The Governments of Europe. Frederic Austin Ogg
technically, by the king with the assent of the magnates at the request of the commoners. The knights and burgesses were recognized as petitioners for laws, rather than as legislators. They could ask for the enactment of a statute, or for a clearer definition of law, but it was for the king and his councillors to determine finally whether legislation was required and what form it should assume. Even when a law which was requested was promised it not infrequently happened that the intent of the Commons was thwarted, for the text of the measure was not drawn up, normally, until after the parliament was dissolved, both form and content were determined arbitrarily by the crown and council, and between petition and statute there might be, and often was, gross discrepancy.
15. Development of the Legislative Process.—By a memorable statute of 1322, in the reign of Edward II., it was stipulated that "the matters which are to be established for the estate of our lord the king and of his heirs, and for the estate of the realm and of the people, shall be treated, accorded, and established in parliaments, by our lord the king, and by the assent of the prelates, earls, and barons, and the commonalty of the realm; according as it hath been before accustomed."[13] This declaration is understood to have established, not only the essentially legislative character of Parliament, but the legislative parity of the commoners with the magnates. It remained, however, to substitute for the right of petition the right of legislating by bill. Throughout the fourteenth century Parliament, and especially the Commons, pressed for an explicit recognition of the principle that the statute in its final form should be identical with the petition upon which it was based. In 1414 Henry V. granted that "from henceforth nothing be enacted to the petitions of his commons that be contrary to their asking, whereby they should be bound without their assent."[14] The promise tended in practice to be evaded, and late in the reign of Henry VI. there was brought about an alteration of procedure in accordance with which measures were henceforth to be introduced in either house, in the form of drafted bills. The legislative process was now essentially reversed. The right of initiative was secured to the Commons, concurrently with the Lords; the crown was restricted to a right of veto or assent. The change in procedure was reflected in a change of formula. Statutes began to be made "by the King's most excellent majesty by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same." And these words comprise the formula with which every act of Parliament to-day begins. Technically, the laws were, and are still, made by the crown; practically Parliament, once merely a petitioning and advising body, had become a full-fledged legislative assemblage.
Throughout the later fourteenth and earlier fifteenth centuries the growth of Parliament in self-assertiveness was remarkable. Twice during the fourteenth century, in 1327 and in 1399, it exercised the fundamental prerogative of deposing the sovereign and of bestowing the crown upon a successor.[15] And before the close of the Lancastrian era it had assumed advanced ground in demanding the right of appropriating (as well as of voting) subsidies, the accounting by the public authorities for moneys expended, the removal of objectionable ministers, and the annual assembling of the two houses. During the civil wars of the second half of the fifteenth century parliamentary aggressiveness and influence materially declined, and at the opening of the Tudor period, in 1485, the body was in by no means the favorable position it had occupied fifty years earlier. As will appear, its eclipse continued largely through the epoch of the Tudors. Yet its broader aspects had been permanently fixed and its perpetuation in the constitutional system positively assured.[16]
V. Administrative and Judicial Development
16. The Permanent Council.—One line, thus, along which were laid the foundations of the English governmental system of to-day comprised the transformation of the Norman Great Council into the semi-aristocratic, semi-democratic assemblage known as Parliament. A parallel line was the development from the Great Council of a body designated after the thirteenth century as the Permanent, after the fifteenth as the Privy, Council, and likewise of the four principal courts of law. By a very gradual process those members of the original Council who were attached in some immediate manner to the court or to the administrative system acquired a status which was different from that of their colleagues. The Great Council met irregularly and infrequently. So likewise did Parliament. But the services of the court and the business of government must go on continuously, and for the care of these things there grew up a body which at first comprised essentially a standing commission, an inner circle, of the Council, but which in time acquired a virtually independent position and was designated, for purposes of distinction, as the Permanent Council. The composition of this body varied from time to time. Certain functionaries were included regularly, while the remaining members owed their places to special summons of the crown. Its powers were enormous, being at the same time administrative, judicial, and financial, and the mass of business to which it was required to give attention was increasingly great.
17. The Courts of Law.—Three things resulted. In the first place, the Permanent Council acquired, in practice, complete detachment from the older and larger body. In the second place, to facilitate the accomplishment of its work there were introduced into it trained lawyers, expert financiers, and men of other sorts of special aptitudes—men, often, who in rank were but commoners. Finally, there split off from the body a succession of committees, to each of which was assigned a particular branch of administrative or judicial business. In this manner arose the four great courts of law: (1) the Court of Exchequer, to which was consigned jurisdiction over all fiscal causes in which the crown was directly concerned; (2) the Court of Common Pleas, with jurisdiction over civil cases between subject and subject; (3) the Court of King's Bench, presided over nominally by the king himself and taking cognizance of a variety of cases for which other provision was not made; and (4) the Court of Chancery, which, under the presidency of the Chancellor, heard and decided cases involving the principles of equity. The differentiation of these tribunals, beginning in the early twelfth century, was completed by the middle of the fourteenth. Technically, all were co-ordinate courts, from which appeal lay to the King in Council; and of the judicial prerogative which the Council as a whole thus retained there are still, as will be pointed out, certain survivals. By the time of Henry VI. (1422–1461) the enlargement of membership and the specialization of functions of the Permanent Council had progressed so far that the Council had ceased entirely to be a working unit. In the end what happened was that, precisely as the Permanent Council had been derived by selection from the original Great Council, so from the overgrown Permanent Council was constituted, in the fifteenth century, a smaller and more compact administrative body to which was assigned the designation of "Privy Council."[17]
VI. The Tudor Monarchy
18. Popular Absolutism.—The salient fact of the Tudor period of English history (1485–1603) is the vigor and dominance of the monarchy. From the Wars of the Roses the nation emerged in need, above all other things, of discipline and repose. It was the part of the Tudors to enforce relentlessly the one and to foster systematically the other. The period was one in which aristocratic turbulence was repressed, extraordinary tribunals were erected to bring to justice powerful offenders, vagrancy was punished, labor was found for the unemployed, trade was stimulated, the navy was organized on a permanent basis, the diffusion of wealth and of education was encouraged, the growth of a strong middle class was promoted—in short, one in which out of chaos was brought order and out of weakness strength. These things were the work of a government which was strongly paternal, even sheerly despotic, and, for a time at least, the evolution of parliamentary machinery was utterly arrested. But it should be observed that the question in sixteenth-century England was not between strong monarchy on the one hand and parliamentary government on the other. The alternatives were, rather, strong monarchy and baronial anarchy. This the nation clearly perceived, and, of the two, it much preferred the former.
"The Tudor monarchy," says an English scholar, "unlike most other despotisms, did not depend on gold or force, on the possession of vast estates, unlimited taxation, or a standing army. It rested on the willing support of the nation at large, a support due to the deeply-rooted conviction that a strong executive was necessary to the national unity, and that, in the face of the dangers which threatened the country both at home and abroad, the sovereign must be allowed a free hand. It was this