Industrial Democracy. Sidney Webb
control over the negotiations conducted or the decisions arrived at by the local branch or district committee. The result was not only failure to cope with the vital problems
1 In financial matters, for instance, though every penny of the funds belonged to the whole society, each branch retained its own receipts, subject only to the cumbrous annual " equalisation." The branch accordingly had it in its power to make any disbursement it chose, subject only to subsequent disallowance by the central executive. Nor was the decision of the centrah executive in any way final. The branch aggrieved by any disallowance couTd, and habitually did, appeal—not to the members at large, who would usually have supported the executive—but to another body, the general council, which met every three years for the express purpose of deciding such appeals. There was even a further appeal from the general council to the periodical delegate meeting. In the meantime the payment objected to was not required to be refunded, and it will therefore easily be understood that the vast majority of executive decisions were instantlv appealed against. And when we add that each of these several courts of Appeal frequently reversed a large proportion of the decisions of its immediate inllk-ior, the effect of these frequent appeals in destroying all authority can easily be imagined.
Representative Institutions 49
of trade policy involved in the changing conditions of the industry, but also an increasing paralysis of administration,^ against which officers and committee-men struggled in vain.' When in 1892 the delegates met at Leeds to find a remedy for these evils, they brought from the branches two leading suggestions. One party urged the appointment, in aid o^ the central executive, of a s alaried staff of distric t delegates, ' elected, in direct imitation of those of the BoiTeSrmaKefsTby the whole society. Another section favored the transforma- tion of the executive committee into a representative body, and proposed the division of the country into eight equal electoral districts, each of which should elect a representative to a salaried executive council sitting continually in London, and thus giving its whole time to the society's work. Probably these remedies, aimed at different sides of the trouble, were intended as alternatives. It is significant of the deep impression made upon the delegate meeting that it eventually adopted both, thus at one blow increasing the number of salaried officers from three to seventeen.^
Time has yet to show how faf thfs revolution in the constitution of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers wilT conduce either to efficient administration or to genuine popular control. It is easy to see that government by an executive committee of this character differs essentially from government by a representative assembly appointing! its own cabinet, and that it possesses certain obvious dis-J advantages. The eight members, who are thus transferrea by the vote of their fellows from the engineer's workshop tq the Stamford Street office, become by this fundamental change of life completely severed from their constituents, \ Spending all their days in office routine, they necessarily lose the vivid appreciation of the feelings of the man
' It is interesting to observe that the United Society of Boilermakers, by adopting in 1895 a Representative Executive, has made its foffi&I constitution almost identical with that of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. The vital difiference between these two societies now lies in the working relation between the central executive and the local branches and district committees ; see the subsequent chapter on "The Unit of Government."
5© Trade Union Structure
who works at the lathe or the forge. Living constantly in London, they are subject to new local influences, and tend unconsciously to get out of touch with the special grievances or new drifts of popular opinion on the Tyne or the Clyde, at Belfast or in Lancashire. It is true that the representa- tives hold office for only three years, at the expiration of which they must present themselves for re-election ; but there would be the greatest possible reluctance amongst the members to relegate to manual labor a man who had once served them as a salaried official. Unless, therefore, a re- vulsion of feeling takes place among the Engineers against the institution itself, the present members of the representa- tive executive committee may rely with some confidence on becoming practically permanent officials.
These objections do not apply with equal force to other examples of a representative executive. The tradition of the Stamford Street office—that the whole mass of friendly- society business should be dealt with in all its details by the members of the executive committee themselves—involves their daily attendance and their complete absorption in office work. In other Trade Unions which have adopted"" the same constitutional form, the members of the represent- ative executi ve residj . in thpir r gnstituenc ies and, in some cases, even continue to work at their trade. They are called, together, like the members of a representative assembly, at ■quarterly or other intervals to decide only the more im- portant questions, the detailed executive routine being •(jfelegated to a local sub -committee or to the official staff! Thus the executive committee of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives usually meets only for one day a month ; the executive committee of the Associated Loco- motive Engineers and Firemen is called together only when required, usually not more than once or twice a month ; the executive council of the Amalgamated Society of' Railway Servants comes to London once a quarter, and the same practice is followed by the executive committee of the National Union of Gasworkers and General Laborers. It is
Representative Institutions 51
evident that in all these cases the representative executive, whether formed of the salaried officials of the districts or of men working at their trade, has more chance of remaining in touch with its constituents than in the case of the Amalga- mated Society of Engineers.
/Butjybgre .is, la. our opinion,^ a fundamental drawback to government by a represejitajive executive, even under the most favorable conditions. | One jof_the chief duties of a "representative governing bod^^'lS to criticise, control, arid direct the permanent official staff, by whom the policy of the organisation must actually be carried out. Its main function, in fact, is to exercise real and continuous authority over the civir service. Now all experience shows„it to be. an essential ' condition that the permanent officials should be dependent; on and genuinely subordinate to the representative boHy. This condition is fulfilled in the constitutions such as those of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners and the Miners' Federation, where the representative assembly^ itself appoints the officers, determines their duties, and fixesv, their salaries. But 'it is entirely absent in ^1 Trade Union constitutions based on a representative ex p^"tivp- Under thiy arrangement the executive committee neither appoints the] officers nor fixes their salaries. Though the representative^ executive, unlike the old governing branch, can in its corporate capacity claim to speak in the name of all the' members, so can the general secretary himself, and often each assistant secretary." All alike hold their positions from the same supreme power—the votes of the members ; and have their ( respective duties and emoluments defined by the same- written constitution—the society's rules.
This absence of any co-ordination of the several parts of the constitution works out, in practice, in one of two ways. There may arise jealousies between the several officers;^ or between them and some of the members o'f the executive committee. J We have known instances in which an incom- petent and arbitrary general secretary has been pulled up by one or other of his colleagues who wanted to succeed to
52 Trade Union Structure
his place. The suspicion engendered by the relation of competitors for popular suffrage checks, it may be, some positive malpractices, but results also in the obstruction of useful measures of policy, or even in their failure through dis- loyalty. ( More usually the^ executive conimittee^feelingjtself powerless to control the officials, te nds to ma ke a tacit and half-unconscious compact with themj_ based on mutual support against the criticism of their common constituenjsj If the members of the committee are themselves salted officials, they not only have a fellow-feeling for the'weak- nesses of their brother officials, but they also realise~viv^ly the personal risk of appealing against them to the popular vote. If, on the other hand, the Piembers-xontinue to work at their trade, they feel themselves at a hopeless disadvaatage in any such appeal. They have neither the business ex- perience nor the acquaintance with details~necessary for a successful indictment of an officer who is known from one end of the society to the otherj^nd who enjoys the aarontage^ of controlling its machinery.