Proceedings of the New York Historical Association [1906]. New York State Historical Association. Meeting
![Proceedings of the New York Historical Association [1906] - New York State Historical Association. Meeting](limg_read866290.jpg "Proceedings of the New York Historical Association [1906] - New York State Historical Association. Meeting")
the river Perdito, with all the ports on the gulf, and cede West Florida, New Orleans, and the territory on the west bank of the Mississippi to the United States. This cession will only be valuable to the latter from its giving them the mouths of the river Mobile and other small rivers which penetrate their territory, and in calming their apprehensions relative to the Mississippi. It may be supposed that New Orleans is a place of some moment; it will be so to the United States, but not to France. The right of depot which the United States claims and will never relinquish, must be the source of continued disputes and animosities between the two nations, and ultimately lead the United States to aid any foreign power in the expulsion of France from that colony. Independent of this, as the present commercial capital of New Orleans is mostly American, it will be instantly removed to Natchez, to which the United States can give such advantages as to render New Orleans of little importance. Upon any other plan. Sir, it needs but little foresight to predict that the whole of this establishment must pass into the hands of Great Britain, which has, at the same time, the command of the sea, and a martial colony containing every means of attack. While the fleets block up the seaports, she can, without the smallest difficulty, attack New Orleans from Canada with 15,000 or 20,000 men and a host of savages. France, by grasping at a desert and an insignificant town, and thereby throwing the weight of the United States into the scale of Britain, will render her mistress of the new world. By the possession of Louisiana and Trinidad the colonies of Spain will lie at her mercy. By expelling France from Florida and possessing the ports on the Gulf, she will command the Islands. The East and West Indies will pour their commodities into her ports; and the precious metals of Mexico, combined with the treasures of Hindostan, enable her to purchase nations whose aid she may require in confirming her power. Though it would comport with the true policy and magnanimity of France gratuitously to offer these terms to the United States, yet they are not unwilling to purchase them at a price suited to their value and to their own circumstances, in the hope that France will at the same time satisfy their distressed citizens the debts which they have a right by so many titles to demand."
These arguments do not read like the letters of Jefferson or the instructions of Madison. There is no suggestion that the United States is without interest in the right bank of the Mississippi for fear of a divided government, or because germs of collision will develop in spite of affinities in manners and language. New Orleans is minimized, the great west is magnified. A glance at the map shows that he offered to purchase half an empire, leaving to France only a small corner in the southwest bordering on Texas. His argument fixed its limitation. "First, let France cede to the United States so much of Louisiana as lay above the mouth of the river Arkansas, West Florida, New Orleans, and the territory on the west bank of the Mississippi." Talleyrand thought the rest would be of little value. "I will give you a certificate," he said, in the course of the discussion, "that you are the most importunate negotiator I have yet met with." For this and his aid to Robert Fulton, Edward Everett Hale called Livingston "the wisest American of his time."
Napoleon received Livingston's argument three days after he heard of Leclerc's death. To a soldier who had entered Italy over the Alps, the suggestion of an attack from Canada would strongly appeal; with Nelson on the ocean, he could understand the helplessness of a French army in New Orleans; and after the failure of Leclerc in St. Domingo, the presence of yellow fever and other obstacles to success in Louisiana would not seem improbable. Such a discussion at such a time, therefore, was certain to have the most profound influence, and from January 10 to April 10, 1803, Livingston kept his reasons constantly before the First Consul and his ministers as the only policy to conserve the true interest of France, to impair the strength of England, and to win the affection of the United States.
"I have never yet had any specific instructions from you how to act or what to offer," he wrote Madison on February 18, 1803, eighteen days before Monroe left the United States; "but I have put into Napoleon's hands some notes containing plain truths mixed with that species of personal attention which I know to be most pleasing. The only basis on which I think it possible to do anything here is to connect our claims with offers to purchase the Floridas. Upon this subject my notes turn. I have first endeavored to show how little advantage France is likely to make from these colonies; the temptation they offer to Britain to attack them by sea and from Canada; the effect a conquest of them by Britain would have on the islands; and the monopoly which that conquest would give to a rival power to the trade of the West as well as of the East Indies. I have dwelt upon the importance of a friendly intercourse between them and us, both as it respects their commerce and the security of their islands; and I have proposed to them the relinquishment of New Orleans and West Florida as far as the River Perdito, together with all the territory lying to the north of the Arkansas, under an idea that it was necessary to interpose us between them and Canada, as the only means of preventing an attack from that quarter. For this I proposed an indefinite sum, not wishing to mention any till I should receive your instructions. These propositions with certain accompaniments were well received, and were some days under the First Consul's consideration. I am now lying on my oars in hopes of something explicit from you. I consider the object of immense importance; and this perhaps the favorable moment to press it."
While Livingston's letter was being read in Washington, conveying to Jefferson the first suggestion of a purchase other than that of New Orleans, the First Consul was making up his mind to accede to Livingston's request. When the decision did come, it came with Napoleonic suddenness. For three months he had considered it; but not until Sunday, April 10, did he make known his intention; then, in a moment, without warning, he let his desire be known to Talleyrand and Marbois. "I can scarcely say that I cede it," said Napoleon, "for it is not yet in our possession. If, however, I leave the least time to our enemies, I shall only transmit an empty title." Marbois agreed, Talleyrand dissented, and the trio parted; but at daybreak, on Monday, Napoleon sent for Marbois, declaring that "irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season; I renounce Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I cede; it is the whole colony, without reserve. I know the price of what I abandon. I renounce it with the greatest regret; to attempt obstinately to retain it would be folly. I direct you to regulate the affairs. Have an interview this very day with Mr. Livingston."
Whatever occurred after this belongs simply to the making of a bargain. The mind of Napoleon had acted. It is not easy, perhaps, to differentiate the influences that led to such action, but it is not difficult to measure them. In writing the Minister of Marine, Talleyrand explained that "the empire of circumstances, foresight of the future, and the intention to compensate by an advantageous arrangement for the inevitable loss of a country which was going to be put at the mercy of another nation—all these motives have determined the Government to pass to the United States the right it had acquired from Spain over the sovereignty and property of Louisiana." In brief, Napoleon's sale of Louisiana, as explained by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, disposed of a country which he would inevitably lose whenever war occurred with England. This was the argument Livingston had been urging for three months, with evident effect. Had he been less earnest or dramatic, Napoleon's purpose might not then have exploded into an order to sell. The American Minister knew he was dealing with a man guided by such an implacable hatred of England, that when he was not fighting her openly, he was plotting against her secretly; that his one purpose, his one hope, his great ambition, was her conquest. In his argument, therefore, Livingston dangled before him a picture to feed his hatred—a picture of Trinidad and Louisiana forming a base from which England might drive Spain from Florida, command the islands of the Gulf, and receive into its ports the riches of the West Indies and the treasures of Mexico. Thus, Livingston's presence becomes a great factor in the sale. It took six months to communicate with the United States, but only six days to do business with the man who was pressing the sale upon him. If more time had elapsed, the sudden decision might have been changed with equal suddenness, for Napoleon, aside from his inconstancy, had cause to shrink from his intended action. It meant the violation of a sacred pledge to Spain, the death of Talleyrand's pet colonial policy, the certain disgust, sooner or later, of the French people, and a hot quarrel with Lucien and Joseph Bonaparte, his brothers.
In the negotiations that followed Livingston ventured to offer twenty million francs, and Marbois finally suggested sixty millions, with payment of the American claim to the amount of twenty millions more. Thus ended the historic midnight conference during which the bargain was practically made. "It is so very important," wrote Livingston, "that