Lee and Longstreet at High Tide: Gettysburg in the Light of the Official Records. Helen Dortch Longstreet
of march by eight o’clock the 1st of July. When the troops of Ewell’s corps (it was Johnston’s division in charge of Ewell’s wagon-trains, which were coming from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains) had passed the head of my column I asked General Longstreet’s staff-officer, Major Fairfax, if my division should follow. He went off to inquire, and returned with orders for me to wait until Ewell’s wagon-train had passed, which did not happen until after four o’clock P.M.
“The train was calculated to be fourteen miles long, when I took up the line of march and continued marching until I arrived within three miles of Gettysburg, where my command camped along a creek. This was far into the night. My division was leading Longstreet’s corps, and of course the other divisions came up later. I saw Hood’s division the next morning, and understood that Pickett had been detached to guard the rear.
“While on the march, at about ten o’clock at night I met General Longstreet and some of his staff coming from the direction of Gettysburg and had a few moments’ conversation with him. He said nothing of having received an order to attack at daylight the next morning. Here I will state that until General Pendleton mentioned it about two years ago, when he was on a lecturing tour, after the death of General Lee, I never heard it intimated even that any such order had ever been given.”
The following is an extract from a letterD of General Hood to General Longstreet on the subject of the sunrise order, which indirectly, though conclusively, shows there could have been no such order, besides being interesting and instructive as to other points:
“I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, when the troops were allowed to stack arms and rest until further orders. A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of the same morning, we were both engaged in company with Generals A. P. Hill and Lee in observing the position of the Federals. General Lee, with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre belt around his waist, and field-glasses pending at his side, walked up and down in the shade of large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet at times buried in deep thought. Colonel Fremantle, of England, was ensconced in the forks of a tree not far off with glasses in constant use examining the lofty position of the Federal army.
“General Lee was seemingly anxious that you should attack that morning. He remarked to me, ‘The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him he will whip us.’ You thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett’s division, at that time still in the rear, in order to make the attack, and you said to me subsequently, while we were seated together near the trunk of a tree, ‘General Lee is a little nervous this morning. He wishes me to attack. I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into a battle with one boot off.’ ”
Another letter, which in a way is still more important than any of the foregoing, is one from Colonel John W. Fairfax, a member of General Longstreet’s staff. It tends to show that the sunrise-order story was conjured up by Dr. Pendleton and others at Lexington after Lee’s death; in other words, it is strong circumstantial confirmation of General Longstreet’s belief in a conspiracy. Written more than twenty-six years ago, the manner in which it dovetails with all the foregoing statements and documents as to the various events involved is peculiarly significant. Colonel Fairfax is a Virginian and was always an ardent admirer of General Lee, but not to the extent of desiring to uphold his fame at the expense of honor or the ruin of another:
“Freestone P. O., Prince William County, Virginia.
“November 12, 1877.
“My dear General Longstreet,— … The winter after the death of General Lee I was in Lexington, visiting my sons at the Virginia Military Institute. General Pendleton called to see me at the hotel. General Custis Lee was in my room when he came in. After General Lee left, General Pendleton asked me if General Longstreet was not ordered to attack on the 2d of July at six o’clock in the morning, and did not attack until four in the evening. I told him it was not possible. When he left me I was under the impression I had convinced him of his mistaken idea. I told General Pendleton that you and General Lee were together the greater part of the day up to about three o’clock or later; that you separated at the mouth of a lane not long thereafter. You said to me, ‘Those troops will be in position by the time you get there; tell General Hood to attack.’
“When I gave the order to General Hood he was standing within a step or two of his line of battle. I asked him to please delay his attack until I could communicate to General Longstreet that he can turn the enemy—pointing to a gorge in the mountain, where we would be sheltered from his view and attack by his cavalry. General Hood slapped me on the knee, and said, ‘I agree with you; bring General Longstreet to see for himself. When I reported to you, your answer was, ‘It is General Lee’s order; the time is up,—attack at once.’ I lost no time in repeating the same to General Hood, and remained with him to see the attack, which was made instantly. We had a beautiful view of the enemy’s left from Hood’s position, which was close up to him. He gave way quickly. General Hood charged, and I spurred to report to you; found you with hat in hand, cheering on General McLaws’s division. …
“Truly your friend,
“John W. Fairfax.”
General Longstreet’s views at the time of the Gettysburg operations are conveyed in a personal letter of a confidential nature, written only twenty days after the event to his uncle in Georgia, upon being made aware that there was a sly undercurrent of misrepresentation of his course current in certain circles of the army:
“Camp Culpeper Court-House,
“July 24, 1863.
“My dear Uncle,—Your letters of the 13th and 14th were received on yesterday. As to our late battle I cannot say much. I have no right to say anything, in fact, but will venture a little for you alone. If it goes to aunt and cousins it must be under promise that it will go no farther. The battle was not made as I would have made it. My idea was to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, and force the enemy to attack us. So far as is given to man the ability to judge, we may say with confidence that we should have destroyed the Federal army, marched into Washington, and dictated our terms, or at least held Washington and marched over as much of Pennsylvania as we cared to, had we drawn the enemy into attack upon our carefully chosen position in his rear. General Lee chose the plans adopted, and he is the person appointed to choose and to order. I consider it a part of my duty to express my views to the commanding general. If he approves and adopts them, it is well; if he does not, it is my duty to adopt his views and to execute his orders as faithfully as if they were my own. I cannot help but think that great results would have been obtained had my views been thought better of, yet I am much inclined to accept the present condition as for the best. I hope and trust that it is so. Your programme would all be well enough had it been practicable, and was duly thought of, too. I fancy that no good ideas upon that campaign will be mentioned at any time that did not receive their share of consideration by General Lee. The few things that he might have overlooked himself were, I believe, suggested by myself. As we failed, I must take my share of the responsibility. In fact, I would prefer that all the blame should rest upon me. As General Lee is our commander, he should have the support and influence we can give him. If the blame, if there is any, can be shifted from him to me, I shall help him and our cause by taking it. I desire, therefore, that all the responsibility that can be put upon me shall go there and shall remain there. The truth will be known in time, and I leave that to show how much of the responsibility of Gettysburg rests on my shoulders. …
“Most affectionately yours,
“J. Longstreet.
“To A. B. Longstreet, LL.D., Columbus, Ga.”
Aside from all this irrefragable personal testimony of conspicuous participants disproving Pendleton’s apocryphal story, there is other evidence still more conclusive that no sunrise order for attack by Longstreet was given by Lee, and equally strong that an early attack on that day was out of the question. The position of Longstreet’s troops, all still absent from