Final Report of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition Commission. Louisiana Purchase Exposition Commission
significant words: "And so far as may depend on ourselves, we tender to our country our lives and fortunes in support of such measures as Congress may deem necessary to vindicate the honor and protect the interests of the United States."
The settlers in the States "west of the Allegheny Mountains" also, in a memorial to the Government, clearly indicated their impatience and readiness for extreme action, declared that prompt and decisive measures were necessary, and referred to the maxim that protection and allegiance are reciprocal as being particularly applicable to their situation. They concluded their statement with these solemn words: "Without interfering in the measures that have been adopted to bring about the amicable arrangement of a difference which has grown out of the gratuitous violation of a solemn treaty, they desire that the United States may explicitly understand that their condition is critical; that the delay of a single season would be ruinous to their country, and that an imperious necessity may consequently oblige them, if they receive no aid, to adopt themselves the measures that may appear to them calculated to protect their commerce, even though those measures should produce consequences unfavorable to the harmony of the Confederacy."
These representations emphasized the apprehension of those charged with governmental affairs that the course of deliberate caution and waiting, which up to that time had appeared to be the only one permissible, might be insufficient to meet the situation, and that whatever the result might be, a more pronounced position and more urgent action should be entered upon. President Jefferson wrote to a friend on the 1st of February, 1803: "Our circumstances are so imperious as to admit of no delay as to our course, and the use of the Mississippi so indispensible that we can not hesitate one moment to hazard our existence for its maintenance." He appointed an additional envoy to cooperate with our representative already at the French capital in an attempt to obtain a concession that would cure the difficulty, and, in a communication to him, after referring to the excitement caused by the withdrawal of the right of deposit, he thus characterizes the condition which he believed confronted the nation: "On the event of this mission depend the future destinies of this Republic. If we can not by a purchase of the country insure to ourselves a course of perpetual peace and friendship of all nations, then, as war can not be far distant, it behooves us immediately to be preparing for that course, though not hastening it."
I have not recited these details for the purpose of claiming that this accelerated speed and advanced position on the part of our Government had any important effect in hastening final results. I have thought it not amiss, however, to call attention to the fact that a century ago the people of this country were not seeking to gain governmental benefit by clandestine approach and cunning pretense, but were apt to plainly present their wants and grievances, and to openly demand such consideration and care from the General Government as was their due under the mandate of popular rule, and that in making their demands they relied on the mutual obligation of the relationship between the governed and those invested with authority, and invoked the reciprocity in political duty which enjoins that for the people's obedience and support of government, there shall be given in exchange, by the Government to the people, defense of their personal rights and the assurance that in safety and peace they shall surely reap the fruits of their enterprise and labor.
It may also be well to note the efficacy of the people's call upon the Government in those early days, and how quickly the response came; not by yielding to gusts of popular whim and caprice; not by conferring benefits upon the few at the expense of the many; but by a quick observation of the fact that the withdrawal of certain rightful privilege by another nation from American settlers had caused them distress, and by a prompt determination to relieve their distress, even if the unwelcome visage of war frowned in opposition.
Another incident which, it seems to me, we may recall to-day with profit and satisfaction, grew out of the conduct of the President when the treaty of 1803 had been formulated and was returned to him for ratification and final completion. He was, as is well known, originally quite firm in his belief that the Constitution as it stood did not authorize such an extension of our limits by purchase as the treaty for the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory contemplated. Holding this opinion, and at the same time confronted with the clear conviction that the treaty, with all its stupendous advantages, could not be allowed to fail without positive peril, if not to our national life, at least to its most vital object and aspirations, his perplexity was increased by the receipt of an authoritative intimation that any delay in final action on the treaty might open the way to a recession on the part of France. In these circumstances, not daring to risk the delay of an amendment to the Constitution prior to such final action, he proposed reconciling consistency with duty by procuring confirmation of the treaty by the Senate and compassing its unquestionable validation by a subsequent constitutional amendment.
In view of the conclusive statement, since that time of this constitutional question by every branch of the Government against Mr. Jefferson's original opinion and in favor of the nation's power to acquire territory, as was done under the treaty of 1803, and considering the fact that we have since that time immensely increased our area by the acquisition, not only of neighboring territory, but of distant islands of the sea, separated by thousands of miles from our home domain, we may be inclined to think lightly of President Jefferson's scruples concerning the acquisition of lands, not only next adjacent to us, but indisputably necessary to our peace and development.
There were wise men near our President in 1803 who differed with him touching the nation's power to acquire new territory under the original provisions of the Constitution; and these men did not fail to make known their dissent. Moreover, in the Senate, to which the treaty was submitted for confirmation, there was an able discussion of its constitutional validity and effectiveness. The judgment of that body on this phase of the subject was emphatically declared, when out of 31 votes 24 were cast in favor of confirmation. An amendment to the Constitution was afterwards presented to Congress, but its first appearance was its last. It does not appear that the President interested himself in its fate, and it died at the moment of introduction.
While in this day and generation we may wonder at the doubts which so perplexed Jefferson in 1803 and at his estimate of the limitation of our fundamental law, and may be startled when we reflect that if they had been allowed to control his action we might have lost the greatest national opportunity which has been presented to our people since the adoption of the Constitution, we can not fail at the same time to be profoundly grateful that these doubts and this estimate were those of a man sincere enough and patriotic enough to listen to wise and able counselors and to give his country the benefit of his admission of the fallibility of his judgment.
Thomas Jefferson never furnished better evidence of his greatness than when, just before the submission of the treaty to the Senate, he wrote to a distinguished Senator who differed with him on this question: "I confess that I think it important in the present case to set an example against broad construction by appealing for new power to the people. If, however, our friends shall think differently, certainly I shall acquiesce with satisfaction, confiding that the good sense of our country will correct the evil of construction when it shall produce ill effects."
A recent writer on American diplomacy, who is not suspected of partiality for Jeffersonian political doctrine, gave in strong and graceful terms a good reason for our gratitude to-day, when, in referring to this subject, he wrote: "It was fortunate for the future of America that we had at the head of affairs a man of such broad views of our country's future. A less able President, with the same views as entertained by Jefferson as to the constitutionality of the measure would have put aside the opportunity. Jefferson put aside his preconceived views as to the fundamental law; or subordinated them to the will of the nation and welcomed the opportunity to open up the continent to the expansion of American democracy and free institutions."
We are glad at this hour that Jefferson was wrong in his adverse construction of the Constitution and glad that he was liberal minded enough to see that he might be wrong. And yet may we not profitably pause here long enough to contrast in our thoughts the careful and reverent manner in which the restrictions of our fundamental law were scrutinized a hundred years ago with the tendency often seen in later times to flippantly attempt the adjustment of our Constitution to the purposes of interest and convenience?
In conclusion, I hope I may be permitted to suggest that our thoughts and