Complete Works. Henry Cabot Lodge

      Chapter VII.

       On the Ocean (1814)

       Table of Contents

      Strictness of the blockade—Cruise of Rodgers—Cruise of the Constitution—Her unsuccessful chase of La Pique—Attack on the Alligator—The Essex captured—The Frolic captured—The Peacock captures the Epervier—Commodore Barney's flotilla—The British in the Chesapeake—The Wasp captures the Reindeer and sinks the Avon—Cruise and loss of the Adams—The privateer General Armstrong—The privateer Prince de Neufchatel—Loss of the gunboats in Lake Borgne—Fighting near New Orleans—Summary.

      During this year the blockade of the American coast was kept up with ever increasing rigor. The British frigates hovered like hawks off every seaport that was known to harbor any fighting craft; they almost invariably went in couples, to support one another and to lighten, as far as was possible, the severity of their work. On the northern coasts in particular, the intense cold of the furious winter gales rendered it no easy task to keep the assigned stations; the ropes were turned into stiff and brittle bars, the hulls were coated with ice, and many, both of men and officers, were frost-bitten and crippled. But no stress of weather could long keep the stubborn and hardy British from their posts. With ceaseless vigilance they traversed continually the allotted cruising grounds, capturing the privateers, harrying the coasters, and keeping the more powerful ships confined to port; "no American frigate could proceed singly to sea without imminent risk of being crushed by the superior force of the numerous British squadrons." 246 But the sloops of war, commanded by officers as skillful as they were daring, and manned by as hardy seamen as ever sailed salt water, could often slip out; generally on some dark night, when a heavy gale was blowing, they would make the attempt, under storm canvas, and with almost invariable success. The harder the weather, the better was their chance; once clear of the coast the greatest danger ceased, though throughout the cruise the most untiring vigilance was needed. The new sloops that I have mentioned as being built proved themselves the best possible vessels for this kind of work; they were fast enough to escape from most cruisers of superior force, and were overmatches for any British flush-decked ship, that is, for any thing below the rank of the frigate-built corvettes of the Cyane's class. The danger of recapture was too great to permit of the prizes being sent in, so they were generally destroyed as soon as captured; and as the cruising grounds were chosen right in the track of commerce, the damage done and consternation caused were very great.

      Besides the numerous frigates cruising along the coast in couples or small squadrons, there were two or three places that were blockaded by a heavier force. One of these was New London, before which cruised a squadron under the direction of Sir Thomas Hardy, in the 74 gun-ship Ramillies. Most of the other cruising squadrons off the coast contained razees or two-deckers. The boats of the Hogue, 74, took part in the destruction of some coasters and fishing-boats at Pettipauge in April; and those of the Superb, 74, shared in a similar expedition against Wareham in June. 247 The command on the coast of North America was now given to Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane. The main British force continued to lie in the Chesapeake, where about 50 sail were collected. During the first part of this year these were under the command of Sir Robert Barrie, but in May he was relieved by Rear-Admiral Cockburn.248

      The President, 44, Commodore Rodgers, at the beginning of 1814 was still out, cruising among the Barbadoes and West Indies, only making a few prizes of not much value. She then turned toward the American coast, striking soundings near St. Augustine, and thence proceeding north along the coast to Sandy Hook, which was reached on Feb. 18th. The light was passed in the night, and shortly afterward several sail were made out, when the President was at once cleared for action. 249 One of these strange sail was the Loire, 38 (British), Capt. Thomas Brown, which ran down to close the President, unaware of her force; but on discovering her to be a 44, hauled to the wind and made off. 250 The President did not pursue, another frigate and a gunbrig being in sight. 251 This rencontre gave rise to nonsensical boastings on both sides; one American writer calls the Loire the Plantagenet, 74; James, on the other hand, states that the President was afraid to engage the 38-gun frigate, and that the only reason the latter declined the combat was because she was short of men. The best answer to this is a quotation from his own work (vol. vi, p. 402), that "the admiralty had issued an order that no 18-pounder frigate was voluntarily to engage one of the 24-pounder frigates of America." Coupling this order with the results of the combats that had already taken place between frigates of these classes, it can always be safely set down as sheer bravado when any talk is made of an American 44 refusing to give battle to a British 38; and it is even more absurd to say that a British line-of-battle ship would hesitate for a minute about engaging any frigate.

      On Jan. 1st, the Constitution, which had been lying in Boston harbor undergoing complete repairs, put out to sea under the command of Capt. Charles Stewart. The British 38-gun frigate Nymphe had been lying before the port, but she disappeared long before the Constitution was in condition, in obedience to the order already mentioned. Capt. Stewart ran down toward the Barbadoes, and on the 14th of February captured and destroyed the British 14-gun schooner Pictou, with a crew of 75 men. After making a few other prizes and reaching the coast of Guiana she turned homeward, and on the 23d of the same month fell in, at the entrance to the Mona passage, with the British 36-gun frigate Pique (late French Pallas), Captain Maitland. The Constitution at once made sail for the Pique, steering free; 252 the latter at first hauled to the wind and waited for her antagonist, but when the latter was still 3 miles distant she made out her force and immediately made all sail to escape; the Constitution, however, gained steadily till 8 P.M., when the night and thick squally weather caused her to lose sight of the chase. Captain Maitland had on board the prohibitory order issued by the admiralty, 253 and acted correctly. His ship was altogether too light for his antagonist. James, however, is not satisfied with this, and wishes to prove that both ships were desirous of avoiding the combat. He says that Capt. Stewart came near enough to count "13 ports and a bridle on the Pique's main-deck," and "saw at once that she was of a class inferior to the Guerrière or Java," but "thought the Pique's 18's were 24's, and therefore did not make an effort to bring her to action." He portrays very picturesquely the grief of the Pique's crew when they find they are not going to engage; how they come aft and request to be taken into action; how Captain Maitland reads them his instructions, but "fails to persuade them that there had been any necessity of issuing them"; and, finally, how the sailors, overcome by woe and indignation, refuse to take their supper-time grog,—which was certainly remarkable. As the Constitution had twice captured British frigates "with impunity," according to James himself, is it likely that she would now shrink from an encounter with a ship which she "saw at once was of an inferior class" to those already conquered? Even such abject cowards as James' Americans would not be guilty of so stupid an action. Of course neither Capt. Stewart nor any one else supposed for an instant that a 36-gun frigate was armed with 24-pounders.

      It is worth while mentioning as an instance of how utterly untrustworthy James is in dealing with American affairs, that he says the Constitution had now "what the Americans would call a bad crew," whereas, in her previous battles, all her men had been "picked." Curiously enough, this is the exact reverse of the truth. In no case was an American ship manned with a "picked" crew, but the nearest approach to such was the crew the Constitution carried in this and the next cruise, when "she probably possessed as fine a crew as ever manned a frigate. They were principally New England men, and it has been said of them that they were almost qualified to fight the ship without her officers." 254 The statement that such men, commanded by one of the bravest and most skilful captains of our navy, would shrink from attacking a greatly inferior foe, is hardly worth while denying; and, fortunately, such denial is needless, Captain Stewart's account