The Red Army in Austria. Группа авторов
October 1953, NSC 162/2 replaced NSC 68 as the basic American national security strategy. NSC 162/2 reflected the “Solarium exercises” by rejecting “rollback” of communism as a realistic strategy, now arguing “the detachment of any major satellite from the Soviet bloc does not now appear feasible except by Soviet acquiescence or by war.”39 In the fall of 1953 Eisenhower’s basic policy toward Eastern Europe was refined in NSC 174. It ended Eisenhower’s active “liberation” policy. The Eisenhower administration continued psychological warfare in order to undermine Soviet control of the Eastern European satellite regimes in the long run. It promised to “support the spirit of resistance” via ongoing propaganda initiatives. But, very significantly, it wanted to avoid the “incitement of premature revolts” in the Soviet bloc. Undermining the satellite regimes in the long run would promote “conditions favorable to eventual liberation.”40 While the Eisenhower administration’s “new look” strategy was very cautious, his “rhetorical diplomacy” was very aggressive.41
While the Eisenhower administration was reinventing its basic national security strategy, it also conducted a basic review of its Austrian policy. First, it needed to shelf the unproductive “short treaty” draft, which had been a very unproductive “propaganda” instrument and had basically arrested the negotiations of the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers, which had been the most productive arena of Austrian treaty talks. Secondly, it needed to respond to Austrian initiatives that tried to restart treaty negotiations on new terms. The new government of Julius Raab had reacted positively to the Kremlin’s “peaceful coexistence” initiative, which had produced an easing of the Soviet occupation regime in its Austrian zone. Long-time Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber had begun to test the option of a neutral Austria via Indian intermediaries directly with the Kremlin. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov was not (yet) ready to consider a neutralization of Austria in the summer of 1953. Washington and London viewed Gruber’s unilateral moves not coordinated with the Western powers with great suspicion (“Gruberisms”). The new Austrian government threatening to embark on its own diplomacy to end the interminable four-power occupation of the country, sparked a review of American policies vis-à-vis Austria in the summer/fall of 1953.42
This review of Austrian polices culminated in NSC 164/4, adopted in October 1953; it paralleled the larger review of basic US national security policy NSC 162/2. NSC 162/2 stated: “there is no evidence that the Soviet leadership is prepared to modify its basic attitudes and accept any permanent settlement with the United States, although it may be prepared for a modus vivendi on certain issues” [my emphasis].43 Might the Austrian question be such an issue? The debate in the National Security Council on adopting NSC 164/4 was vigorous. Admiral Radford, the uncompromising JCS chairman,opposed a neutralization of Austria; he feared severe repercussions on Germany and demanded that the United States “vigorously resist the neutralization of Austria as contrary to U.S. interests.” Secretary of State J. F. Dulles, who was known to be a vigorous opponent of fence-sitting neutrality in the Cold War, turned out to be remarkably sensitive to the Austrian issue and noted “while we should of course oppose the neutralization of Austria just as far as possible in any negotiation, the decision in the long run would depend on the Austrians themselves” [emphasis mine]. He added “an embittered Austria would never prove a reliable ally of the U.S.” And then Harold Stassen, Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for Disarmament issues, added a brilliant insight that would produce an opening in the future: “to his mind the status of neutralization did not necessarily imply disarmament.”44 Was this an indication that he was thinking of the Swiss model of armed neutrality? We can only surmise, though we will never know.
The formula that the American national security managers found in the final document NSC 162/2 was a compromise. Along the lines of Radford’s cautious remarks, Washington would “vigorously resist the neutralization of Austria as contrary to U.S. interests.” However, along the lines of Dulles’ thoughts, “should the Austrians, British, and French press strongly for accepting some degree of neutralization, the United States may be required to make some concession to avoid the onus of unilaterally blocking a Treaty.”45
In the fall of 1953, the Deputies’ talks on the Austrian treaty were not resumed even though the State Department officially withdrew the still-born short treaty draft. Representatives from the great powers’ foreign offices, however, were working on an agenda for a future meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Churchill, who had been out of action all summer due to a stroke in June, kept pleading for a summit meeting. His Western allies agreed only to a Western Summit meeting in Bermuda late in 1953. Little progress was made in unmooring the deadlock of entering negotiations with the new leaders in the Kremlin on crucial issues such as Germany, Indochina, and nuclear disarmament. However, it was agreed that the Foreign Ministers’ meetings would resume in Berlin in February 1954 with the German and Austrian treaties back at the forefront of the international agenda.46
While the Foreign Ministers made no progress on the German question, the neutralization of Austria was prominently discussed in Berlin, in the end without leading to a decisive breakthrough. Agreeing with Governor Stassen’s observation in the National Security Council’s debate over NSC 162/2, State Department position papers had stressed since October 1953: “that neutralization of a nation did not necessarily mean its disarmament.” This view seems to have percolated over to the White House as well. Before the Secretary of State departed Washington for the Berlin Council of Foreign Ministers, Eisenhower and Dulles discussed the Austrian question in a breakfast conference on January 20, 1954. The President was in agreement with the earlier State Department position on possible Austrian neutrality: “He [Eisenhower] could see no objection to the neutralization of Austria if this did not carry with it the demilitarization. If Austria could achieve a status somewhat comparable to Switzerland, this would be quite satisfactory from a military standpoint” [emphasis added].47
The Council of Foreign Ministers met in Berlin in early February 1954. Molotov remained non-concessionary on the German issues. A high-level government delegation led by Foreign Minister Figl was officially admitted to present the Austrian point of view. They strongly pleaded for a neutral solution to end the interminable Austrian occupation. Dulles agreed with the Austrian position and made a strong statement on February 13, 1954, on behalf of Austrian armed neutrality along the lines of the Swiss model:
A neutral status is an honorable status if it is voluntarily chosen by a nation. Switzerland has chosen to be neutral, and as a neutral she has achieved an honorable place in the family of nations. Under the Austrian State Treaty as heretofore drafted, Austria would be free to choose for itself to be a neutral state like Switzerland. Certainly the United States would fully respect its choice in this respect, as it fully respects the comparable choice of the Swiss nation. However, it is one thing for a nation to choose to be neutral. It is another thing to have neutrality forcible imposed on it by the other nations as a perpetual servitude [emphasis added].48
Molotov, however, was not prepared to make a major concession on Austria and end the Austrian occupation. He continued to link the solution of the Austrian question with the conclusion of a German peace treaty. Dulles and the Austrian delegation left Berlin highly disappointed about another breakdown of Austrian treaty negotiations.49
For the rest of 1954 nothing happened to bring about an agreement on the Austrian question. The Western powers, however, moved decisively on the German question. After the French parliament rejected the ratification of the European Defense Community, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden quickly organized a meeting in London to find another solution to West German rearmament. The “London Agreements” of October 1954 admitted the Federal Republic into the NATO alliance. West Germany’s Adenauer government pledged not to build any ABC weapons. West German rearmament and integration into NATO constituted a major failure of Molotov’s intransigent Stalinist foreign policy.
This decisive breakthrough of West German integration into the North Atlantic defense framework sparked dramatic changes in the Kremlin leadership. By early 1955, Malenkov had been demoted because he had not “distanced himself from Beriia,”50 Molotov lost his almost iron grip on formulating Soviet foreign policy and executing Stalin’s