Return to Winter. Douglas E. Schoen

Return to Winter - Douglas E. Schoen


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is this: Russia and China know what they want, are determined and organized in how they are pursuing it, and are meeting, by and large, with substantial success in their goals. None of this can be said about the American response, let alone about any proactive American vision for leadership in the 21st century. Until this changes, it’s hard to feel optimistic. Our adversaries would be formidable on their own; working together, they cast a long shadow over the American future.

      A DEEPENING, STRENGTHENING ALLIANCE

      On May 17, 2015, originating from Novorissiysk on the Black Sea, the Russian and Chinese navies began weeklong joint naval exercises: Sea Cooperation 2015, as the Russian Defense Ministry billed it. Ten ships from the two countries participated, anchored by the Moskva, Russia’s Crimea-based guided-missile cruiser, which served as headquarters for the drills. The goal of the exercises was to “strengthen mutual understanding between the navies . . . regarding boosting stability, countering new challenges and threats at sea,” said Russian deputy navy commander Aleksandr Fedotenkov. “The joint drills are not aimed against third parties and are not connected with the political situation in that region,” the Russian Defense Ministry said.

      Despite those disclaimers, no observer, watching the navy ships pass in tandem, could miss the message: that the Russia-China alliance, once viewed as unthinkable, continues to deepen, with profound consequences for the world. The exercises take place as Russia continues to stare down the United States and its Western allies about Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its continued destabilization of Ukraine, and as China is confronting the United States and its Asian allies in the Pacific, where Beijing’s aggressive moves against neighboring countries seem to be challenges to regional security. What better time than now, then, and what better place than the Mediterranean—on NATO’s southern perimeter—for Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chinese president Xi Jinping to advertise the strength of their growing partnership?

      Sea Cooperation 2015 took place a week after Russia’s annual Victory Day ceremonies commemorating its triumph in World War II over Germany. This year marked the 70th anniversary of that historic moment, so the celebrations were grander than usual. Russian soldiers marched in period garb, and 2,000 surviving Red Army veterans of what Russians call the Great Patriotic War were bused in to Moscow for the ceremonies. But because of Putin’s aggression in Ukraine and violation of international law in annexing Crimea, no head of state from the Western democracies agreed to attend.

      That was okay with Putin, though—because he had Xi sitting by his side.

      The Chinese president was the most high-profile world leader in Moscow, where he joined Putin on the reviewing stand and watched not only Russian troops but a Chinese honor guard, too—which marched past the two leaders singing “Katyusha,” a Russian war ballad. Along with the troops and pageantry, Putin wheeled out an impressive new tank, the Armata, considered by some to be the Russian army’s new “secret weapon,” and a new ICBM launcher. In his Victory Day speech, Putin made sure to get a dig in at the West and at the United States in particular.

      “In past decades, we have seen attempts to create a unipolar world,” Putin said, referring to what he sees as American attempts to control the affairs of other countries.

      If the joint naval exercise wasn’t the largest of its kind, and the Victory Day parade mostly pageantry and symbolism, the two events nonetheless underscore the Russian-Chinese partnership, which is far more substantive, in all major categories—military cooperation, economic and trade agreements, cyber-security issues, dealings with rogue nations, and mutual support in international venues such as the United Nations. This cooperation would be concerning enough on its own to American interests and those of our allies, but independently, Russia and China are also engaged in what amount to stare-downs with the United States in critical spots in the world.

      FLASHPOINTS

      Russia’s aggression in Ukraine could be poised to reach a crucial stage. Troubling signs suggest that we could soon see a major Russian incursion. The Ukrainian government in Kiev has already lost more than two dozen towns to the Russian-backed separatists since early 2015. Ukraine president Petro Poroshenko has warned that 50,000 Russian troops remain massed on the Ukraine border—despite Moscow’s repeated attempts to deny aggressive intent—while some 40,000 separatists or Russian loyalists are operating inside the country. Those numbers taken together represent an increase of 50 percent from the same time in 2014.

      The separatist militants have repeatedly violated the Minsk II cease-fire agreement, provoking armed confrontations and shooting at Ukrainian positions.2 The Kiev-based government in Ukraine now claims that Russia violates the cease-fire 50 to 80 times a day. Moscow’s proxies in Ukraine have shelled Avdiyivka in eastern Ukraine, a town still held by the Kiev government, and also fired on Ukrainian forces near the port of Mariupol. Moscow’s allies have brought in heavy weaponry, including tanks—again in direct violation of Minsk. Russian special forces have infiltrated Ukraine, and the Russians have maintained surface-to-air missile systems in areas prohibited by the agreement.3 And a report from a Virginia-based cyber-security firm indicates that Russia has been waging a cyber war against Ukraine all along.4

      In the words of a senior Western diplomat: “The familiar pattern is recurring. Russia makes high-level assurances that it wants peace, and meanwhile stokes the violence on the ground with fighters and arms.”5

      All the signs point to a Russian escalation. The proof will come in Moscow’s deeds, not its denials. But it’s worth remembering that Russian actions in Ukraine have already crossed a Rubicon before now—several Rubicons. The annexation of Crimea itself was thought unthinkable—until Putin went in and did it. Then, in summer 2014, while Moscow was supplying the separatist rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk with tanks, rocket launchers, and advanced air-defense systems, one of those air-defense systems shot down Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, killing 298 civilians.6 Forensic evidence implicates Russian regular forces, as opposed to separatist rebels, for the incident, according to an independent report from a German research organization.7 The episode aroused memories of Moscow’s downing of Korean Air 007 in 1983, which took place during some of the frostiest days of the Cold War.

      Recent years seem to have liberated Putin to be more frank and unapologetic about his aims. He has publicly acknowledged that he ordered the annexation of Crimea weeks before that region’s referendum on independence,8 and he admitted that he was willing to put Russian nuclear forces on alert during the Crimea crisis.9 Putin might also feel emboldened because his back-against-the-wall stance against the West has bolstered his political popularity at home, where his approval ratings remain very high. Western sanctions on Russia for its behavior in Ukraine show little sign of working, even after multiple rounds, the most recent following the downing of Flight 17.

      Respected, sober political analysts, such as Graham Allison and Dimitri K. Simes, writing in the National Interest, warn that a U.S. response to Russian aggression in Ukraine could potentially lead to war. (Conflicting accounts even suggest that Putin has threatened to use nukes if the United States intervenes in any substantial way.) A Russian–American war seems inconceivable to many, but Allison and Simes caution that “when judging something to be ‘inconceivable,’ we should always remind ourselves that this is a statement not about what is possible in the world, but about what we can imagine.” How many of us imagined that one day Putin would dare to send two Russian nuclear bombers into American airspace over Alaska? That’s what he did in May 2015.

      Allison and Simes, longtime observers of Russia, say that they are “more concerned about the drift of events than at any point since the end of the Cold War.”10 In a sign of what may come next, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia has begun a so-called investigation into “the legality of the independence” of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—the Baltic States that were the first to break from the Soviet Union.11

      Meanwhile, Putin’s budding ally in Beijing is also moving aggressively, if more quietly, to expand Chinese influence and put pressure on American allies in Asia. The most visible, consequential, and troubling area of Chinese activity is in the South China Sea, where a newly assertive Beijing is staking claims to disputed island archipelagoes


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