Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War. Reinhard Scheer
had spent under water was remarkable. For instance, Gayer's ship had been compelled by destroyers to remain under water six and a quarter hours on August 16, eleven and three-quarters on the 17th, and eleven and a quarter on the 18th.
Let us now cast a glance at the chances for attack which presented themselves to the enemy. It could not possibly be unknown to him that the German Fleet was concentrated in the North Sea. The reports of spies from Holland and Denmark could not have left any doubt about that. If the English Fleet made a demonstration against Sylt or the East Frisian Island's it would have compelled our Fleet to come out of the estuaries unless we were prepared to allow them a bombardment without retaliation, and they would thus have an opportunity of using their submarines which were patrolling at the mouths of the Jade and Elbe. A success for their submarines would be satisfaction enough for them if we did not follow them out to sea. They could arrange their approach in such a way that they took up a favourable position in the early morning hours to offer battle to our fleet as it came up, or if they appeared with only part of their forces they could promptly retire before a superior German force and limit themselves to the operations of their submarines. The only danger in such an attack lay In the possibility of a nocturnal meeting with our destroyers. This danger was not to be overestimated, as the English could plan their entrance into the German Bight in such a way that our destroyers, which were dependent on darkness, would be already on their way back to the Bight at the time the enemy was approaching. Further, no very serious danger was to be anticipated from our U-boats, as most of them were away on distant enterprises.
The English High Command, however, must have had a much higher estimate of the damage our destroyers and U-boats could do than was actually the case. It appears also that their confidence in the achievements of their own submarines, which were the foundation for the execution of any such plan, was not very great. At the outset, therefore, considerations prevailed on both sides which led, the Commands to hold back their fleets from battle. The over-estimate of the submarine danger played a most important role.
The German Commander-in-Chief, Admiral von Ingenohl, gave expression to his view of the general situation on August 14 in the following Order of the Day :-
"All the information we have received about the English naval forces points to the fact that the English Battle Fleet avoids the North Sea entirely and keeps far beyond range of our own forces. The sweep of our brave U-boats beyond the Lat. 6o° in the north and as far as the entrance to the English Channel in the south, as well as the raids of our destroyers and aeroplanes, have confirmed this information. Only between the Norwegian and Scottish coasts and off the entrance to the English Channel are English forces patrolling. Otherwise in the rest of the North Sea not a single English ship has been found hitherto."This behaviour on the part of our enemy forces us to the conclusion that he himself intends to avoid the losses he fears he may suffer at our hands and to compel us to come with our battleships to his coast and there fall a victim to his mines and submarines."We are not going to oblige our enemy thus. But they must, and will, come to us some day or other. And then will be the day of reckoning. On that day of reckoning we must be there with all our battleships."Our immediate task is therefore to cause our enemy losses by all the methods of guerilla warfare and at every point where we can find him, so that we can thus compel him to join battle with us."This task will fall primarily to our light forces (U-boats, destroyers, mine-layers and cruisers) whose prospects of success increase the darker and longer the nights become."The bold action of our mine-layer Kbnigin Luise, which did the enemy material damage before she came to her glorious end, and the audacious cruises of our U-boaits have already made a beginning. Further enterprises will follow."The duty of those of us in the battleships of the Fleet is to keep this, our main weapon, sharp and bright for the decisive battle which we shall have to fight. To that end we must work with unflinching devotion to get our ships perfectly ready in every respect, to think out and practise everything that can be of the slightest help and prepare for the day on which the High Sea Fleet will be permitted to engage a numerically superior enemy in battle for our beloved Emperor who has created this proud Fleet as a shield for our dear Fatherland, in full confidence in the efficiency whioh we have acquired by unflagging work in time of peace."The test of our patience, which the conduct of the enemy imposes upon is, is hard, having regard to the martial spirit which animates all our ships' companies as it animates our army also, a spirit which impels us to instant action."The moment the enemy comes within our range he shall find us waiting for him. Yet we must not let him prescribe the time and place for us but ourselves choose what is favourable for a complete victory."It is therefore our duty not to lose patience but to hold ourselves ready at all times to profit by the favourable moment."
Chapter 4 - The English Break into the Heligoland Bight
THE nightly cruises from the foremost patrol line by Heligoland were continued and extended. On August 12 the light cruisers Köln (Flagship of the First Flag Officer of the destroyer flotillas, Rear-Admiral Maass) and Hamburg went out with Flotilla VI; Köln and Stuttgart with Flotillas I and II on the 15th, and the light cruiser Mainz with the Flotilla VIII on the 16th. As no enemy was met on any of these enterprises the light cruisers Stralsund (Captain Harder) and Strassburg (Captain Retzmann) were sent out to the Hoofden against the destroyer patrol line, the existence of which had been reported by submarines.
They put to sea on the morning of August 11 with two U-boats, which stood by near Vlieland while the cruisers steamed south to about the line Lowestoft - Scheveningen. When this was reached they turned, early on the morning, of the 18th. Shortly afterwards the Strassburg sighted three enemy submarines, distant about 100 hm. (11,000 yards). These were fired on and one of them seemed to be hit. Soon after eight destroyers were sighted in a northerly direction and a light cruiser with another eight destroyers in an easterly direction, which were in a position to cut off the retreat of our cruisers. The range, howeyer, did not fall below 100 hm., so that no success was obtained on either side. The possibility that there might be other English forces not far off seemed to make it imperative for our ships not to lose time in manoeuvring for attack, for the sixteen destroyers of the enemy had an immense preponderance of gun-power over our cruisers armed only with 10.5 cm. guns. Both cruisers returned home without trouble.
In the second half of August the number of reports of submarines sighted at the mouth of the Ems and in the Heligoland Bight increased, and very heavy demands were made on the destroyers to drive them out. On August 21 the light cruisers Rostock and Strassburg with Flotilla VI made a sweep in the direction of the Dogger Bank with a view to searching the fishing-grounds for English fishing-smacks. They also met enemy submarines, one of which fired two torpedoes at the Rostock, but both missed. On this cruise six fishing-steamers were destroyed which were found, well separated, in a circle round Heligoland, and were suspected of working with English submarines.
As all these cruises pointed to the conclusion that we could not expect to find considerable enemy forces in the southern half of the North Sea, our two mine-laying cruisers, Albatros (Commander West) and Nautilus (Commander Wilhelm Schultz) received orders to lay a minefield at the mouths of the Humber and Tyne. By day their operations were covered by a light cruiser and a half-flotilla of destroyers, as mine-layers must be kept out of action if at all possible. Both ships were able to carry out their commission undisturbed and laid their mines accurately at the places indicated. The actual work began at midnight and was favoured by thick weather. On the way back another six fishing-steamers were sunk.
The previous raids had been favoured by luck inasmuch as the forces employed, which were anything but strong, had not been located and cut off by superior forces. Their safety lay in speed alone. Before support from units lying ready in the estuaries could reach them it might easily be too late. But for that purpose it was considered inadvisable to have proper supporting forces hanging about in the Heligoland Bight on account of the submarines reported there.
August 28th brought us the first serious collision with English cruisers. The reports taken back by the English submarines as to our offensive arrangements in the Heligoland Bight must have decided the English to roll up our patrol line. As the English dispatches on the events of this day have been published, a clear idea of the course of the action can