Reform And Development In China: After 40 Years. Группа авторов

      Introduction

      When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to open up the country to the rest of the world and reform its socialist economic system in December 1978, few could have imagined how many economic, social and political changes would take place in the next 40 years. With an average annual growth rate of over 9%, China has become the world’s second-largest economy and its share in the global economy has increased from 2.7% to 16%.

      Since Xi Jinping’s leadership came into power, the reform and opening up have entered into a more sensitive stage. The high-speed growth was replaced by a moderate rate of 7% or so. Further, economic growth requires reform of the state-business relations or even the political system per se. Such reform, according to many observers, has been slowed down in the recent decade or stopped by so-called “vested interests” — those who gain from the existing system and are reluctant to make further reforms. In the meantime, the Internet, big data and artificial intelligence have increasingly become a major engine for economic growth and reshaped various sectors of industries. How to use these vibrant technological progresses to boost economic development but not allowing the flow of information to threaten the existing regime remains a challenge for the Chinese leadership. A series of changes in the political sphere, such as Xi’s consolidation of power and removal of term limits of state president, have brought about confusion among China observers regarding the future direction of the country.

      In 2017, the 19th Party Congress announced an ambitious development plan to continue the country’s economic miracle. By 2020, China will turn itself into “a moderately prosperous society in all respects”; by 2035, China will realize “socialist modernization” and by the middle of this century, China will become “a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful.” When the country is steered on the way to those grand goals, what kind of social and political changes will ensue?

      It is risky for academic researchers to predict the future. Fortunately, we can learn from history. Francis Bacon said “Histories make men wise.” In the Chinese tradition, history has always been a source of wisdom and strength. To review the experience of reform, the opening up in the past decades will help us develop a clearer view of the future.

      When we look retrospectively after four decades, it is evident that the dramatically changed economic landscape is both the result and the driving force of institutional reform and innovation. The question is how far the reform and innovation will go. Academic scholars have long debated on the degree to which China has departed from the Leninist system, and the degree to which alternative rules and procedures have been institutionalized. Economically, scholars discuss whether the country’s market transition has generated institutions that could reduce the cost of technological innovation and advance, which can sustain the rapid growth. In the social sphere, researchers observe how the authoritarian state interacts with changing social values and demands, and how the expanding welfare regime complicates with the market transition process.

      Writers of Chinese politics discuss whether China’s political process has become institutionalized since the regime has been apparently moving away from the Maoist era. Some believe the reform and opening up has made formal procedural rules more vital in decision making and implementation process, thereby facilitating the institutionalization of elite selection, elite management and elite succession, which constitute important sources of authoritarian resilience. Others contend that the institutionalization thesis is misleading. The Chinese political system has moved from political tumult to relative peace; but nothing more than that. Personal loyalty and clientelism still prevail within the system. The general rules are still Leninist in essence.

      This volume we edited reflects our latest efforts in understanding changing political, social and economic landscapes during the reform era. The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) at the South China University of Technology has a long tradition of studying political, economic and social development of contemporary China. Cooperating with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, IPP has hosted a series of international conferences to discuss the major challenges to China and the world since 2013. The chapters in this volume are selected from papers presented at the conferences held in 2014, 2015 and 2016.

      The chapters consist of three thematic clusters. The first cluster discusses reform within the party-state. Our authors review changes in the party, the bureaucracy, the state companies, as well as conceptually examine the idea of meritocracy. The second cluster surveys the social sphere. Emphases are given to how public opinion and mass political behavior intertwine with state policy, and how the state enforces its social policy in welfare and poverty reduction. The final cluster focuses on economy and technology, discussing China’s endeavor in promoting innovation-driven development and new green industries.

      The first thematic cluster begins with a chapter on reforms within the political system. “Is China’s political system innovative?” this is a question Yongnian Zheng attempts to answer in his chapter. In the past three decades, the Chinese political system has established an “internal pluralism” — the ruling party opens itself to emerging social interests and absorbs them into the regime. This political openness has facilitated the rapid alternation of political elite in an institutionalized manner. Deng successfully established