General Richard Montgomery and the American Revolution. Hal T. Shelton
the harbor. This premature activity by the crowd took the “Mohawks” by surprise, as they were donning Indian disguises in a nearby tavern at the time, and preempted their planned event. The next morning, festive celebrants watched the two tea ships set sail for England— one with all of its tea plundered and ruined, and the other with a hold of undelivered tea. This was New York’s “Tea Party,” which approximated and reinforced that of Boston.20
All of these events formed the backdrop to Montgomery’s studied detachment from politics. Although he favored a simple existence of noninvolvement, his lifestyle was not reclusive. Montgomery must have confronted reports of these happenings on a regular basis as he went about the daily routine of managing his estate. Information concerning aggravated British-colonial relations dominated newspapers, broadsides, pamphlets, rumors, and conversation of the time. In addition, Montgomery no doubt had firsthand knowledge of some of these incidents. He possessed an educated and inquiring mind, and these events begged analysis. The jarring conditions of the times were not conducive to prolonged stoicism. Compelling external forces intruded upon and altered the lives of the colonists. Like the rest of his contemporaries, Montgomery eventually felt the pressure to choose sides in the growing controversy. All alternatives had to be considered to resolve the dilemma in his own mind and arrive at a personal decision. Then, there was the Livingston connection.
The Livingston dynasty projected the family into a position of power in New York provincial politics. Yet, it did not enjoy absolute primacy in this respect. The De Lanceys paralleled the Livingstons in their evolution into prominent and influential families. As these two houses built ambitious and competitive commercial enterprises, it was natural that this contention be extended to the political front. Also, most of the socioeconomically advantaged colonists felt that it was an obligation of their social station to serve the community as political leaders. So, these two families were not the only members of the ruling elite involved in New York politics, but they were undoubtedly the most active. After a visit in early 1774, John Adams noted, “The two great families in this province, upon whose motions all their politics turn, are the De Lanceys and Livingstons.”21
The predominance of the Livingstons and De Lanceys in politics dated from the 1740s, and they competed on generally equal terms, with control of the provincial assembly alternating between the two for several decades. Additionally, the Livingston-De Lancey rivalry was not limited to kinship. Political activists of all sorts broadened the partisan system by lining up behind one family standard or the other. In opposing each other, the two factions amended their agendas as political expediency dictated. The Livingstons and De Lanceys engaged in a balancing act between currying favor from the governor and the Crown, and seeking cooperation with an emerging popular movement hostile to ministerial rule. Thus, if changes in the political system were inevitable, each side maneuvered to be well positioned in the new order that would follow. The prerevolutionary period would finally resolve this longstanding family and political rivalry. The Stamp Act crisis opened a crucial period in which the De Lanceys almost delivered a death blow to Livingston political prospects. Both factions supported the Stamp Act Congress held in New York City to voice disapproval of such imperial measures. Judge Livingston served as a delegate to the congress and authored the petition that was sent to King George III, respectfully protesting the stamp legislation. But, the Livingstons suffered from the measured, reasoned manner by which they fashioned their moderate opposition to the British in the general emotional storm that ensued. The De Lanceys fared much better because of the strong ties they forged with the more radical, popularly supported Sons of Liberty.22
In the aftermath of the Stamp Act protests, a widespread tenant or land riot broke out in the rural districts north of New York City. This general disorder consisted of five hundred to two thousand participants, as disgruntled tenants roamed the countryside in armed bands during 1766 and clashed with the Hudson Valley landlords. During these disturbances, the “levelers,” as they sometimes called themselves, killed and wounded a number of men, burned houses, and destroyed crops. This activity centered on the large Livingston estates and threatened New York City before local law enforcement units and British soldiers subdued the outbreak.23
A rebellious spirit that challenged established civil authority provided the atmosphere for the tenant riots, although these hostilities were not an integral part of the coming Revolution. The New York Sons of Liberty, for example, regarded the riots as a separate issue and did not support them. A British officer who participated in apprehending the offending tenants snidely remarked in his journal that the Sons of Liberty were “great opposers to these rioters as they were of the opinion no one is entitled to riot but themselves.”24
Judge Livingston’s propensity for law and order in protecting manorial property was revealed when his cousin, the lord of Livingston Manor adjacent to Clermont, wrote to him for advice on dealing with riotous tenants. The judge responded, “I would let the mob go on their own way and as soon as they had separated get a warrant and take up those that are most dangerous and guilty, and carry them to Albany Gaol. . . . If they should chance kill any person in the Fray every man of them is guilty of murder and the Government must interpose even if they should be obliged to raise men for the purpose.”25
The Quartering or Mutiny Act matter heated up after authorities quelled the tenant uprising. This legislation required colonial assemblies to provide quarters and supplies for British soldiers stationed in their province. Parliament had annually passed temporary acts for quartering troops in America during the French and Indian War. Many Americans came to regard the acts as strictly wartime emergency measures. After the conclusion of hostilities, therefore, the colonies proved less willing to support the British military establishment in their midst. Yet at the time of its passage in 1765, the latest act stirred little controversy in the New York Assembly. Its members were too occupied with adopting resolutions against the Stamp Act to give the Quartering Act much of their attention.
Parliament persisted in seeking adherence to its decree. Now reeling from recent events, the Livingstons embraced the quartering statute in the hope that British troops could safeguard the colony from such domestic law-breaking and attacks on property as experienced during the land riots. Since they were the principal plaintiff in the riots, the Livingstons’ self-interest in the bill was all too obvious. As a result, they appeared to be willing to jeopardize the common good—because the same British soldiers could also be used to enforce the Stamp Act and other objectionable ministerial measures—for selfish considerations.
The Livingston-led New York assembly pushed through quartering-enabling legislation in July 1766. Even so, the measure did not fully conform with the Quartering Act. It did not acknowledge Parliament’s authority to pass such a law and treated the requirement as a mere requisition, with the final decision resting with the New York assembly. Mounting tensions over the measure led to a clash between citizens and soldiers on August 11, 1766. Subsequent action by the New York assembly led to continued reluctance for unconditionally implementing provisions of the bill. On July 2, 1767, a frustrated Parliament declared the province in rebellion and passed the New York Restraining Act, which ordered the assembly suspended effective October 1, 1767, as punishment for noncompliance. Meanwhile, New York assemblymen voted for a more liberal interpretation of the Quartering Act, but it still fell significantly short of complete conformity. Fearing that a prolonged confrontation with New York over the issue might unite the colonies in opposition and defeat its original intent, Parliament decided not to invoke the suspension.
The damage had already been done. The Restraining Act, even though it had not been enforced, provided a cause célébre to kindle colonial resistance. Richard Henry Lee, the ardent Virginia patriot, referred to the act as a “flaming sword over our heads.”26 New York’s recalcitrance toward the Quartering Act also provided an example for other colonies to emulate. Of the seven continental colonies (New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Georgia, South Carolina, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania) specifically affected by the Quartering Act, all but two (Connecticut and Pennsylvania) followed New York by refusing full compliance at one time or another.27
As a result of the Livingstons’ conspicuous advocacy of the Quartering Act, public opinion increasingly regarded the family leaders as self-serving patricians who had lost touch with the general cause. The De Lanceys took good advantage of the