The History of French Revolution. Taine Hippolyte
2268 (return) [ Ultramontane: Extreme in favoring the Pope's supremacy. (SR.)]
2269 (return) [ Sauzay, I. 168.]
2270 (return) [ Personal knowledge, as I visited Besançon four times between 1863 and 1867.]
2271 (return) [ Moniteur, sitting of May 30, 1790, and others following. (Report of Treilhard, speech by Robespierre.)]
2272 (return) [ Duvergier, laws of July 12th-August 14th; November 14–25, 1790; January 21–26, 1791.]
2273 (return) [ Moniteur, sitting of May 31, 1790. Robespierre, in covert terms, demands the marriage of priests.—Mirabeau prepared a speech in the same sense, concluding that every priest and monk should be able to contract marriage; on the priest or monk presenting himself with his bride before the curé, the latter should be obliged to give them the nuptial benediction etc. Mirabeau wrote, June 2, 1790: "Robespierre … has juggled me out of my motion on the marriage of priests."—In general the germ of all the laws of the Convention is found in the Constituent Assembly. (Ph. Plan, "Un Collaborateur de Mirabeau," p.56, 144.)]
2274 (return) [ Duvergier, laws of November 27th—December 26, 1790; February 5th, March 22nd, and April 5, 1791.—Moniteur, sitting of November 6, 1790, and those that follow, especially that of December 27th. "I swear to maintain with all my power the French Constitution and especially the decrees relating to the Civil Constitution of the clergy."—Cf. sitting of January 2, 1791, speech by the Bishop of Clermont.]
2275 (return) [ Duvergier, law of May 7, 1791, to maintain the right of nonjuring priests to perform mass in national or private edifices. (Demanded by Talleyrand and Sieyès.)]
2276 (return) [ "Archives Nationales," F7, 3235. Letter of M. de Château-Randon, deputy of la Lozère, May 28, 1791. After the decree of May 23rd, all the functionaries of the department handed in their resignations.]
2277 (return) [ Duvergier, law of May 21–29, 1791.]
2278 (return) [ Sauzay, I. 366, 538 to 593, 750.—"Archives Nationales," F7, 3235, Letter of M. de Chânteau-Randon, May 10, 1791.—Mercure, April 23rd, and April 16, 1701. Articles of Mallet du Pan, letter from Bordeaux, March 20, 1791.]
2279 (return) [ Buchez and Roux, XII, 77. Report of Gallois and Gensonné sent to La Vendée and the Deux Sévres (July 25, 1791).—" Archives Nationales," F7, 3253, letter of the Directory of the Bas-Rhin (letter of January 7, 1792).—" Le District de Machecoul de 1788 à 1793," by Lallier.—" Histoire de Joseph Lebon," by Paris.—Sauzay, vol. I. and II. in full.]
2280 (return) [ Mercure, January 15th, April 23rd, May 16th and 30th, June 1st, November 23rd, 1791.—"Le District de Machecoul," by Lallier, 173.—Sauzay, I. 295.—Lavirotte, "Annales d'Arnay-le-Duc" (February 5, 1792).—"Archives Nationales," F7, 3223. Petition of a number of the inhabitants of Montpellier, November 17, 1791.]
2281 (return) [ Duvergier, decree of November 29, 1791.—Mercure, November 30, 1791 (article by Mallet du Pan).]
CHAPTER III. THE CONSTRUCTIONS—THE CONSTITUTION OF 1791.
That which is called a Government is a concert of powers, each with a distinct function, and all working towards a final and complete end. The merit of a Government consists in the attainment of this end; the worth of a machine depends upon the work it accomplishes. The important thing is not to produce a good mechanical design on paper, but to see that the machine works well when set up on the ground. In vain might its founders allege the beauty of their plan and the logical connection of their theorems; they are not required to furnish either plan or theorems, but an instrument.
Two conditions are requisite to render this instrument serviceable and effective. In the first place, the public powers must harmonize with each other, if not, one will neutralize the other; in the second place they must be obeyed, or they are null.
The Constituent Assembly made no provision for securing this harmony or this obedience. In the machine which it constructed the motions all counteract each other; the impulse is not transmitted; the gearing is not complete between the center and the extremities; the large central and upper wheels turn to no purpose; the innumerable small wheels near the ground break or get out of order: the machine, by virtue of its own mechanism, remains useless, over-heated, under clouds of waste steam, creaking and thumping in such a matter as to show clearly that it must explode.
I.—Powers of the Central Government.
The Assembly on the partition of power.—Rupture of every
tie between the Legislature and the King.—The Assembly on
the subordination of the executive power.—How this is
nullified.—Certainty of a conflict.—The deposition of the
King is inevitable.
Let us first consider the two central powers, the Assembly and the King.—Ordinarily when distinct powers of different origin are established by a Constitution, it makes, in the case of conflict between them, a provision for an arbiter in the institution of an Upper Chamber. Each of these powers, at least, has a hold on the other. The Assembly must have one on the King: which is the right to refuse taxation. The King must have one on the Assembly: which is the right of dissolving it. Otherwise, one of the two being disarmed, the other becomes omnipotent, and, consequently, insane. The peril here is as great for an omnipotent Assembly as it is for an absolute King. If the former is desirous of remaining in its right mind, it needs repression and control as much as the latter. If it is proper for the Assembly to restrain the King by refusing him subsidies, it is proper for him to be able to defend himself by appealing to the electors.—But, besides these extreme measures, which are dangerous and rarely resorted to, there is another which is ordinarily employed and is safe, that is, the right for the King to