an equilibrium between these two margins. Rent is measured from a zero point of utility either in a good, or in other poorer grades of goods.
A corollary of this proposition is that there is a limit to the rental that anything can yield under any given condition. Below the present margin of utility of any goods there exist great quantities of free goods, unused goods, or unexploited uses. It is only uses above this margin that yield rent. Rent is the difference between the value of the better grades and the value of the free goods. It is therefore due to the limitation in the supply of indirect agents of the better quality, or to the scarcity of the more effective uses in those agents.
Restatement of rent, economic and contract
Economic rent is primary
5. Rent may be redefined as the value of the scarce uses of wealth within a given period. Rent is the felt importance of the usufructs of agents in securing gratification. It is measured by the marginal utility of any particular grade of agents in securing products. These definitions and the discussion throughout this chapter applies to economic rather than to contract rent. In fixing and agreeing on contract rent, men are seeking to estimate the importance of indirect goods, the importance that an agent will have in getting a product. They are bidding for the use of things, and what they bid is contract rent. Contract rent is based on the existence of economic rent. Economic rent does not depend on contract rent, but on the differences in the effectiveness of agents to secure a given product. If there were not differences in the product, and no limits to the supply of indirect agents, rent could not exist; it would be inconceivable. But these differences existing, economic rent inevitably arises, for men cannot keep from attaching value to the things that affect their desires. Contract rent in turn appears wherever the use of wealth becomes an object of exchange and agreement between men in a free society.
CHAPTER 11