Putin's Russia. Группа авторов
and pay inadequate attention to aspects of well-being omitted from their national income statistics (social externalities and other nonmarket aspects of personal fulfilment). These defects give an unduly favourable impression of Russia’s inclusive economic performance. Russian well-being and quality of existence are substantially lower than the World Bank’s indicators suggest (Trudolyubov, 2019),13 while the Kremlin’s military and political power are higher. Russia is not a typical lower tier advanced economy playing a benign part in the global order. It is a great military power at odds with Western-led globalising that privileges kleptocratic servitors at the expense of ordinary consumers. A system’s merit, like beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder. This is a matter of values. Nonetheless, one important aspect of Russia’s economic potential should be beyond dispute. Russia can persevere on its current course without foregoing guns, butter, growth and modernisation. It can remain on a Muscovite trajectory as long as the regime holds power by successfully repressing full democratisation.
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1 See https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/government-debt-to-gdp. The American debt to GDP ratio is 105.4.
2The absolute numbers of employed people was 73.2 million in September 2018. World Bank, Russia’s Economy: Preserving Stability, Doubling Growth, Halving Poverty — How? December 4, 2018: 40th issue of the Russia Economic Report; www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/publication/rer; http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/673631543924406524/RER-40-English.pdf.
3 Most of the unemployment is still long term: 30% of the unemployed had been looking for a job for over a year. The number of part-time employees increased slightly in the first half of 2018 but remained far below the levels of the 2009 crisis period. Ibid. https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/unemployment-rate.
4 See https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/inflation-cpi.
5 See https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp-growth-annual.
6 World Bank, Russia’s Economy: Preserving Stability, Doubling Growth, Halving Poverty — How? December 4, 2018: 40th issue of the Russia Economic Report; http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/publication/rer; pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/673631543924406524/RER-40-English.pdf.
7 See https://www.cia.gov/library/PUBLICATIONS/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html. Russia’s per capita GDP computed in purchasing power parity dollars in 2017 was $27,900. The counterpart American figure was $59,000.
8 CIA World Factbook. www.cia.gov/library/PUBLICATIONS/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html.
9 Ibid. Other Russian sources indicated a higher figure. The Russian Presidential Academy of the National Economy and Public Administration says 22% of Russians fall into the “poverty zone”, meaning they are unable to buy anything beyond basic staples needed for subsistence. See “One-Fifth of Russians Live in Poverty, 36 Percent in ‘Risk Zone,’ Study Finds”, Radio Free Europe, November 21, 2018. https://www.rferl.org/a/study-22-percent-of-russians-live-in-poverty-36-percent-in-risk-zone-/29613059.html.
10 World Bank, Russia’s Economy: Preserving Stability, Doubling Growth, Halving Poverty — How? December 4, 2018: 40th issue of the Russia Economic Report, pp. 35–36. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/673631543924406524/RER-40-English.pdf.
11 Ibid., pp. 36–40.
12 Ibid.,