Of Matters Military. Mrinal Suman
Now, the Acquisition Wing has to take directions and submit reports to the Defence Production Board as well. In both ‘Make (Indian)’ and ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’ cases, the Acquisition Wing has to function under the oversight of the Secretary Defence Production.
A look at Illustration 5 will show multiplicity of agencies involved in defence acquisitions. Lack of single point authority with decision making powers results in dilution of accountability. That is the reason why no functionary has ever been held responsible for failing to deliver and the armed force continue to suffer critical equipment deficiencies.
Illustration 5: Major Agencies of Indian Defence Acquisition System
Additionally, the Government of India functions on the basis of consensus and no diktats are ever issued. It implies that all stake holders have to be taken on board with their concerns duly addressed before taking any decision. Such an arrangement not only results in undue delays but also distorts policy objectives and blurs delineation of authority/responsibility.
Proposed Reorganisation
With a view to cause minimum organisational turbulence, it is suggested that the existing structures be reorganised within MoD to create a centralised authority. The Department of Defence Production should be restructured and rechristened as the Department of Defence Modernisation (DDM) to act as the nodal agency for all facets of defence acquisitions. A Minister of State in MoD could be designated as Minister of State (Modernisation) and assigned the task of overseeing the complete acquisition process.
The current structure and functioning of the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) as the overarching policy making body should carry on. It should debate capability gaps and accord approval to evolved 15-years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan and 5-years Services Capital Acquisition Plan, as hitherto fore. While the Service Headquarters (SHQ) should remain the prime initiator of all proposals, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) should continue to oversee proposals and evolve integrated plans. However, categorisation of proposals should be outside the charter of responsibility of DAC.
A Defence Modernisation Board (DMB) should be constituted in DDM under the chairmanship of the Minister of State (Modernisation). Plans and proposals approved by DAC should flow to this Board for implementation. To start with, DMB will have to convert capability requirements into performance parameters of equipment sought by the services. Thereafter, a detailed scan of technology available in India and abroad will be required to translate performance parameters into viable and verifiable qualitative requirements. Subsequently, various alternatives to acquire the necessary equipment in the specified time frame will have to be studied to identify the most suitable and cost-effective route. Being the empowered executive agency, DMB’s charter of responsibility will be all encompassing right up to in-service support.
Once the acquisition route is approved by DMB, it will be the responsibility of DDM to initiate the necessary process. Technical evaluation and field trials should continue to be held under the aegis of respective SHQ, thereby facilitating appraisal of the equipment by agencies that are independent of the acquisition authority, an ideal arrangement indeed. See Illustration 6 for schematic flow chart of the proposed functioning.
Illustration 6: Proposed Defence Acquisition Structures
As stated earlier, the proposed DDM is recommended to be designated as the nodal authority to oversee the complete gamut of acquisition activities. Its charter of responsibility will include preparation of qualitative requirements of required equipment; identification and adoption of the route/routes selected to procure equipment in the specified timeframe; overseeing purchase/development process; monitoring implementation of offset obligations; development of indigenous defence industry including absorption of technology; and promotion of exports. Suggested organisational structure of DDM has been shown in Illustration 7.
Illustration 7: Suggested Structure of the Department of Defence Modernisation
In order to deliver, functionaries manning DDM must be selected with due care for their technical/professional competence, demonstrated flair and impeccable integrity. They should be trained and equipped to discharge their functions proficiently. To ensure continuity, they should be given extended tenures with full protection of their career prospects. Needless to say, DDM has to be an integrated set-up comprising of the best talent available amongst the bureaucracy and the services. Appointments should be qualification-specific and not service-specific, in other words best man should be selected for every job.
Conclusion
Authority and accountability go hand in hand. One without the other is untenable. Defence acquisitions are a multifaceted process involving a large number of disciplines. Need for an overarching authority to administer, coordinate, oversee, direct and control multifarious acquisition activities has been well realised by all countries. Emergence of USD (AT&L) as the nodal authority in the US, BWB in Germany and DE&S in Britain are manifestations of the belated endorsement of the need for a central acquisition authority.
India cannot afford to neglect the requirement any longer. The Government must muster enough courage to undertake necessary reforms. Organisational parochialism and turf-guarding must not be allowed to stall progress – national interests must reign supreme. DDM should be an empowered umbrella organisation with duly spelt out responsibility, commensurate authority and overall accountability to ensure that the Indian armed forces get the equipment that they need in the given timelines and with optimal economic efficiency.
In addition to the acquisition tasks, DDM should aim at building a modern defence industrial base to reduce dependence on foreign equipment and to promote defence exports. A vibrant and thriving defence industry will act as a catalyst to the upgradation of technologies and skills in Indian engineering, manufacturing and production sector. No country can achieve long-term national security unless it is supported by a well-developed, dynamic and responsive defence industry.
Defence Procurements Suffer due to StaffInadequacies: Need for a Training Institute
The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) in its report observed that defence acquisition is ‘a cross-disciplinary activity requiring expertise in technology, military, finance, quality assurance, market research, contract management, project management, administration and policy making’. “The existing system of acquisitions being handled by unspecialised personnel posted for three-year tenures is simply not adequate”, it opined. The CAG was the first agency that looked at the staff inadequacies that plague India’s defence procurement regime. Earlier, the thrust was limited only to organisational and procedural reforms, whereas mediocrity of the staff has been the main reason for non-performance of the acquisition regime.
India has failed to appreciate that procurement of defence equipment is a highly specialised and complex activity needing extraordinary professional skills and unique attributes. Therefore, little thought has been paid to human resources and the staffing system. Procurement of military equipment worth billions of dollars is being carried out by people who are ill-equipped for the job. Sadly, the indifferent quality of personnel continues to be the weakest link to date. This aspect needs immediate attention.
The staff carrying out acquisition related functions is drawn from the three services, the civil bureaucracy and the defence finance. They are neither selected for