The Battle of the Rivers. Edmund Dane
target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="#ulink_ed7b99fc-6d87-5733-97df-848dbd66264a">[3] Simon: The Emperor William and his Reign.
[4] This phrase is that of General F. von Bernhardi.
[5] After the Berlin Congress in 1878, Prince Gortschakov mooted the idea of an alliance between Russia and France. In 1879 Bismarck, in view of such a development, concluded the alliance between Germany and Austria. Italy joined this alliance in 1883, but on a purely defensive footing. The account given of the Triple Alliance by Prince Bernhard von Bülow, ex-Imperial Chancellor, is that it was designed to safeguard the Continental interests of the three Powers, leaving each free to pursue its extra-Continental interests. From 1815 to 1878 the three absolutist Powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, had aimed at dominating the politics of the Continent by their entente. For many years, however, German influence in Russia has been giving way before French influence. This is one of the most important facts of modern European history. The Triple Alliance was undoubtedly designed to counteract its effect. Germany, with ambitions in Asia Minor, backed up Austria, with ambitions in the Balkans. Both sets of ambitions were opposed to the interests of Russia. Russia's desertion of the absolutist entente for the existing entente with the liberal Powers of the West has been due nevertheless as much to the growth of constitutionalism as to diplomacy. The entente with Great Britain and France is popular. On the other hand, the entente with Germany and Austria was unpopular. The view here taken that one of the real aims of the Triple Alliance was the furtherance of Prussia's designs against France is the view consistent with the course of Prussian policy. For Prince von Bülow's explanations, see his Imperial Germany.
[6] F. von Bernhardi: The Next War: see Introduction.
[7] Of the remaining corps, five were posted along the frontier of East Prussia to watch the Russians. The rest were held chiefly at Mainz, Coblentz, and Breslau as an initial reserve.
The now definitely ascertained facts regarding the military strength of Germany appear to be these:—
| 25 corps and one division of the active army mustering | 1,530,000 men |
| 21 corps of Landwehr mustering | 1,260,000 men |
| ———— | |
| Total | 2,790,000 men |
In addition, there were raised 12 corps of Ersatz Reserve, and there were also the Landsturm and the Volunteers, whose numerical strength is uncertain. These troops, however, were not embodied until later in the campaign.
[8] The leading army, that of General von Kluck, consisted of 6 corps; and the second army, that of General von Bülow, of 4 corps. The others were formed each of 3 corps, making an original total of 28 corps.
Following the disaster at Liége, however, the army of General von Emmich was divided up, and the view here taken, which appears to be most consistent with the known facts, is that it was, after being re-formed, employed to reinforce the armies of Generals von Kluck and von Bülow. That would make the strength of the German force, which marched through northern Belgium, 780,000 men.
[9] A German army corps is made up, with first reserves, embodied on mobilisation, to 60,000 men. Twenty-eight army corps, therefore, represent a total of 1,680,000 of all arms.
CHAPTER II WHY THE PLANS WERE CHANGED
Let us now pass from designs to events, and, reviewing in their military bearing the operations between August 3, when the German troops crossed the Belgian frontier, to the day, exactly one month later, when the German plans were apparently changed, deal with the question: Why were the plans changed?
The Germans entered Liége on August 10. They had hoped by that time to be, if not at, at any rate close to, Paris. In part they were unable to begin their advance through Belgium until August 17 or August 18, because they had not, until that date, destroyed all the forts at Liége, but in part, also, these delays had played havoc with the details of their scheme.
Consider how the shock of such a delay would make itself felt. The mighty movement by this time going on throughout the length and breadth of Germany found itself suddenly jerked into stoppage. All its couplings clashed. Excellently designed as are the strategic railways of Germany they are no more than sufficient for the transport of troops, guns, munitions, foodstuffs, and other things necessary in such a case. If, owing to delays, troop trains got into the way of food trains, and vice versa, the resultant difficulties are readily conceivable. All this war transport is run on a military time table. The time table was there, and it was complete in every particular. But it had become unworkable. Gradually the tangle was straightened out, but the muddle, while it lasted, was gigantic, and we can well believe that masses of men, arriving from all parts of Germany at Aix-la-Chapelle, found no sufficient supplies awaiting them, and that sheer desperation drove the German Government to collect supplies by plundering all the districts of Belgium within reach. As the Belgians were held to be wilfully responsible for the mess, the cruelty and ferocity shown in these raids ceases to be in any sense unbelievable.
Dislocation of the plan, however, was not all. In the attempts to carry the fortress of Liége by storm the Germans lost, out of the three corps forming the army of General von Emmich, 48,700 men killed and wounded.[10] These corps, troops from Hanover, Pomerania, and Brandenburg, formed the flower of the army. The work had to be carried out of burying the dead and evacuating the wounded. The shattered corps had to be reformed from reserves. All this of necessity meant additional complications.
Then there was the further fighting with the Belgians. What were the losses sustained by the Germans between the assaults on Liége and the occupation of Brussels is, outside of Germany, not known, nor is it known in Germany save to the Government. To put that loss as at least equal to the losses at Liége is, however, a very conservative estimate.
Meanwhile, the French had advanced into Belgium along both banks of the Meuse and that further contributed to upset the great preparation.
We have, therefore, down to August 21, losses, including those in the fighting on the Meuse and in Belgian Luxemburg, probably equal to the destruction of two reinforced army corps.
Now we come to the Battle of Mons and Charleroi, when to the surprise of all non-German tacticians, the attacks in mass formation witnessed at Liége were repeated.
To describe that battle is beyond the scope of this narrative. But it is certain that the estimates so far formed of German losses are below, if not a long way below, the truth.
There is, however, a reliable comparative basis on which to arrive at a computation, and this has a most essential bearing on later events.
At Liége there were three heavy mass attacks against trenches defended by a total force of 20,000 Belgian riflemen with machine guns.[11] We have seen what the losses were. At Mons, against the British forces, there were mass attacks against lines held by five divisions of British infantry, a total roughly of 65,000 riflemen, with machine guns, and backed by over sixty batteries of artillery.
Now, taking them altogether, the British infantry reach,