Know the Truth: A Critique on the Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation. Jesse Henry Jones
that it is necessarily criminal; or, in other words, that no act, of any will, can make it otherwise than it is. The assertion, then, that "Malice is criminal," is an axiom, and conditions all being, God as well as man.
2. The Reason asserts that every mathematical form must be seen in Space and Time, and it affirms the same necessity in this as in the former case.
3. The full illustration of this point would be Anselm's a priori argument for the existence of God. His statement of it should, however, be so modified as to appear, not as an a priori argument for the existence of God, but as an amplified declaration of the fact, that the existence of God is a first principle of Reason; and as such, can no more be denied than the multiplication table. Objection.—This doctrine degrades God to the level of the finite; both being alike conditioned. Answer.—By no means; as will be seen from the two following points.
1. It is universally acknowledged that God must be self-existent, which means, if it means anything, that the existence of God is beyond his own control; or, in other words, that self-existence is an a priori elemental principle, which conditions God's existing at all.
2. In the two instances under consideration, the word condition has entirely different significations. God is conditioned only by Himself. Not only is this conditioning not a limitation, properly speaking, but the very absence of limitation. The fact that He is absolute and infinite, is a condition of His existence. Man's conditions are the very opposite of these. He is relative, instead of absolute; finite, instead of infinite; dependent, instead of self-existent. Hence he differs in kind from God as do his conditions.
Such being the function of the Pure Reason, it is fully competent to solve the difficulties raised by Sir William Hamilton and his followers; and the statement of such solution is the work immediately in hand.
Much of the difficulty and obscurity which have, thus far, attended every discussion of this subject, will be removed by examining the definitions given to certain terms;—either by statement, or by implication in the use made of them;—by exposing the errors involved; and by clearly expressing the true signification of each term.
By way of criticism the general statement may be made—that the Limitists—as was natural from their rejection of the faculty of the Pure Reason—use only such terms, and in such senses, as are pertinent to those subjects which come under the purvey of the Understanding and the Sense; but which are entirely impertinent, in reference to the sphere of spiritual subjects. The two following phases of this error are sufficient to illustrate the criticism.
1. The terms Infinite and Absolute are used to express abstractions. For instance, "the infinite, from a human point of view, is merely a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible." "It is thus manifest that a consciousness of the Absolute is equally self-contradictory with that of the Infinite."—Limits of Religious Thought, pp. 94 and 96. If asked "Absolute" what? "Infinite" what? Will you allow person, or other definite term to be supplied? Mansel would reply—No! no possible answer can be given by man.
Now, without passing at all upon the question whether these terms can represent concrete objects of thought or not, it is to be said, that the use of them to express abstract notions, is utterly unsound. The mere fact of abstraction is an undoubted limitation. There may be an Infinite and Absolute Person. By no possibility can there be an abstract Infinite.
2. But a more glaring and unpardonable error is made by the Limitists in their use of the words infinite and absolute, as expressing quantity. Take a few examples from many.
"For example, we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, that is, a whole so great that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so small, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent, or realize, or construe to the mind (as here understanding and imagination coincide), an infinite whole, for this could only be done by the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes which would itself require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of parts."—Hamilton's Essays, p. 20.
"The metaphysical representation of the Deity as absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality."—Limits of Religious Thought, p. 76.
"Is the First Cause finite or infinite? … To think of the First Cause as finite, is to think of it as limited. To think of it as limited, necessarily implies a conception of something beyond its limits; it is absolutely impossible to conceive a thing as bounded, without conceiving a region surrounding its boundaries."—Spencer's First Principles, p. 37.
The last extract tempts one to ask Mr. Spencer if he ever stood on the north side of the affections. Besides the extracts selected, any person reading the authors above named, will find numerous phrases like these: "infinite whole," "infinite sum," "infinite number," "infinite series," by which they express sometimes a mathematical, and sometimes a material amount.
Upon this whole topic it is to be said, that the terms infinite and absolute have, and can have, no relevancy to any object of the Sense or of the Understanding, judging according to the Sense, or to any number. There is no whole, no sum, no number, no amount, but is definite and limited; and to use those words with the word infinite, is as absurd as to say an infinite finite. And to use words thus, is to "multiply words without knowledge."
Again, the lines of thought which these writers pursue, do not tend in any degree to clear up the fogs in which they have lost themselves, but only make the muddle thicker. Take, for instance, the following extract:—
"Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious; it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple; it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the Universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible."—Limits of Religious Thought, p. 79.
The soul, while oaring her way with weary wing, over the watery waste of such a philosophy, can find no rest for the sole of her foot, except on that floating carcase of a doctrine, Chaos is God. The simple fact that such confusion logically results from the premises of the Limitists, is a sufficient warrant for rejecting their whole system of thought—principle and process; and for striking for a new base of operations. But where shall such a base be sought for? On what immutable Ararat can the soul find her ark, and a sure resting-place? Man seeks a Rock upon which he can climb and cry, I know that this is truth. Where is the Everlasting Rock? In our search for the answer to these queries, we may be aided by setting forth the goal to be reached—the object to be obtained.
By observation and reflection man comes to know that he is living in, and forms part of, a system of things, which he comprehensively terms the Universe. The problem is—To find an Ultimate Ground, a Final Cause, which shall be adequate to account for the existence and sustentation of this Universe. There are but two possible directions from which the solution of this problem can come. It must be found either within the Universe, or without the Universe.
Can it be found within the Universe? If it can, one of two positions must be true. Either a part of the Universe is cause for the existence of the whole of the Universe; or the Universe is self-existent. Upon the first position nothing need be said. Its absurdity is manifested in the very statement of it. A full discussion, or, in fact, anything more than a notice of the doctrine of Pantheism, set forth in the second point, would be beyond the intention of the author. The questions at issue lie not between theists and pantheists, but between those who alike reject Pantheism as erroneous. The writer confesses himself astonished that a class of rational men could ever have been found, who should have attempted to find the Ultimate Ground of the Universe in itself. All that man can know of the facts of the Universe, he learns by observation; and the sum of the knowledge he thus gains is, that a vast system of physical objects exists. From