History of Sculpture, Painting, and Architecture. J. S. Memes

      INTRODUCTION.

       Table of Contents

      Taste is the perception of intellectual pleasure. Beauty, the object of taste and the source of this pleasure, is appreciated by the understanding, exercised, either upon the productions of art, or upon the works of nature. The term beauty, indeed, has appeared to admit a specific difference of import, according to the diversity of objects in which it may seem to reside, and the supposed variety of means through which it is perceived by the mind. This cause, more than any other, has tended to throw difficulty and inconclusive inference over every department of the subject. Yet, perhaps in all cases, most certainly in every instance of practical importance to our present purpose—elucidation of the Fine Arts, beauty will be found resolvable into some relation discerned and approved by the understanding. Hence the objects in which this relation exists impart pleasure to the mind, on the well known principles of its constitution.

      But in all languages, the word beauty is applied to the results of those operations of the intellectual powers, which are not commonly recognised as appertaining to any province of taste. Thus we speak of the beauty of a theorem, of an invention, of a philosophical system or discovery, as frequently, and with the same propriety, as of a picture or a group of statuary, of a landscape or a building. Correspondent to these objective modes of speech, we find, in every polished idiom, such causative forms as these—a taste for the mathematics, for mechanics, for philology, or science. Now, in these, and similar instances, in which a like manner of expression by the common sentiment of mankind, opposed to the opinion of certain writers, is rightly applied, relations furnishing the specific beauty of the subjects are perceived, and pleasurable emotions are excited. What then constitutes the essential difference between the beautiful in general language, and the beautiful in the fine arts? or, which is identical, the difference between the powers of judgment and of taste? Shall we say with some, that to decide on the relations of truth and falsehood, is the sole province of the judgment or understanding? But in the fine arts, to whose labours, taste, by these philosophers, is confined, truth is beauty, falsehood deformity; hence, to discriminate between even their minutest shades, requires the constant exercise of the most refined taste. Or, shall we maintain with others, that beauty consists in certain arrangements and proportions of the parts to a whole; or in the fitness of means to an end? This, as far as an intelligible description of beauty, applies equally to the pursuits of the philosopher and of the artist. Or, omitting almost innumerable minor theories, shall we say with the philosophy presently accepted, that beauty is something not intrinsic in the beautiful object, but dependent on associations awakened in the mind of the spectator? Without entering now into an examination of this important, because received opinion, we remark, that this definition of beauty, from its associated pleasures, is applicable alike to the deductions of science, to the exercises of imagination, and to the disquisitions of taste. Indeed, as the discoveries of the philosopher, and the truths which he discloses, are both more abiding in their nature, and in their influence more universally important and interesting, it would follow, even on the system of association, that the beauty of scientific truth must be, at least, equally fruitful in pleasurable emotions, as the beauty of any one object in those pursuits to which this system has hitherto been restricted. And that such is actually the case, may be proved by an appeal to the writings and the annals of men of study. The law of gravitation, to take a familiar instance, possesses an essential principle of the beautiful—simplicity. Accordingly, to a mind of any refinement, the abstract contemplation of this theory will ever impart high delight. Yet, how imperfect is the pleasure, and even the beauty, till the mind associates with this simple law, that thereby worlds are governed in their course through boundless space; that by the same discovery, the future generations of rational and immortal beings will be directed in their most useful and loftiest speculations; and to all this magnificence of association, what tender sublimity will be added, by the thought, that the Supreme Father of all has graciously endowed his creatures with powers, and with permission, to discern the secondary laws by which infinite wisdom sees fit to rule in the visible creation!

      Even the holier and lovelier sensibilities awakened by moral beauty, though certainly distinct in principle, are in their influence not easily separable from the pleasures of taste. At least, by the wise and gracious constitution of the human heart, the latter, when unallied with the former, necessarily remain imperfect. Our most exquisite enjoyments in literature and the fine arts will be found to arise from such performances as most directly remind us of virtuous associations; while, in the material world, those scenes prove most delightful which call forth recollections of man's nobleness, or which elevate our contemplations to the power, and wisdom, and goodness of the Creator. In one important point, however, is at once discoverable the independent and higher principle of moral pleasure and beauty. The humble and pious mind may, often does, enjoy the most refined and mental gratification in the exercises of charity and devotion, while the intellectual resources or the adornments of taste are extremely circumscribed. How wise, how salutary, are these appointments! The possessor of the most cultivated perceptions and extensive knowledge, thus feels, if he feel aright, that his acquirements render him only the more dependent upon religion and virtue for his best and purest enjoyments, as also for the dignified estimation of his pursuits. The unlettered but sincere Christian, again, thus knows that his heartful joys suffer not alloy from ignorance of this world's external culture. Both are thus equal; yet each profits by his own peculiar good. The latter is secure against a deprivation imposed by temporal circumstances: the former is paid the toil and self-denial of attainment, by the increased manifestations he is thus enabled to discern of the charms of virtue, and the goodness of Omnipotence.

      The presence and operation of taste can thus be traced in every act of the mind, and are intimately associated with the feelings of our moral nature. The exercises of taste have ever been regarded as productive generally of pleasurable emotion. Hence we consider ourselves justified in defining, at the beginning of this chapter, taste to be 'the perception of intellectual pleasure.' The common use of language, also—an authority always to be respected in tracing the extent or import of ideas—and even the best theories of taste, when rightly understood, coincide with this definition.

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