Dancing with the Devil. Michael Rubin

      Any pretense of secrecy ended when South Korean diplomats leaked word of North Korea’s activities after being briefed by American diplomats.⁴⁷ International headlines soon broadcast predictions that North Korea might be nuclear-weapons capable by the mid-1990s.

      North Korea responded with bluster. Pyongyang accused the West of hypocrisy, a card to which American diplomats are sensitive, as Iran and other rogues well understand. The North Koreans said they would not accede to inspections of Yongbyon so long as the American military maintained a nuclear arsenal in South Korea.⁴⁸ Whereas rogue regimes as a rule do not accept Western arguments, Bush yielded to the North Korean argument.⁴⁹ Those who elevated arms control over national security won the day.⁵⁰

      Bush hoped that removing nuclear missiles from South Korea would set the circumstances for successful negotiations. Rather than shape the move as a concession to Pyongyang, Bush’s team depicted it as outreach to Moscow.⁵¹