Critical Decade, A: China's Foreign Policy (2008-2018). Zhiqun Zhu
project during the decade is undoubtedly the BRI. First unveiled by Xi Jinping in 2013, the BRI has become one of the largest infrastructure and investment mega-projects in human history, covering over 70 countries, equivalent to 65 percent of the world’s population and 40 percent of the global GDP as of 2018. The BRI consists of the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the ocean-going 21st century Maritime Silk Road (丝绸之路经济带和 21 世纪海上丝绸之路) and aims to enhance connectivity and cooperation among countries along the routes, particularly Eurasian and African countries. Countries in faraway places such as Latin America, the Caribbean, and South Pacific have also been included in this massive development plan. The Chinese government asserts that the BRI idea may have come from China, but the dividends of cooperation are for all participating countries to share.
China continues to play a leadership role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is a major multilateral organization on Eurasian political, economic and security affairs and which expanded in 2017 to include India and Pakistan. In big power diplomacy, China has proposed “a new type of great power relations” (新型大国关系), particularly with the United States, but also with Russia, the EU, Japan, and India, in an attempt to promote cooperation and friendly competition and avoid conflict associated with the global power transition, or the so-called “Thucydides’ Trap.”2
Despite China’s enhanced power and growing influence globally, China faces some daunting challenges in its foreign policy. When China was weak, no one seemed to see it as a threat since it caused no discomfort among its smaller neighbors, let alone a superpower like the United States or an industrial power like Japan. But as an economic and military giant now, China has stoked anxieties among rivals and neighbors. As a result, its relations with the United States, Japan, India, Vietnam, Australia, and several other countries have all become more difficult and even deteriorated in recent years.
On balance, China’s bilateral relations with most countries are largely positive, but in its neighborhood, the PRC continues to be frustrated by disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea and developments on the Korean Peninsula.3 In cross-Taiwan Strait relations, Beijing remains disappointed at no major breakthroughs despite its charm offensives and preferential economic policies toward Taiwan. The United States is unlikely to give up the Taiwan card any time soon, which is evidenced by the unanimous passage of the “Taiwan Travel Act” by both houses of U.S. Congress in 2017 and 2018, respectively. The Act was signed into law by President Donald Trump in March 2018. At the end of 2018, Trump signed another pro-Taiwan bill, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, into law. With a pro-independence party in power in Taiwan that refuses to abide by the so-called “1992 Consensus,” whereby both sides agree there is one China, but the exact meaning of one China is open to interpretation, cross-Taiwan Strait relations are unlikely to improve in the short term.4
India and China had a 70 plus day military standoff in the Doklam/Donglang area in the summer of 2017 before tensions were finally defused through diplomacy. Today India remains concerned about the BRI, especially the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that passes through the controversial Kashmir region. Despite moderate improvement in Japan–China relations by the end of 2018 with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s official visit to Beijing after a long hiatus of top-level exchanges, Japan has been uncomfortable about China’s continued rise and has worked with India to propose an Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) partially in response to China’s BRI.5 The United States, Japan, India, and Australia have formed the so-called “Quad” to promote security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Though ostensibly not an anti-China club, many believe the Quad is shaping up to provide an alternate narrative to the China-centered development in the region.
Notably, China’s international image remains mixed and even poor in some parts of the world. Various global opinion polls conducted by Pew and others suggest that in general China enjoys favorable views in many parts of the developing world but more negative views in the West. As far as the South China Sea controversy is concerned, China is perceived to be violating international law and bullying small countries in its neighborhood, and no country has stepped forward to defend China’s position. In Africa and Latin America, China is often criticized for not helping promote governance, environment or human rights while focusing on trade and investment and extracting resources. In fact, the term “neocolonialism” is sometimes used to describe China’s exploitative practices in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. Upon closer examinations, not all such charges against China hold water, but China does need to work harder and do a better public relations job in presenting its preferred image of an open, peaceful, caring and responsible global power. With a deficit in soft power, there will be a limit to what China can achieve in its foreign policy.
Internal and External Factors
The international security environment remains fragile and unpredictable even as China continues to benefit from the current international system. Meanwhile, China’s domestic politics has become more complicated with multiple players vying for influence and with the reemergence of a strong leader. China’s decision-making process remains opaque, but changing international and domestic conditions will continue to shape China’s foreign policy. The Chinese government has to maintain a balanced foreign policy without succumbing to growing domestic pressures that demand tougher Chinese actions in international affairs. These external and internal factors will produce a dynamic, and sometimes inconsistent and contradictory, foreign policy in Beijing.
Pessimists tend to view China through the realist lens, while optimists often from a liberal perspective. China’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has received diverse reactions. On one hand, many countries welcome China’s growth and benefit from trading with its robust economy. China’s efforts to help combat poverty in developing countries have been appreciated by these governments. Its commitment to a peaceful international environment has also contributed to global development. In many regional and global affairs such as North Korea and climate change, China has played a positive and responsible role. On the other hand, China’s relations with the West and some of its neighbors remain delicate and even strained. Its practice in Africa and Latin America of focusing on expanding trade and snatching energy and commodity resources while paying little attention to other development issues has raised many eyebrows. Its human rights record, tight control in ethnic minority regions particularly Tibet and Xinjiang, and lack of transparency in military modernization continue to be sources of frictions in China’s external relations.
Uncertain about China’s long-term intentions, many of its neighbors have adopted a “hedging” strategy or a balanced approach. They remain engaged with China economically and diplomatically, but at the same time they reach out to the United States for security reassurance. For example, worried about big power rivalry in Asia, Southeast Asian nations have taken such a dual-track policy and have become some of the strongest advocates of strong relations with both the United States and China since they do not want to take sides between the two powers (Lemon, 2018). These countries also urge the two powers to maintain friendly ties and resolve differences peacefully.
Aspiring to be a global power, China seems aware of the need to balance its national interests and its increasing global responsibilities. Its foreign policy is not radical or ideological but more pragmatic, calculated, and sophisticated now. It is still in transition and will keep adjusting to the changing international and domestic conditions while upholding long-standing principles.
As the second largest economy, China is expected by the international community to play more leadership roles in world affairs, yet despite its expanding global reach, China considers itself a developing nation and does not want to shoulder too many responsibilities. China may be doing what it thinks is right to defend its national interests, but some of its behaviors are regarded assertive and even aggressive by other countries. These two contradictions will continue to characterize China’s relations with other countries. A variety of external and internal factors will make conducting Chinese foreign policy more complicated in the years ahead.
Key External Factors
It appears that Deng Xiaoping’s cautious “Tao