The Death of Socrates. Romano Guardini
same object? Is it not for the good and benefit of that on which it is bestowed? for instance, you see horses are benefited and improved when they are cared for by the art which is concerned with them. Is it not so? . . . Then is holiness, which is the care which we bestow on the gods, intended to benefit the gods, or to improve them? Should you allow that you make any of the gods better, when you do a holy action?
EUTH. No indeed: certainly not.
SOCR. No: I am quite sure that that is not your meaning, Euthyphro: it was for that reason that I asked you what you meant by the attention due to the gods. I thought that you did not mean that.
EUTH. You were right, Socrates. I do not mean that.
SOCR. Good. Then what sort of attention to the gods will holiness be?
EUTH. The attention, Socrates, of slaves to their masters.
SOCR. I understand: then it is a kind of service to the gods?
The answer has got stuck in the practical again. The nature of the thing meant has not come out yet. What is the meaning of this “care” and this “service”?
SOCR. Then tell me, my excellent friend; what result will the art which serves the gods serve to produce? You must know, seeing that you say that you know more about divine things than any other man.
The train of thought has come back again—somewhat deviously—to the critical point. Euthyphro has now to say what constitutes the special significance of an act of piety. He will thereby enunciate the essence of piety and clear the way for the further question as to the essence of its superior virtue, justice. “Justice” is for Plato something ultimate and comprehensive, namely the will and ability to give everything what is due to its proper nature—therefore, rightly understood, morality as such. Euthyphro, however, does not understand what it is all about, but again talks round the point, until, pressed by Socrates, he finally declares:
I told you just now, Socrates, that it is not so easy to learn the exact truth in all these matters. However, broadly I say this: if any man knows that his words and deeds in prayer and sacrifice are acceptable to the gods, that is what is holy: that preserves the common weal, as it does private households, from evil; but the opposite of what is acceptable to the gods is impious, and this it is that brings ruin and destruction on all things.
Another disappointment. The answer begs the question. That disposition is called “pious” in which the right “service” is rendered, whereas the very thing to be determined is, in what consists the service that is right for the gods, that is, pious. At the same time the answer slips down from the region of serious thinking into that of practice—and a very dubious practice, as will soon appear.
PIETY AND SERVICE OF THE GODS
But Socrates does not let go:
But you are evidently not anxious to instruct me: just now, when you were just on the point of telling me what I want to know, you stopped short. If you had gone on then, I should have learnt from you clearly enough by this time what is holiness. But now I am asking you questions, and must follow wherever you lead me; so tell me, what is it that you mean by the holy and holiness? Do you not mean a science of prayer and sacrifice?
Apparently an attempt to come to a definition—but an insidious one, as will be seen in a moment:
SOCR. To sacrifice is to give to the gods, and to pray is to ask of them, is it not?
EUTH. It is, Socrates.
SOCR. Then you say that holiness is the science of asking of the gods, and giving to them?
EUTH. You understand my meaning exactly, Socrates.
SOCR. Yes, for I am eager to share your wisdom, Euthyphro, and so I am all attention: nothing that you say will fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service of the gods? You say it is to ask of them, and to give to them?
EUTH. I do.
SOCR. Then, to ask rightly will be to ask of them what we stand in need of from them, will it not?
EUTH. Naturally.
SOCR. And to give rightly will be to give back to them what they stand in need of from us? It would not be very clever to make a present to a man of something that he has no need of.
EUTH. True, Socrates.
SOCR. Then, holiness, Euthyphro, will be an art of traffic between gods and men?
Euthyphro feels that this is questionable, and would like to let it rest there:
Yes, if you like to call it so.
But Socrates holds him fast:
Nay, I like nothing but what is true.
And he then exposes the reason for the evidently dubious character of the statement, namely the false religious ideas on which Euthyphro’s argument rests.
But tell me, how are the gods benefited by the gifts which they receive from us? What they give us is plain enough. Every good thing that we have is their gift. But how are they benefited by what we give them? Have we the advantage over them in this traffic so much that we receive from them all the good things we possess and give them nothing in return?
Euthyphro sees where the ideas he has expressed are leading:
But do you suppose, Socrates, that the gods are benefited by the gifts which they receive from us?
But Socrates will not let him escape the consequences of his assertions:
But what are these gifts, Euthyphro, that we give the gods?
Euthyphro answers:
What do you think but honour, and homage, and, as I have said, what is acceptable to them.
Socrates now proceeds to close the circle:
Then holiness, Euthyphro, is acceptable to the gods, but it is not profitable, or dear to them?
EUTH. I think that nothing is dearer to them.
SOCR. Then I see that holiness means that which is dear to the gods.
EUTH. Most certainly.
CONCLUSION
SOCR. After that, shall you be surprised to find that your definitions move about, instead of staying where you place them? Shall you charge me with being the Daedalus that makes them move, when you yourself are far more skilful than Daedalus was, and make them go round in a circle? Do you not see that our definition has come round to where it was before? Surely you remember that we have already seen that holiness, and what is pleasing to the gods, are quite different things. Do you not remember?
EUTH. I do.
SOCR. And now do you not see that you say that what the gods love is holy? But does not what the gods love come to the same thing as what is pleasing to the gods?
EUTH. Certainly.
SOCR. Then either our former conclusion was wrong, or, if that was right, we are wrong now.
EUTH. So it seems.
What, then, is the outcome of the whole discussion? Substantially, nothing at all. Euthyphro has stuck to his first opinion. But could not Socrates have told him what piety really is? To such a question the master of irony would probably have answered: “But I don’t know that myself!” Yet the answer might have had several meanings. It might have meant: “I know a few things, but would like to find out more. That can only happen when the other man joins in the search, therefore I cannot give away the solution to him.” But perhaps the answer would have meant the following: “I cannot tell him the solution so simply as that. For either he would not understand it at all, and then it would be no use telling him. Or he would understand it as a positive