Lee and Longstreet at High Tide: Gettysburg in the Light of the Official Records. Helen Dortch Longstreet
road. There had been only a few of my pickets there in the morning, thrown forward by the First Massachusetts Infantry. It distinctly appears that Lee rejected Longstreet’s plan to turn the Federal left on Cemetery Ridge. And Hood makes it plain enough that Longstreet refused to listen to Hood’s appeal for permission to turn Round Top, on the main Federal line, always replying, “No; General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road.” Of course, that plan of battle was not formed until troops had been placed in positions commanding that road. This, we have seen, was not done until towards three in the afternoon.
The only order of battle announced by General Lee on July 2 of which there is any record was to assail my position on the Emmitsburg road, turn my left flank (which he erroneously supposed to rest on the Peach-Orchard), and sweep the attack “up the Emmitsburg road.” This was impossible until I occupied that road, and it was then that Longstreet’s artillery began its practice on my advanced line.
I am unable to see how any just person can charge Longstreet with deviation from the orders of General Lee on July 2. It is true enough that Longstreet had advised different tactics; but he was a soldier,—a West Pointer,—and once he had indicated his own views, he obeyed the orders of the general commanding,—he did not even exercise the discretion allowed to the chief of a corps d’armée, which permits him to modify instructions when an unforeseen emergency imposes fresh responsibilities, or when an unlooked-for opportunity offers tempting advantages.
We have seen that many circumstances required General Lee to modify his plans and orders on July 2 between daybreak, when his first reconnoisance was made, and three o’clock in the afternoon, when my advanced position was defined. We have seen that if a morning attack had been made the column would have encountered Buford’s strong division of cavalry on its flank, and that it would have been weakened by the absence of Law’s brigade of Hood’s division. We have seen that Longstreet, even in the afternoon, when Law had come up and Buford had been sent to Westminster, was still too weak to contend against the reinforcements sent against him. We have seen that Lee was present all day on July 2, and that his own staff-officer led the column of attack. We have seen that General Lee, in his official report, gives no hint of dissatisfaction with Longstreet’s conduct of the battle of July 2, nor does it appear that Longstreet was ever afterwards criticised by Lee. On the contrary, Lee points out that the same danger to Longstreet’s flank, which required the protection of two divisions on July 3, existed on July 2, when his flank was unsupported. We have seen that again and again, when Hood appealed to Longstreet for leave to swing his column to the right and turn the Round Tops, Longstreet as often refused, always saying, “No; General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road.” The conclusion is irrefutable, that whilst the operations were directed with signal ability and sustained by heroic courage, the failure of both assaults, that of July 2 and the other of July 3, must be attributed to the lack of strength in the columns of attack on both days, for which the commanding general alone was responsible.
It was Longstreet’s good fortune to live until he saw his country hold a high place among the great powers of the world. He saw the new South advancing in prosperity, hand in hand with the North, East, and West. He saw his people in the ranks of our army, in Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines, China, and Panama; he saw the Union stars and the blue uniform worn by Fitzhugh Lee, and Butler, and Wheeler. He witnessed the fulfilment of his prediction,—that the hearty reunion of the North and South would advance the welfare of both. He lived long enough to rejoice with all of us in a reunited nation, and to know that his name was honored wherever the old flag was unfurled. His fame as a soldier belongs to all Americans.
Farewell, Longstreet! I shall follow you very soon. May we meet in the happy realm where strife is unknown and friendship is eternal!
LEE AND LONGSTREET
AT HIGH TIDE
CHAPTER I
THE STORY OF GETTYSBURG
Back of the day that opened so auspiciously for the Confederate cause at the first Manassas, and of the four years that followed, lies Longstreet’s record of a quarter of a century in the Union army, completing one of the most lustrous pages in the world’s war history. That page cannot be dimmed or darkened; it rests secure in its own white splendor, above the touch of detractors.
The detractors of General Longstreet’s military integrity assert that, being opposed to fighting an offensive battle at Gettysburg, he was “balky and stubborn” in executing Lee’s orders; that he disobeyed the commanding general’s orders to attack at sunrise on the morning of July 2; that, again ordered to attack with half the army on the morning of July 3, his culpably slow attack with only Pickett’s division, supported by some of Hill’s troops, caused the fatal Confederate defeat in that encounter.
General Gordon has seen fit, in a recent publication, to revive this cruel aspersion.
When General Longstreet surrendered his sword at Appomattox his war record was made up. It stands unassailable—needing no defenders. Back of the day that opened so auspiciously for the Confederate cause at the first Manassas, and of the four years that followed, lies the record of a quarter of a century in the Union army.
In those times General Longstreet, at Cerro Gordo, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec, was aiding to win the great empire of the West; in subsequent hard Indian campaigns lighting the fagots of a splendid western civilization, adding new glory to American arms and, in the struggles of a nation that fell, a new star of the first magnitude to the galaxy of American valor, completing one of the most lustrous pages in the world’s war history. That page cannot be dimmed or darkened; it rests secure in its own white splendor, above the touch of detractors.
General Longstreet has of late years deemed it unnecessary to make defence of his military integrity, save such as may be found in his memoirs, “Manassas to Appomattox,” published nearly ten years since. He has held that his deeds stand on the impartial pages of the nation’s records—their own defender.
The cold historian of our Civil War of a hundred years hence will not go for truth to the picturesque reminiscences of General John B. Gordon, nor to the pyrotechnics of General Fitzhugh Lee, nor yet to the somewhat hysterical ravings of Rev. Mr. Pendleton and scores of other modern essayists who have sought to fix the failure of Gettysburg upon General Longstreet. The coming chronicler will cast aside the rubbish of passion and hate that followed the war, and have recourse to the nation’s official war records, and in the cool, calm lights of the letters and reports of the participants, written at the time, will place the blunder of Gettysburg where it belongs. Longstreet’s fame has nothing to fear in that hour.
R. E. Lee
But for the benefit of the present—of the young, the busy, who have neither time nor inclination to study the records, and for that sentiment that is increasingly shaped by the public press,—for these and other reasons it appears fitting that in this hour historical truth should have a spokesman on the Gettysburg contentions. In the absence of one more able to speak, this little story of the truth is written. The writer belongs to a generation that has come up since the gloom of Appomattox closed the drama of the great “Lost Cause” of American history—a generation that seeks the truth, unwarped and undistorted by passion, and can face the truth.
In the prosecution of my researches for the origin of the extraordinary calumnies aimed at General Longstreet’s honor as a soldier, two most significant facts have continually pressed upon my attention.
First, not one word appears to have been published openly accusing him