librsnet@mail.ru
A Century of American Diplomacy. John W. Foster
that the President and Senate may not make treaties in the interest of all the States, or may act corruptly, Mr. Jay wrote :
" As all the States are equally represented in the Senate, and by men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their constituents, they will all have an equal degree of influence in that body, especially while they continue to be careful in appoint- ing proper persons, and to assist on their punctual attendance. In proportion as the United States assume a national form and a national character, so will the good of the whole be more and more an object of
ORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 109
attention; and the government must be a weak one indeed, if it should forget that the good of the whole can only be promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts or members which compose the whole. It will not be in the power of the President and Senate to make any treaties by which they and their families and estates will not be equally bound and affected with the rest of the community; and having no private inter- ests distinct from that of the nation, they will be under no temptations to neglect the latter.
" As to corruption, the case is not supposable. He must either have been very unfortunate in his inter- course with the world, or possess a heart very suscepti- ble of such impressions, who can think it probable that the President and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of such unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross and too invidious to be entertained. But in such a case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the law of nations.
"With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to conceive how it should be increased. Every con- sideration that can influence the human mind, such as honor, oaths, reputations, conscience, the love of coun- try, and family affections and attachments, afford se- curity for their fidelity. In short, as the Constitution has taken the utmost care that they shall be men of talents and integrity, we have reasons to be persuaded that the treaties they make will be as advantageous as, all circumstances considered, could be made; and so far as the fear of punishment and disgrace can operate,
110 .
that motive to good behavior is amply afforded by the article on the subject of impeachments." l
Alexander Hamilton had no experience in diplomatic service; and, although a member of the Constitutional Convention, circumstances had prevented him from tak- ing an active and continuous part in the framing of that instrument. His colleagues from the State of New York opposed the creation of a new form of govern- ment, and thereby greatly lessened his influence. Be- sides, while he heartily favored a new form of govern- ment, his own views respecting it were not adopted, and that detracted from his interest in the framing of the details. He was by instinct and association an aristo- crat, and doubted the wisdom of conferring upon the people so great and direct a participation in the federal government; but he was an ardent patriot. Although absent during a considerable part of the sessions, he returned towards the close, and entered with zeal into the final deliberations, throwing his influence in favor of the Constitution as agreed upon.
Before the final adjournment, the venerable Franklin made an appeal for unanimous action, saying : " I con- sent to this Constitution, because I expect no better," and he asked each member to " doubt a little of his own infallibility." It was in this spirit Hamilton gave it his support. His contributions to the "Federalist" constitute much the greater portion of the work. Madi- son's part in the convention, in controlling and fram- ing its conclusions, justly confers upon him the title of " Father of the Constitution;" but his task in bringing i Lodge's Federalist, 404.
ORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE. Ill
Virginia to its acceptance prevented him from using so freely his pen in its defense. To Hamilton was given the preeminence as the ablest and most effective advo- cate before the country, and in no part of his career was his matchless intellect more conspicuous. The fol- lowing is his discussion of the diplomatic functions of the President, and his executive powers under the Con- stitution, in contrast with the king of Great Britain : " The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. He can, of his own accord, make treaties of peace, commerce, alli- ance, and of every other description. It has been insinuated that his authority, in this respect, is not conclusive, and that his conventions with foreign pow- ers are subject to the revision, and stand in need of the ratification, of Parliament. But I believe this doc- trine was never heard of until it was broached upon the present occasion. Every jurist of that kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its Constitution, knows, as an established fact, that the prerogative of making treaties exists in the crown in its utmost pleni- tude; and that the compacts entered into by the royal authority have the most complete legal validity and perfection, independent of any other sanction. The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen employing itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to the stipulations of a new treaty; and this may have possibly given birth to the imagination, that its co-
112 .
operation was necessary to the obligatory efficacy of the treaty. But this parliamentary interposition proceeds from a different cause; from the necessity of adjust- ing a most artificial and intricate system of revenue and commercial laws to the changes made in them by the operation of the treaty; and of adapting new pro- visions and precautions to the new state of things, to keep the machine from running into disorder. In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature.
" The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and other public ministers. This, though it has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a circum- stance which will be without consequence in the ad- ministration of the government; and it was far more convenient that it should be arranged in this manner than that there should be a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor.
"The President is to nominate, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the United States established by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise pro- vided for by the Constitution. The king of Great Britain is emphatically and truly styled the fountain of
ORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 113
honor. He not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices. He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure; and has the disposal of an immense number of church preferments. There is evidently a great inferiority in the power of the President, in this par- ticular, to that of the British king; nor is it equal to that of the governor of New York, if we are to inter- pret the meaning of the constitution of the State by the practice which has obtained under it."
One of the objections most strongly urged against the Constitution was the creation of a President and the powers conferred upon him; the opponents likening him to the king of Great Britain. In the same article, Mr. Hamilton continues :
" It appears yet more unequivocally that there is no pretense for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain. But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group.
" The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for four years; the king of Great Britain is a perpetual and hereditary prince; the one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the other is sacred and invio- lable. The one would have a qualified negative upon the acts of the legislative body; the other has an abso- lute negative. The one would have a right to com- mand the military and naval forces of the nation; the other, in addition to this right, possesses that of de- claring war, and of raising and regulating fleets and
114 .
armies by his own