1997 Special Investigation in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns. United States Senate Committee
ceasing to check the origin of such funds, and its entrusting its fundraising efforts among Asian-Americans to lawbreakers such as Huang, Trie, and Hsia led to numerous abuses. Among them, the DNC’s heedless pursuit of contributions allowed wealthy and well-connected foreign nationals to arrange almost unlimited access to the President and other top U.S. policymakers. Time after time, figures such as Johnny Chung, who used access to the President to advance his private business interests, Ted Sioeng, Ng Lap Seng, Wang Jun, and Eric Hotung met privately or in small groups with the President, Vice President, or other senior Administration officials. Since this controversy began, concerns have been expressed that the flood of foreign money to the DNC during the 1995–96 election cycle and the access it purchased might have permitted interested foreign parties to influence the U.S. political process. Thus, the Committee made it a priority of its investigation to determine whether this had occurred.
PRC Efforts
The Committee’s attempt to examine this issue was difficult. Many knowledgeable witnesses invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to cooperate with the inquiry. Others fled the country, or were foreign nationals who remained abroad and refused to cooperate. Finally, much of the information relevant to this subject is classified and cannot be publicly disclosed.
Despite these limitations, at the outset of the Committee’s hearings, based on information gathered from law enforcement and intelligence agencies and open sources, Chairman Thompson reported that the PRC government had undertaken efforts to influence the U.S. electoral process during the 1995–96 election cycle. Owing to the sensitive nature of the subject, it has not been possible until now to elaborate publicly upon this matter in any detail. The full version of the Committee’s public findings are detailed elsewhere in this report.10 In brief, while the Committee cannot determine conclusively whether the PRC government funded, directed, or encouraged certain illegal contributions made in connection with the 1996 election cycle, there is strong circumstantial evidence that the PRC was involved. The basis for this conclusion is in summary:
* Ties between the PRC and prominent figures in the campaign finance investigation: The
Committee has received information that several individuals who provided donations from foreign sources (principally in the greater China area) to the DNC and other causes have ties to the PRC. The Committee has learned that Maria Hsia has been an agent of the Chinese government, that she has acted knowingly in support of it, and that she has attempted to conceal her relationship with the Chinese government. The Committee has also learned that Ted Sioeng has worked, and perhaps still works, on behalf of the Chinese government. The Committee has further learned from recently-acquired information that James and Mochtar Riady have had a long-term relationship with a Chinese intelligence agency. Finally, an unverified single piece of information shared with the Committee indicates that John Huang himself may possibly have had a direct financial relationship
with the PRC government.
* Evidence of a “China Plan” and Other, Possibly Related Efforts: Against this backdrop,
the Committee has received other information that high-level PRC government officials devised plans to increase China’s influence over the U.S. political process and to be implemented by diplomatic posts in the U.S. Some Beijing’s efforts appear relatively innocuous, involving learning more about Members of Congress, redoubling PRC lobbying efforts in the U.S., establishing closer contacts with the U.S. Congress, and funding from Beijing. But the Committee has learned that Beijing expected more than simply increased lobbying from its diplomatic posts in the U.S. Indeed, as the Committee examined the issue in greater detail, it found a broad array of Chinese efforts designed to influence U.S. policies and elections through, among other means, financing election
campaigns.
* Evidence of Implementation: The Committee has identified specific steps taken in
furtherance of the these plans. Although some of the efforts were typical, appropriate steps foreign governments take to communicate their views on United States policy, others appear illegal under U.S. law. Among these efforts were the devising of a seeding strategy of developing viable candidates sympathetic to the PRC for future federal elections; the creation of a “Central Leading Group for U.S. Congressional Affairs” to coordinate China’s lobbying efforts in this country; and PRC officials discussing financing
American elections through covert means.
In addition, the Committee notes that this report is being issued at a time in which there have been, and are likely to continue to be, significant developments in the ongoing investigation being conducted by the DOJ/FBI task force. If the Committee receives significant new information that it can disclose to the public, it may issue a supplemental report.
John Huang
Because of his central role in raising so much of the foreign money returned to date by the DNC, and because of his long relationship to the Lippo Group, the Committee examined in detail John Huang’s fund-raising activities and his service at the Department of Commerce. Huang began involving himself in U.S. politics in 1988 while an official at LippoBank, working with James Riady, Hsia, and others to found the Pacific Leadership Council (“PLC”), an Asian- American interest group and political fund-raising organ, which organized a trip to Taiwan (and the Fo Kuang Shan temple there) for then-Senator Gore. Huang’s colleagues at LippoBank -- where he served as President and Director -- never understood his corporate duties and described him as a “mystery man.”
After the election of 1992, with Riady’s encouragement, the White House placed Huang on its list of “high priority” candidates for political appointment. In a letter to Deputy Director of Presidential Personnel John Emerson, Democratic activist Maeley Tom recommended Huang for a government position, describing him as
the political power that advises the Riady family on issues and where
to make contributions. [The Riadys] invested heavily in the Clinton campaign. John is the Riady family’s top priority for placement
because he is like one of their own.
Huang was hired in 1993 as Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Economic Policy at the Department of Commerce.
The work Huang actually performed in his new job, however, was apparently as perplexing to his colleagues at the Commerce Department as it had been to his associates at LippoBank. During the 18 months that Huang worked at the Department, in fact, he left virtually no mark; many of his colleagues found themselves wholly at a loss to explain what he did.
Despite his superiors’ attempt to “wall off” Huang from matters relating to China, Huang received regular classified briefings that included the greater China area. Without his superiors’s knowledge, Huang received 37 intelligence briefings, viewing 10 to 15 intelligence reports at each session—a total of 370 to 500 items of “raw intelligence” during his tenure. Also unbeknownst to his superiors, Huang made multiple visits and telephone calls to the Chinese Embassy while at Commerce. And despite Huang’s status as only a mid-level official at Commerce, he made at least 67 visits to the White House, often meeting with top officials and receiving briefings on trade policy.
Equally mysterious were the over 400 contacts Huang had with Lippo officials while he worked at Commerce: 237 phone calls to LippoBank and affiliated entities in the United States, calls and fax transmissions to Lippo’s Indonesian headquarters, and an additional 107 calls to such countries as China, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Huang may have made more such calls from the Washington office of Stephens, Inc. — an investment banking firm based in Little Rock, partly owned by the Riady family, which had extended loans to help finance President Clinton’s 1992 campaign—located across the street from the