From Fort Henry to Corinth. M. F. Force
on the transports, returned the fire. Each side was confident that its fire caused great slaughter; but, in fact, little damage was done. The fleet, some distance up-stream, overtook and received on board the Twenty-seventh Illinois, which had become separated from the column, and, instead of returning with it, returned by the road over which the advance was made. The national loss was: in McClernand's brigade, 30 killed, 130 wounded, and 54 missing; in Dougherty's brigade, 49 killed, 154 wounded, and 63 missing; in Taylor's battery, 5 wounded. There were no casualties in the cavalry. The aggregate loss was 79 killed, 289 wounded, and 117 missing; making, in all, 485. Most of the wounded were left behind and taken prisoners. A number of the missing made their way to Cairo. The Seventh Iowa suffered most severely. Among the 26 killed and 80 wounded were the lieutenant-colonel killed, and the colonel and major wounded. Colonel Dougherty, of the Twenty-second Illinois, commanding the second brigade, was wounded and taken prisoner. The Confederate loss was 105 killed, 419 wounded, and 117 missing; in all, 641. Of this aggregate, 562 were from the five regiments originally engaged. Besides the loss in men and the destruction of the camp, forty-five horses were killed.
CHAPTER II.
FORT HENRY.
General A.S. Johnston, on September 17, 1861, sent General S.B. Buckner, who had left Kentucky and entered the Confederate service, to seize and occupy Bowling Green, in Kentucky, with a force of 4,000 men. Bowling Green is at the crossing of the Big Barren River by the Louisville and Nashville road. A little to the south the Memphis and Ohio branches off from the Louisville and Nashville. Bowling Green was therefore a gateway through which all approach to the south from Louisville by rail must pass. There was no access by rail from the Ohio River to the south, east of Bowling Green. The road from Paducah led nowhere. The railroads to the north from Mississippi ended, not on the Ohio, but at Columbus, on the Mississippi. Defensive earthworks had already been begun at Fort Donelson, on the left Bank of the Cumberland, Fort Henry, on the right bank of the Tennessee, twelve miles west of Fort Donelson, and at Columbus, on the Mississippi. General Johnston, with the aid of his engineers, Lieutenant Dixon and Major J.F. Gilmer, afterward General and Chief Engineer of the Confederate army, adopted these sites as places to be strongly fortified. The line from Columbus to Bowling Green became the line chosen to bar access from the North to the South, and to serve as a base for invasion of the North.
The idea of breaking this line by an expedition up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers seems to have presented itself to many. Colonel Charles Whittlesy, of the Twentieth Ohio, a graduate of West Point and formerly in the army, while acting as Chief Engineer on the staff of General O.M. Mitchell in Cincinnati, wrote to General Halleck, November 20, 1861, suggesting a great movement by land and water up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, on the ground that this was the most feasible route into Tennessee, and would necessitate the evacuation of Columbus and the retreat of Buckner from Bowling Green. In December, 1861, General Sherman, conversing with General Halleck, in St. Louis, suggested that the proper place to break the line was the centre, to which Halleck assented, pointing on the map to the Tennessee River, and saying that is the true line of operations. On January 3, 1862, General D.C. Buell, in a letter to General Halleck, proposed a combined attack on the centre and flanks of General Johnston's line, and added: "The attack on the centre should be made by two gunboat expeditions, with, I should say, 20,000 men on the two rivers." General Halleck, writing to General McClellan, January 20, 1862, said a movement down the Mississippi was premature; that a more feasible plan was to move up the Cumberland and Tennessee, making Nashville the objective point, which movement would threaten Columbus and force the abandonment of Bowling Green, adding "but the plan should not be attempted without a large force—not less than 60,000 men." General McClellan, however, thought such a movement should be postponed for the present. He wrote on January 6th, to General Buell, Commander of the Department of the Ohio, which department included all of Kentucky east of the Cumberland River: "My own general plans for the prosecution of the war make the speedy occupation of East Tennessee and its lines of railway matters of absolute necessity. Bowling Green and Nashville are in that connection of very secondary importance at the present moment." General Grant wrote no reasoned speculations about it, but throughout January pressed Halleck for permission to make the attempt.
The Line from Columbus to Bowling Green.
On January 6, 1862, Grant wrote to General Halleck for permission to visit St. Louis. On the same day General Halleck, in pursuance of orders received from General McClellan, who was then in Washington in supreme command of the United States forces, directed General Grant to make a demonstration on Mayfield, in the direction of Murray. He was directed to "make a great fuss about moving all your force toward Nashville," and let it be understood that twenty or thirty thousand men are expected from Missouri. He was further directed to give this out to the newspapers, and not let his own men or even his staff know the contrary. At the same time he was advised that the real object was to prevent reinforcements being sent to Buckner, and charged not to advance far enough to expose his flank or rear to an attack from Columbus, and by all means to avoid a serious engagement. On the 10th, Halleck telegraphed to delay; but Grant was already gone, with McClernand and 6,000 men from Cairo and Bird's Point, and had sent General C.F. Smith from Paducah with two brigades. The troops were out more than a week. The weather was cold, with rain and snow. The excursion was good practice in campaigning for the new volunteers, and detained reinforcements at Columbus while General George H. Thomas fought and won the battle of Mill Springs, in Kentucky.
General Grant, on his return to Cairo, wrote again on January 20th for permission to visit St. Louis. Receiving General Smith's report on the 22d, in which Smith said that the capture of Fort Henry was feasible—that two guns would make short work of it, he at once forwarded the report to St. Louis, and on the same day obtained the permission sought. When he began to unfold the object of his visit, to obtain permission to capture Henry and Donelson, Halleck silenced him so quickly and sharply that he said no more, and returned to Cairo believing his commander thought him guilty of proposing a military blunder. But, persisting still, he telegraphed on the 28th that, if permitted, he would take Fort Henry and establish and hold a camp there. Next day he wrote to the same effect in detail. On the 28th, Commodore A.H. Foote, flag-officer of the gunboat fleet, wrote to General Halleck that he concurred with General Grant, and asking if they had Halleck's authority to move when ready. On January 30th, General Halleck telegraphed to Grant to get ready, and made an order directing him to proceed. The order was received on February 1st, and next day General Grant started up the Tennessee with 17,000 men on transports, convoyed by Commodore Foote with seven gunboats.
The sites of Forts Henry and Donelson were chosen, and the work of fortifying them begun, by the State of Tennessee, when Kentucky was still holding itself neutral. Fort Donelson, immediately below the town of Dover, was a good position, and was near the Kentucky line. The site chosen for Fort Henry commanded a straight stretch of the river for some miles, and was near the State line and near Donelson. But it was low ground, commanded by higher ground on both sides of the river, and was washed by high water. Under the supervision of General A.S. Johnston's engineers, the work had become a well-traced, solidly constructed fortification of earth, with five bastions mounting twelve guns, facing the river, and five guns bearing upon the land. Infantry intrenchments were thrown up on the nearest high land, extending to the river both above and below the main work, and commanding the road to Fort Donelson. A work named Fort Heiman was begun on the bluff on the opposite side of the river, but was incomplete.
General McClernand, commanding the advance, landed eight miles below the fort. General Grant made a reconnoissance in one of the gunboats to draw the fire of the fort and ascertain the range of its guns. Having accomplished this, he re-embarked the landed troops, and debarked on February 4th, at Bailey's Ferry, three miles below the fort and just out of range of its fire. The river overflowed its banks, much of the country was under water; a heavy rain fell. The entire command did not get ashore till in the night of the 5th. In the night, General C.F. Smith was sent across the river to take Fort Heiman, but it was evacuated