The Yellow House. Sarah M. Broom

The Yellow House - Sarah M. Broom


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value to (1) the immediate area through which it passes, (2) the state of Louisiana and the city and port of New Orleans, (3) and the entire Mississippi Valley.” When construction began in 1958, the marshes lit up in a dynamite explosion that BOOM, BOOM, BOOMED, debris flying three hundred feet in the air, raining fragments and mud on the heads of scurrying city officials, “many of whom looked for cover that was nowhere to be found,” the local paper reported. Mayor Chep Morrison called it “one of the miracles of our time that will have the effect of bringing another Mississippi River to New Orleans.” He could not know just how true his prophecy would turn out to be.

      Soon after it was built, the environmental catastrophe MR-GO wrought would become evident. Ghost cypress tree trunks stood up everywhere in the water like witnesses, evidence of vanquished cypress forests. The now unrestrained salt water that flowed in from the Gulf would damage surrounding wetlands and lagoons, and erode the natural storm surge barrier protecting low-lying places like New Orleans East. This is what happened during Hurricane Betsy: one-hundred-plus-mile-per-hour winds blew in from the east, pushing swollen Gulf waters across Lake Borgne, a vast lagoon surrounded by marshes and open to the Gulf. Water entered the funnel formed by the Intracoastal Waterway and MR-GO. Within this network of man-made canals, the storm surge reached ten feet and topped the levees surrounding it, breaching some. This is how water came to be rushing in at the front door when Uncle Joe opened it; and how water came to flood more than 160,000 homes, rising to eaves height in some. At the same time, Lake Pontchartrain’s surge entered the Industrial Canal and ruptured adjacent levees, including those in the Lower Ninth Ward, topographically higher than the East, but equally vulnerable for how close it is to the canal.

      It was a flood so devastating that Walter Davis said, “I was thinking, ‘Man, I can tell my grandkids about this.’ That’s how awesome Betsy was.” So awesome was Betsy that her name was retired from the tropical cyclone naming list. Governor John McKeithen vowed on television and on the radio, in front of everybody, that “nothing like this will ever happen again.”

      President Lyndon B. Johnson flew into the Lower Ninth Ward the next day—the area, even then, was a drowned and abandoned symbol of water’s destructive power when facilitated by human error—declaring the city and surrounding areas a disaster zone and eventually pledging an $85 million protection plan that would rebuild levees and shore up flood protection systems, which would, in August 2005, forty years after Betsy, fail.

      Those who dared look close knew this would be so, just as they knew that many of the new houses built in the East, owing to slipshod construction, were already having major subsidence problems; this sinking would only worsen. They knew that sometimes after hard rains sewage from canals rose in people’s toilets and tubs like the devil’s bath, that the dream would not, could not hold, because the foundation was bad.

      In the days after Betsy, people tallied their losses. The damage exceeded $1.2 billion, a record for the time. There was mud everywhere. Drowned rats and dead cats floated. National Guard trucks drove around. Some people were arrested for looting.

      People in the deluged areas recalled hearing dynamite, an eruption in the middle of their scrambling. “The levees were blown on purpose,” my brother Michael says. Levees had been blown before by the federal government, during the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 to divert water away from more “valuable” neighborhoods. In New Orleans East, the marshes had been blown to dredge MR-GO. Everyone in the area heard. They knew the sound of dynamite. Thus Michael’s story was not entirely in the realm of fantasy. This story, that the levees were blown, the poorest used as sacrificial lambs, would survive and be revived through the generations.

      The city’s vulnerability to widespread flooding and the images of stranded poor people shocked the nation. HUNDREDS MAROONED ON ROOFS AS SWOLLEN WATERS RIP LEVEE. HURRICANE BETSY LEAVES NEW ORLEANS WITH 16-FOOT FLOOD, the Chicago Tribune’s front page blared. And: 70,000 LEFT HOMELESS AS WATER RISES.

      “Why weren’t the people of inundated areas evacuated?” asked Dr. Edward Teller, a Berkeley atomic scientist, during a speech in New Orleans before the Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, weeks after the storm. “Your city had hours of warning,” he went on. “Why wasn’t it anticipated that the levee of the Industrial Canal might break … that the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet might overflow?” City officials resisted his plain questions, attacking his integrity instead: “The uprooting of people is not as simple as Dr. Teller wants it to be … to evacuate a million people into the wilderness in the middle of the night would have resulted in more casualties.” But, Teller said, people had only twenty minutes to evacuate between the time they knew water was rushing in and the time it had risen over their heads.

      “Who is this Teller who comes in here making unauthorized, ridiculous, and irresponsible statements?” asked newly elected mayor Victor Schiro, using his status as a native New Orleanian to deride the foreigner as an outsider, short of understanding, an interloper who could not possibly know.

      “He’s talking completely out of his field now,” said Louisiana Governor John McKeithen. “Why, he has probably never been to Louisiana before. He flew in here Tuesday night and damned us all and then flew back to Los Angeles the same night,” he said before quoting President Lyndon B. Johnson, who he claimed called Teller a “scientific nut.”

      More than seventy-five people died in Betsy. Most drowned. Or they died of heart attacks while waiting to drown. Fishing boats were overturned, people whipped to death by winds. Or their houses collapsed on top of them. A few people died while being evacuated, literally while walking from their house to the rescue boat.

      Even though expanses of New Orleans East Inc.’s property lay underwater, development surged on. Everyone vowed to rebuild higher, better. The feeling caught. New apartment houses went up everywhere on Chef Menteur Highway and elsewhere in the East, just as the interstate highway was expanded and the North Claiborne Overpass erected, decimating much of the cultural and economic life of historic black neighborhoods. It was still boom time; oil was cheap. NASA in Michoud had sustained superficial damage in Betsy—broken glass, peeled-off roofs—but the space vehicles were untouched, and the program eventually expanded, with work on the Saturn V (to this day the largest, most powerful rocket in NASA history) under way for rocketing into space thirty-two months later. Liftoff.

      MR-GO would become an expensive failure, eventually costing taxpayers $20,000 per boat that passed through. Rarely used, it would not usher in its projected revenue and jobs. But, post-Betsy, the levees would be shored up by the government just as Lyndon Johnson promised. New Orleans East Inc. and other eastern developers would use this fact in their advertisements to lure more and more people to the area. And in 1968, Congress would spur this repopulation along by creating the National Flood Insurance Program, which allowed people to buy flood insurance at low rates, even and especially in dangerous flood zones.

       VII

       The Crown

      After the floodwaters receded, the Broom clan got to work removing carpets and waterlogged furniture, turning the house upside down, letting it air-dry. Nothing could be saved. Ivory Mae and her children stood on the curb watching the house, just as her mother had stood with her after their house had burned down. She was too young to understand loss then, but she knew now.

      For weeks, the family stayed with Lolo on Dryades Street, applying for every possible voucher, the children getting typhoid and diphtheria shots, while Simon saw in the ruins a chance to build up. He recruited his brother-in-law Ernest Coleman and Ernest’s son Lil Pa, skilled builders. Uncle Joe, who had become a detail-obsessed carpenter, helped, too. Mr. Taylor, the electrician from NASA, rewired the house, but badly. They poured a slab of concrete in the back and set about expanding upward, mistrusting the ground. This is how the shotgun house with two bedrooms became a camelback shotgun house with a second bathroom, a den, and an upstairs bedroom rearing toward the sky in the back, a crown that did not run the length of the house. If you looked at it from the side, it drew a boxy, backward lying-down L.

      Simon


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